People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift. 相似文献
This paper presents Automath encodings (which are also valid in LF/λP) of various kinds of foundations of mathematics. Then it compares these encodings according to their size, to find out which foundation is the simplest.
The systems analyzed in this way are two kinds of set theory (ZFC and NF), two systems based on Church's higher order logic (Isabelle/Pure and HOL), three kinds of type theory (the calculus of constructions, Luo's extended calculus of constructions, and Martin-Löf's predicative type theory) and one foundation based on category theory.
The conclusions of this paper are that the simplest system is type theory (the calculus of constructions), but that type theories that know about serious mathematics are not simple at all. In that case the set theories are the simplest. If one looks at the number of concepts needed to explain such a system, then higher order logic is the simplest, with twenty-five concepts. On the other side of the scale, category theory is relatively complex, as is Martin-Löf's type theory.
(The full Automath sources of the contexts described in this paper are one the web at http://www.cs.ru.nl/~freek/zfc-etc/.) 相似文献
Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development
of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a
structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory
depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are
dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely
autonomous from set theory. 相似文献
The relationship between creativity and executive control has long been controversial. Some researchers view creative thinking as a defocused process with little executive control involvement, whereas others claim that executive control plays a vital role in creative thinking. In this study, we focused on one subcomponent of executive control, cognitive shifting, and examined its relationship with creativity by using latent variable analysis and structural equation modeling. We also analyzed whether this relation was mediated by intelligence. The results showed that: (a) cognitive shifting ability had a positive relationship with creativity, but only on the quantitative aspects (fluency and flexibility); (b) Intelligence had a positive relationship with both quantitative and qualitative aspects (originality) of creativity, and its effect on qualitative aspect was stronger than that on the quantitative aspect; (c) There was a mediating effect of intelligence on the relationship between creativity cognitive and shifting. 相似文献
Competent speakers of natural languages can borrow reference from one another. You can arrange for your utterances of ‘Kirksville’
to refer to the same thing as my utterances of ‘Kirksville’. We can then talk about the same thing when we discuss Kirksville. In cases like this, you borrow “aboutness” from me by borrowing reference. Now
suppose I wish to initiate a line of reasoning applicable to any prime number. I might signal my intention by saying, “Let
p be any prime.” In this context, I will be using the term ‘p’ to reason about the primes. Although ‘p’ helps me secure the aboutness of my discourse, it may seem wrong to say that ‘p’ refers to anything. Be that as it may, this paper explores what mathematical discourse would be like if mathematicians were
able to borrow freely from one another not just the reference of terms that clearly refer, but, more generally, the sort of
aboutness present in a line of reasoning leading up to a universal generalization. The paper also gives reasons for believing
that aboutness of this sort really is freely transferable. A key implication will be that the concept “set of natural numbers”
suffers from no mathematically significant indeterminacy that can be coherently discussed. 相似文献