So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

Natural Selection and Design: Comments on Michael Ruse's New Book

Is the adaptive complexity of living organisms the result of evolutionary processes alone? or does it give evidence of intentional design? Michael Ruse appears to argue that we can have it either way. As a scientist I find the argument from design unnecessary. Yet it has great appeal to humans, whose behavior is largely intentional and who look for patterns in events and for the intentions that may have produced them.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Faith and reason and physician-assisted suicide.

Aquinas's conception of the relationship of faith and reason calls into question the arguments and some of the conclusions advanced in contributions to the debate on physician-assisted suicide by David Thomasma and H. Tristram Engelhardt. An understanding of the nature of theology as based on revelation calls into question Thomasma's theological argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide based on the example of Christ and the martyrs. On the other hand, unaided reason calls into question his assumptions about the nature of death as in some cases a good for the human person. Finally, if Aquinas is right about the relationship of faith and reason, Engelhardt's sharp contrast between "Christian" and "secular" approaches to physician-assisted suicide needs reconsideration, although his conclusions about physician-assisted suicide would find support.     

Weigh(t)ing for Awareness

We wished to learn if weight perception can be extinguished by studying two patients with right hemisphere brain damage. When lifting weights simultaneously, a patient with right frontal damage was not biased in her judgments of which weight was heavier. By contrast, a patient with right parietal damage reported left-sided weights as being lighter than those on the right. Psychophysical power functions revealed that her awareness of increasing weights on the left was dampened compared to the right when lifting weights individually on each side. Strikingly, her awareness of weight changes on the left was completely abolished when she lifted weights in both hands simultaneously. She demonstrated an unusual split in awareness, being motorically aware of and actively engaged with left-sided weights while being unaware of their incremental changes.     

授权的测量及其与员工工作态度的关系

首先，对Spreitzer的授权量表在中国文化背景下的适用性进行了检验，3家企业395份调查问卷的探索性因素分析和内部一致性分析表明，授权量表具有较好的效度和信度；20家企业942份调查问卷的验证性因素分析和内部一致性分析进一步验证了授权量表的效度和信度，这表明Spreitzer的授权四维模型在中国得到了验证，其编制的授权量表在中国具有较强的适用性。然后，利用20家企业942份调查问卷的结果，采用结构方程模型技术对授权与员工满意度、组织承诺、离职意向与工作倦怠等员工工作态度变量之间的关系进行了交叉验证分析，结果表明，工作意义对员工满意度与组织承诺有正向的影响，对离职意向与工作倦怠有负向的影响；自主性对员工满意度与组织承诺有正向的影响；自我效能对组织承诺有正向的影响     

Traffic Offences: Planned or Habitual? Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour and habit strength to explain frequency and magnitude of speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol

This study addresses the socio‐cognitive determinants of traffic offences, in particular of speeding and drinking and driving. It has two aims: (1) to test the hypothesis of a direct effect of habits on offences (i.e., independent of intentions) by employing a specific measure of habits (i.e., the SRIH) and (2) to analyse the offences by taking account of three distinct parameters: Frequency, usual magnitude (i.e., the most frequent deviation from the law) and maximal magnitude (i.e., the greatest deviation occasionally adopted) in order to represent more accurately the variability of the offending behaviours. A total of 642 drivers replied to a questionnaire. The results corroborate the idea that intention and habit are distinct and direct determinants of offences. The use of the SRIH dismisses the criticisms made with regard to the measure of past behaviour. The distinction between the three behavioural parameters proves to be relevant, as their determinants are not exactly similar. Finally, attitude and subjective norm had direct effects on the maximal magnitude and/or on the frequency of the offence. The discussion concerns the contribution of this study to the analysis of offences as well as its limitations and addresses the theoretical plausibility of the direct effects of attitude and the subjective norm.     

Does retrieval intentionality really matter? Similarities and differences between involuntary memories and directly and generatively retrieved voluntary memories

Theories of autobiographical memory distinguish between involuntary and voluntary retrieval as a consequence of conscious intention (i.e., wanting to remember). Another distinction can be made between direct and generative retrieval, which reflects the effort involved (i.e., trying to remember). However, it is unclear how intention and effort interacts. For example, involuntary memories and directly retrieved memories have been used interchangeably in the literature to refer to the same phenomenon of effortless, non‐strategic retrieval. More recent theoretical advances suggest that they are separate types of retrieval, one unintentional (involuntary), another intentional and effortless (direct voluntary retrieval), and a third intentional and effortful (generative voluntary retrieval). Whether this also entails differing phenomenological characteristics, such as vividness, rehearsal, or emotional valence, has not been previously investigated. In the current study, participants reported memories in an experimental paradigm designed to elicit voluntary and involuntary memories and rated them on a number of characteristics. If intention affects the retrieval process, then we should expect differences between the characteristics of involuntary and directly retrieved memories. The results imply that retrieval intention seems to differentiate how a memory appears in a person's mind. Furthermore, we argue that these differences in part could result from differences in encoding and consolidation.     

Individual social capital and the implementation of entrepreneurial intentions: The case of Russia

The current research hypothesized that individual social capital facilitates the implementation of one's intention to start a business. The research samples were drawn from a sample of 2061 adult respondents: a sub‐sample of 269 adults who stated their intention to start their own business during the next two years (‘intenders’) and a matching sub‐sample of 270 who said they did not intend to do so (‘non‐intenders’). The study shows that the ‘intenders’ possessed greater individual social capital. These resources had a positive indirect impact (through increased perceived behavioural control and attitude) on their intention to start their own business.     

Expertise in soccer teams: A thematic inquiry into the role of Shared Mental Models within team chemistry

AimsThe purpose of the current study was to establish a conceptual framework of team chemistry components in sport with an emphasis on Shared Mental Models (SMM).MethodElite soccer coaches (n = 6) and players (n = 3) were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide. An inductive thematic analysis was employed to analyze the data.ResultsFour themes related to team chemistry components were identified: (1) members' characteristics (i.e., demographic data, on-field characteristics, and member's ego), (2) coach–players interactions (i.e., professional interaction and emotional intelligence of coaches), (3) interactions among the players (i.e., professional understanding, efficacy beliefs, team cohesion, players' emotional intelligence, team roles, and goals), and (4) interactions with environmental factors (i.e., owners, management, fans, and media).ConclusionsThe cognitive components of the team chemistry model were clustered to establish a conceptual framework of SMM. Furthermore, the cognitive-affective-social-behavioral linkage of team chemistry and athletic performance is examined in light of the emerged model and conceptual framework. Implications and future directions are also discussed.