在不同注意定向条件下是否出现返回抑制的知觉优先

返回控制中的知觉优先是指相对于非线索化位置,线索化位置的刺激被优先知觉到的现象。研究采用时序判断方法对不同注意定向下返回抑制的知觉优先现象进行了两个实验。实验１采用连续线索化的安排,发现当注意从线索化位置移开后知觉优先仍然存在;实验２采用同时呈现双线索的安排发现知觉优先也存在。     

时距知觉的心理学研究

本文回顾了近五十年来时距知觉的实验研究,对不同的理论模型、实验范式、实验方法以及主要时距判断规律作了较全面的评述,并进一步探讨了时距知觉研究未来的发展。     

Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.     

College students' responding to and rating of contingency relations: The role of temporal contiguity

Two experiments investigated the role of temporal contiguity in college students' responding to and rating of contingency relations during operant conditioning. Schedules were devised that determined when but not whether appetitive or aversive events would occur. Subjects' reports concerning the schedules were obtained by means of a 200-point rating scale, anchored by the phrases “prevents the light from occurring” (−100) and “causes the light to occur” (+100). When tapping a telegraph key advanced the time of point gain, responding was maintained or increased and subjects gave positive ratings. When tapping a telegraph key advanced the time of point loss, subjects also gave positive ratings, but responding now decreased. When key tapping delayed the time of point gain, responding decreased and subjects gave negative ratings. When key tapping delayed the time of point loss, subjects also gave negative ratings, but responding now increased. These findings implicate response-outcome contiguity as an important contributor to causal perception and to reinforcement and punishment effects. Other accounts—such as those stressing the local probabilistic relation between response and outcome or the molar correlation between response rate and outcome rate—were seen to be less preferred interpretations of these and other results.     

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception,spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.     

The more the better – But more of which? Information quantity and shared meaning as predictors of consistency and accuracy in person judgment

This study investigates the consistency and accuracy of person judgments at zero acquaintance in two conditions: Targets were judged repeatedly across a sequence of videotaped situations, either (a) by different observers in each situation, or (b) by the same observer in all situations. Replicating previous research, accuracy increased (inversely accelerated) when including additional situations rated by different observers. However, much of this increase was owed to improved inter-rater reliability (a confound in previous research). Also, cross-situational consistency of judgments was much higher when all ratings came from the same observer. These results underscore the crucial influence of shared meaning on judgment accuracy and consistency.