Vicarious goal satiation

A signature feature of self-regulation is that once a goal is satiated, it becomes deactivated, thereby allowing people to engage in new pursuits. The present experiments provide evidence for vicarious goal satiation, a novel phenomenon in which individuals experience “post-completion goal satiation” as a result of unwittingly taking on another person's goal pursuit and witnessing its completion. In Experiments 1 and 2, the observation of a goal being completed (vs. not completed) led to less striving by the observer on the same task. Given that an actor's strength of commitment affects goal contagion, we hypothesized that such commitment would be an important boundary condition for vicarious goal satiation. The results of Experiment 2 showed that observing stronger (vs. weaker) goal commitment lowered accessibility of goal-related words, but only when the goal being observed was completed. Implications of vicarious goal satiation for goal pursuit in everyday environments are discussed.     

Are there unconscious perceptual processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of unconscious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and colleagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dorsal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious perceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information processing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I conclude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes.     

What are self-generated actions?

The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by [Passingham et al., 2010a] and [Passingham et al., 2010b] . There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining ‘self-generated’ by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.     

Naïve definitions of action and inaction: The continuum,spread, and valence of behaviors

The cohesiveness of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their daily activities with respect to the goals of that society. Hence, there should be a degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. The present research investigated the structure of action and inaction definitions, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and individual differences in these evaluations. Action–inaction ratings of behaviors and states showed more social agreement at the ends of the inaction–action continuum than at the middle, suggesting a socially shared construal of this definition. Action–inaction ratings were also shown to correlate with the valence of the rated behaviors, such that the more active the behavior, the more positive its valence. Lastly, individual differences in locomotion, need for closure, and Christian religious beliefs correlated positively with a preference for action. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating a research agenda in career counselling: the place of action theory

After identifying historical and current problems in career counselling research, we propose a research agenda based on contextual action theory. This theory has been used as a framework for research in the career field and for general counselling practice. It is advantageous for several reasons including its conceptual basis, its detailed qualitative and quantitative research method, and the significant link it provides between research and practice. It is supported by the action-project method, an integrated set of procedures developed for conducting research. Contextual action theory and the action-project method can address major emerging issues in career counselling, for example the place of emotion and the use of narrative, and advance the research agenda in this field.     

Conceptual agreement theory

For some time now, psychological inquiry on reference has assumed that reference is achieved through causal links between words and entities (i.e., direct reference). In this view, meaning is not relevant for reference or co-reference. We argue that this view may be germane to concrete objects, but not to diffuse objects (that lack clear spatio-temporal limits, thus preventing the use of direct reference in interactions). Here, we propose that meaning is the relevant dimension when referring to diffuse entities, and introduce Conceptual Agreement Theory (CAT). CAT is a mathematized theory of meaning that specifies the conditions under which two individuals (or one individual at two points in time) will infer they share a diffuse referent. We present the theory, and use stereotype stability and public opinion as case studies to illustrate the theory’s use and scope.     

Persisting or Withdrawing? An Insight into the Psychosocial Processes Underlying Sustained Engagement

The study explored the roles of commitment, emotional stress, and interpersonal relationships in sustaining individuals' engagement in collective action. Two collective action cases, differing in duration, issue, and territorial rootedness, were analyzed. The processes underlying sustained engagement were probed in 32 semistructured interviews conducted with antiglobalization activists (N = 13) and opponents to a high‐speed railroad (N = 19). Our findings showed that collective action can be stressful, but that there are proximal and distal factors that can counterbalance the disruption and sustain engagement. The proximal factors are embedded in the circumstances of involvement, and these factors concern interpersonal relationships, organizational mechanisms, and the psychological interface between the individuals and the concrete collective action environment. The distal factors are related partly to the individual and partly to the broader community from which the individual absorbs general values and norms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Couples' cultural values, shared parenting, and family emotional climate within Mexican American families

This study tested a model of shared parenting as its centerpiece that incorporates cultural values as predictors and family emotional climate as the outcome variable of interest. We aimed to assess the predictive power of the Mexican cultural values of familismo and simpatia over couples' shared parenting practices. We anticipated that higher levels of shared parenting would predict family emotional climate. The participants were 61 Mexican American, low income couples, with at least one child between 3 and 4 years of age, recruited from a home-based Head Start program. The predictive model demonstrated excellent goodness of fit, supporting the hypothesis that a positive emotional climate within the family is fostered when Mexican American couples practice a sufficient level of shared parenting. Empirical evidence was previously scarce on this proposition. The findings also provide evidence for the role of cultural values, highlighting the importance of family solidarity and avoidance of confrontation as a pathway to shared parenting within Mexican American couples.