Why Combine Logics?

Combining logics has become a rapidly expanding entreprise that is inspired mainly by concerns about modularity and the wish to join together tailor made logical tools into more powerful but still manageable ones. A natural question is whether it offers anything new over and above existing standard languages.By analysing a number of applications where combined logics arise, we argue that combined logics are a potentially valuable tool in applied logic, and that endorsements of standard languages often miss the point. Using the history of quantified modal logic as our main example, we also show that the use of combined structures and logics is a recurring theme in the analysis of existing logical systems.     

Notes for a dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience1

The author postulates that the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience is based on the assumption that both deal with virtual structures. They are two facets of the same noumenal reality, but with different phenomenal realities, and it is possible to use metapsychology as a lingua franca to develop communication between the two fi elds. In the second part of the paper, the author refl ects on the results of recent neurophysiological research which seem to offer to psychoanalysis possibilities for fi nding an anatomical‐physiological correlate of some well‐known psychic phenomena and mechanisms, such as imitation, introjection, identifi cation, empathy, identity, mother‐child communication, learning, social communication and the analyst‐patient relationship. Particular neurons, called mirror neurons, have been located in the F5 area of baboons' brains. They are also present in man's brain within Broca's area. These neurons activate our motor system during both the performance of actions and the observation of actions performed by others giving rise to an automatic response, a sort of simulation or, rather, imitation, as the process is not intentional, but automatic and unaware, that is, unconscious.     

Identity,Indiscernibility, and Philosophical Claims

The concept of indiscernibility in a structure is analysed with the aim of emphasizing that in asserting that two objects are indiscernible, it is useful to consider these objects as members of (the domain of) a structure. A case for this usefulness is presented by examining the consequences of this view to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory.     

Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures

Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).     

The repetition-break plot structure: a cognitive influence on selection in the marketplace of ideas

Using research into learning from sequences of examples, we generate predictions about what cultural products become widely distributed in the social marketplace of ideas. We investigate what we term the Repetition-Break plot structure: the use of repetition among obviously similar items to establish a pattern, and then a final contrasting item that breaks with the pattern to generate surprise. Two corpus studies show that this structure arises in about a third of folktales and story jokes. An experiment shows that jokes with this structure are more interesting than those without the initial repetition. Thus, we document evidence for how a cognitive factor influences the cultural products that are selected in the marketplace of ideas.     

Recovering a Probabilistic Knowledge Structure by Constraining its Parameter Space

In the Basic Local Independence Model (BLIM) of Doignon and Falmagne (Knowledge Spaces, Springer, Berlin, 1999), the probabilistic relationship between the latent knowledge states and the observable response patterns is established by the introduction of a pair of parameters for each of the problems: a lucky guess probability and a careless error probability. In estimating the parameters of the BLIM with an empirical data set, it is desirable that such probabilities remain reasonably small. A special case of the BLIM is proposed where the parameter space of such probabilities is constrained. A simulation study shows that the constrained BLIM is more effective than the unconstrained one, in recovering a probabilistic knowledge structure.     

Standard errors of fit indices using residuals in structural equation modeling

The asymptotic standard errors of the correlation residuals and Bentler's standardized residuals in covariance structures are derived based on the asymptotic covariance matrix of raw covariance residuals. Using these results, approximations of the asymptotic standard errors of the root mean square residuals for unstandardized or standardized residuals are derived by the delta method. Further, in mean structures, approximations of the asymptotic standard errors of residuals, standardized residuals and their summary statistics are derived in a similar manner. Simulations are carried out, which show that the asymptotic standard errors of the various types of residuals and the root mean square residuals in covariance, correlation and mean structures are close to actual ones.The author is indebted to the reviewers for their comments and suggestions which have led to an improvement of this work.     

Truth in Applicative Theories

We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID₁ in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.     

Chunk hierarchies and retrieval structures: Comments on Saariluoma and Laine

The empirical results of Saariluoma and Laine are discussed and their computer simulations are compared with CHREST, a computational model of perception, memory and learning in chess. Mathematical functions such as power functions and logarithmic functions account for Saariluoma and Laine's correlation heuristic and for CHREST very well. However, these functions fit human data well only with game positions, not with random positions. As CHREST, which learns using spatial proximity, accounts for the human data as well as Saariluoma and Laine's correlation heuristic, their conclusion that frequency-based heuristics match the data better than proximity-based heuristics is questioned. The idea of flat chunk organisation and its relation to retrieval structures is discussed. In the conclusion, emphasis is given to the need for detailed empirical data, including information about chunk structure and types of errors, for discriminating between various learning algorithms.     

Ultimate Questions of Science and the Theory of System Relations

Summary  Whenever an adequate theory is found in science, we will still be left with two questions: why this theory rather than some other theory, and how should this theory be interpreted? I argue that these questions can be answered by a theory of system relations. The basic idea is that fundamental characteristics of systems, viz. those arising from the general systemic nature of those systems, cannot be comprehended with the aid of discipline-specific methods. The systems theory required should commence with an analysis of the qualitatively different relations possible between systems, because it is precisely the nature of those relations that determines the basic structures of systems. That the theory of the fundamental system relations and their ontological and epistemological implications is indeed able to provide the answers sought is demonstrated in theoretical physics and Plessner’s analysis of the basic structures of plant, animal and human being.