Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

Salvaging the Biological Design Argument in Light of Darwinism?

It is a common assumption that biological organisms appear as though they were designed. Prior to the Darwinian revolution, the order of biological organisms was often taken as a sign of their divine Creator. It is also commonly argued that Darwinian evolutionary theory as a good explanation for the adaptive complexity of biology reveals this appearance to be merely an illusion. However, in recent philosophical discussion several defenses of the compatibility of divine design and Darwinian evolution have emerged. These defenses insist not only that divine design and evolution are compatible, but even that biological organisms can continue to function as pointers to the Creator, even in a Darwinian cosmos. This article explores and extends these recent arguments. I analyze four different strategies for arguing that the wisdom of the Creator is apparent in biological organisms. The basic underlying assumption is that the products of some larger whole can reflect the rationality and designedness of that whole.     

The Argument from Design: What Is at Stake Theologically?

This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de-sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent and its limits.     

Disagreements Over Analogies

This essay presents a dialogical framework for treating philosophical disagreements as persuasion dialogues with analogical argumentation, with the aim of recasting philosophical disputes as disagreements over analogies. This has two benefits: (1) it allows us to temporarily bypass conflicting metaphysical intuitions by focusing on paradigmatic examples, (dis)similarities, and the plausibility of conclusions for or against a given point of view; and (2) it can reveal new avenues of argumentation regarding a given issue. This approach to philosophical disagreements is illustrated by studying the role of argumentation by analogy in disputes over Lockean justifications of intellectual property rights, and disagreements over whether artificial agents should be treated as moral agents. Finally, a nonexhaustive list of possible global and local points of contention over analogical arguments is identified in order to highlight potential avenues of argumentation in disagreements over analogies.     

Contribution of temporal preparation and processing speed to simple reaction time in persons with Alzheimer’s disease and mild cognitive impairment

Temporal preparation was assessed in 15 Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients, 20 persons with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and 28 healthy older adults. Participants completed a simple reaction time task in which the preparatory interval duration varied randomly within two blocks (short versus long temporal window). Results indicated that AD and MCI patients had difficulty preparing for the shortest preparatory interval of the short temporal window. AD and MCI patients also had difficulty maintaining an optimal level of preparation up to 5 s within the short temporal window. These results suggest that AD and MCI patients might show difficulty preparing for rapidly occurring events and maintaining preparation over time. This phenomenon should be considered when using reaction time measures with such patients.     

司法论证充分性辨析

司法论证充分性问题是一个和法学理论与司法实践都密切相关的问题,各种关于法律论证的争议是和规则治理与纠纷解决两种司法职能的互相冲撞息息相关的。什么样的法律论证才是最合适的,在法律资源有限的情况下,如何运用有限的资源达到司法实践的目的,是各国法制建设的一个永恒话题。文章试图以我国的司法情景为例,从理性思考与现实实践两个层面,展示法官在裁决中所运用的具有地方性知识性质的辅助资源具有实践合理性,说明司法论证应该也必须追求其充分性。     

On Misrepresenting the Thomistic Five Ways

A number of recent discussions of atheism allude to cosmological arguments in support of theism. The five ways of Aquinas are classic instances, offered as rational justification for theistic belief. However, the five ways receive short shrift. They are curtly dismissed as vacuous, arbitrary, and even insulting to reason. I contend that the atheistic critique of the Thomistic five ways, and similarly formulated cosmological arguments, argues at cross purposes because it misrepresents them. I first lay out the context, intent and structure of Aquinas’ arguments, then show in what way recent discussions misrepresent them, and finally conclude with a comment on metaphysical orientation, which I take to be central, not only to a proper understanding of the Thomistic five ways but generally to the debate between atheism and theism on the existence of God.

Falsifiability of political opinions

The concept of "falsifiability," taken from philosophy of science, was applied to the individual's political reasoning. 131 undergraduates, taking a position on the nuclear power issue, estimated: (a) importance attached to factual arguments supporting held opinion, and (b) degree of opinion change evoked by hypothetical disconfirmation of the arguments. The relation between these estimates was analyzed in two respects: (1) the difference served as an indicator of opinion falsifiability, and (2) the correlation served as an indicator of rationality, inasmuch as rationality dictates that disconfirmation of important arguments will evoke a more considerable opinion change than disconfirmation of unimportant arguments. Results showed that nuclear power opponents and subjects holding radically formulated opinions were more reluctant to opinion falsification, whereas degree of involvement in the issue was of no importance. No significant differences in rationality were observed, although additional analyses showed subjects to be more sensitive to disconfirmation of accepted, but opinion contradicting, arguments than to disconfirmation of opinion supporting arguments.     

Two arguments against lying

Kant and Sidgwick are at opposite extremes on whether we may tell paternalistic lies. I trace the extremism to their views about ethical concepts. Sidgwick thinks fundamental ethical concepts must be precise. Common Sense morality says we may tell paternalistic lies to children but not to sane adults. Because the distinction between a child and an adult is imprecise, Sidgwick thinks this principle cannot be fundamental, and must be based on the (precise) principle of utility, which often mandates paternalistic lies to adults. Kant thinks that ethical concepts are ideals of reason, which do not fit the world precisely because the world is imperfect. We lie to children and the insane because they are irrational, but no one is perfectly rational. We must treat all persons with the respect due to rational agents, so the pressure of the theory is toward not lying to anyone. Decisions about where to draw the line must be made pragmatically and to some extent arbitrary. But fear of this is not a good reason to abandon ethical ideals for utilitarianism.