Does performance on the standard antisaccade task meet the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype?

The “co-familiality” criterion for an endophenotype has two requirements: (1) clinically unaffected relatives as a group should show both a shift in mean performance and an increase in variance compared with controls; (2) performance scores should be heritable. Performance on the antisaccade task is one of several candidate endophenotypes for schizophrenia. In this paper we examine whether the various measures of performance on the standard version of the antisaccade task meet the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype. The three measures of performance—reflexive saccade errors, latency of correct antisaccades, and gain—show a wide range of effect sizes and variance ratios as well as evidence of significant or near significant heterogeneity. The estimated mean effect sizes [Cohen’s d: error rate: 0.34 (SD: 0.29); latency: 0.33 (SD: 0.30); gain: 0.54 (SD: 0.38)] are significantly greater than 0, but the magnitude of the departures from 0 is relatively small, corresponding to modest effect sizes. The width of the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated effect sizes (error rate: 0.2–0.49; latency: 0.17–0.50; gain: 0.23–0.85) and the coefficients of variation in effect sizes (error rate: 85.3%; latency: 90.9%; gain: 68.4%) reflect heterogeneity in effect sizes. The effect sizes for error rate showed statistically significant heterogeneity and those for latency (P = .07) and gain (P = .09) showed a trend toward heterogeneity. These results indicate that the effect sizes are not consistent with a single mean and that the average effect size may be a biased estimate of the magnitude of differences in performance between relatives of schizophrenics and controls. Relatives of schizophrenics show a small but significant increase in variance in error rate, but the confidence interval is broad, perhaps reflecting the heterogeneity in effect size. The variance ratios for latency and gain did not differ in relatives of schizophrenics and controls. Performance, as measured by error rate, is moderately heritable. The data do not provide compelling support for a consistent shift in mean or variance in relatives of schizophrenia patients compared with nonpsychiatric controls, both of which are required for a major gene involved in co-familial transmission. This set of findings suggests that although intra-familial resemblance in antisaccade performance is due in part to genetic factors, it may not be related to a schizophrenia genotype. Based on the current literature, it would be premature to conclude that any of the measures of antisaccade performance unambiguously meets the co-familiality criterion for an endophenotype.     

Accuracy of judging others’ traits and states: Comparing mean levels across tests

Tests of accuracy in interpersonal perception take many forms. Often, such tests use designs and scoring methods that produce overall accuracy levels that cannot be directly compared across tests. Therefore, progress in understanding accuracy levels has been hampered. The present article employed several techniques for achieving score equivalency. Mean accuracy was converted to a common metric, pi [Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1989). Effect size estimation for one-sample multiple-choice-type data: Design, analysis, and meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 332–337] in a database of 109 published results representing tests that varied in terms of scoring method (proportion accuracy versus correlation), content (e.g., personality versus affect), number of response options, item preselection, cue channel (e.g., face versus voice), stimulus duration, and dynamism. Overall, accuracy was midway between guessing level and a perfect score, with accuracy being higher for tests based on preselected than unselected stimuli. When item preselection was held constant, accuracy was equivalent for judging affect and judging personality. However, comparisons must be made with caution due to methodological variations between studies and gaps in the literature.     

A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF EVOLUTION AND PARTICIPATION

Recent controversies surrounding the discernment of design in the natural world are an indication of a pervasive disquiet among believers. Can God as creator/sustainer of creation be reconcilable with the belief that God's work is indiscernible behind secondary evolutionary causes? Christian piety requires that the order experienced in the natural world be evidence of God's love and existence. Theistic evolutionary models rarely examine this matter, assuming that God is indiscernible in the processes and order of the world because only secondary causes can be examined. This leaves antievolutionary perspectives to interpret and address the problem of seeing God in the world. I examine these issues in order to gain more credibility for the religious longing to discern God in nature while at the same time affirming the indubitable truth of an evolutionary history. I argue that God's trinitarian nature, hiddenness, and incarnation give us reason to believe that God's presence in the natural world will be discernible, but only within the natural processes, and thereby only in an obscured fashion. I also argue that newer understandings of evolutionary mechanisms are more consistent with theological appropriation than are strictly Darwinian ones.     

Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction

‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James Dreier, David Brink, and others.

自我概念在父母情感关爱与儿童发展间的完全中介效应

运用问卷法,对北京612名中小学生及其父母分别进行了儿童孤独退缩行为、自我概念及父母情感关爱行为测试,运用LISEREL软件对数据的分析结果表明:父母情感关爱行为通过儿童自我概念的完全中介作用,对儿童的孤独退缩行为起到明显的抑制作用;在父母情感关爱行为和儿童学业成就之间,儿童的学业自我概念也起到了明显的完全中介效果.从而支持了儿童自我概念在父母情感关爱与儿童发展间的完全中介地位.     

单侧化准备电位的含义和应用

单侧化准备电位（Lateralized readiness potential, LRP）是指在随意运动中,反应效应器方位所对应的对侧大脑皮层出现的准备电位。LRP分析的关键是确定启动时间点。LRP可以揭示刺激-反应不同阶段的认知加工时间特性。可以从反应准备的抽象性或具体性以及大脑控制运动输出的“中枢”机制或“外周”机制这两个思路去验证LRP。LRP在阈下知觉和内隐学习、运动准备和反应执行、西蒙效应等方面的认知心理学研究以及新兴的脑-机界面工程心理学研究得到了广泛的应用,但LRP的应用存在着某些限制因素,如：脑电干扰、测量的低信噪比和其本身对反应效应器的要求等     

Functions and Health at the Interface of Biology and Technology

Synthetic biology promises to eliminate the distinction between biology and engineering by delivering a philosophically interesting new kind of entity: a biological organism that is wholly designed and constructed by humans. The possibility of such organisms raises interesting questions in three domains: the analysis of (1) biological functions, (2) engineering functions, and (3) health and disease. This paper identifies and systematically answers these questions. This does not only establish how we should think about functions and health and disease in synthetic biological organisms, but it also reveals insights that are of broader relevance: (1) aetiological accounts of biological function need to omit or reinterpret reference to natural selection. This results in complete continuity between aetiological analyses of function in engineering and philosophy; (2) considering synthetic biology prompts interesting further questions about heritability, ancestry, and biological individuals; and (3) accounts of disease as biological dysfunction do not straightforwardly map onto our intuitive health and disease judgments regarding non-human animals. In response to the latter point I examine three possible avenues, and tentatively defend one on behalf of the ‘disease as dysfunction’ theorist.     

The functional equivalence of problem solving skills

The tower of Hanoi problem is used to show that, even in simple problem environments, numerous distinct solution strategies are available, and different subjects may learn different strategies. Four major classes of solution strategies are described for the problem. Different strategies have different degrees of transferability, place different burdens on short-term memory and on perception, and require different learning processes for their acquisition. The analysis underscores the importance of subject-by-subject analysis of “what is learned” in understanding human behavior in problem-solving situations, and provides a technique for describing subjects' task performance programs in detail.