The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

The Community Story,Relationality and Process: Bridging Tools for Researching Local Knowledge in a Peri‐urban Township

In intervening in social challenges impacting local communities, Western forms of dispute/conflict resolution have been critiqued for imparting norms, values and practices that marginalise worldviews of indigenous people. From a decolonizing stance, indigenous scholars have emphasised the need for recovery of ‘lost’ values, beliefs and practices to advance indigenous knowledge. We highlight some of the conceptual challenges associated with applying ‘indigenous knowledge’ and culture‐specific ‘indigenous methodologies’ to a marginalised peri‐urban, ethnically plural township community situated on the outskirts of Johannesburg, South Africa. In embracing the mutuality of indigenous and Western knowledge forms, we explore three elements: the community story, relationality and process in relation to initial engagements with our study community. We attempt to transcend the dualism between ‘Western’ epistemologies and ‘indigenous knowledge’ through these ‘bridging concepts’. What is offered is not a formula or model but an orientation that aims to foster mutual learning through collaborative partnerships within and between communities and researchers with a view to inspiring possibilities for creative and meaningful solutions for violence prevention and dispute/conflict resolution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Team adaptation to an unforeseen system failure: Limits of the potential aids of shared knowledge and standardized communication

The present study investigates the potential benefits of a team’s shared knowledge and standardized communication in adapting to an unforeseen change by combining literature on adaptation and team performance. Each of 20 teams performed a dynamic team task and was suddenly confronted with a simulated partial system breakdown. Results show that a methodological framework designed to describe performance adaptation to an unforeseen change in individuals can also be used to model performance adaptation in teams. The system failure was followed by a performance drop and a subsequent period of gradual performance recovery. Accuracy of teams’ shared knowledge correlated positively with performance before and after the change, confirming and extending the literature on shared mental models. However, the amount of knowledge similarity did not aid teams in adapting to the unforeseen system breakdown. In addition, improving teams’ standardized communication had no damping effect on the sudden performance drop and neither helped them during the subsequent recovery period. These results show that even though shared knowledge and efficient communication are of high value to team performance and success, these characteristics are limited in aiding adaptive team performance after unforeseen unique changes that force team members to update their strategies.     

How are overlapping time intervals perceived? Evidence for a weighted sum of segments model

This study investigated the way in which people time two overlapping intervals. Timing models already proposed in the literature predict different effects of the degree of overlap on each estimate, and empirical findings were compared to these predictions. Two unimodal experiments (in which each to-be-timed interval was a visual stimulus) and one bimodal experiment (in which one to-be-timed interval was auditory and the other visual) were conducted. The estimate of the first interval was either unaffected or decreased, and the estimate of the second interval consistently increased as the intervals were more temporally separated. The only model in the literature that could account for such result patterns is a single pacemaker single accumulator structure with an additional recency weighting (see the weighted sum of segments model). That is, participants appear to segment the two overlapping intervals into three non-overlapping and overlapping segments, time these segments separately, and then combine them to estimate each interval. Importantly, a recency weighting, determined by the time that has passed since the end of that segment, is also applied to each segment in the summation process. Further, in the bimodal experiment the order in which the stimuli of different modalities were presented affected the way in which they were timed, a finding that none of the current models can explain. This highlights that a comprehensive model of interval timing must consider not only the modalities of to-be-timed intervals but also the order in which different modalities must be timed.     

How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task

To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180° rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available for this article at     

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.     

Spatial knowledge acquisition from direct experience in the environment: individual differences in the development of metric knowledge and the integration of separately learned places

Existing frameworks for explaining spatial knowledge acquisition in a new environment propose either stage-like or continuous development. To examine the spatial microgenesis of individuals, a longitudinal study was conducted. Twenty-four college students were individually driven along two routes in a previously unfamiliar neighborhood over 10 weekly sessions. Starting Session 4, they were also driven along a short connecting route. After each session, participants estimated spatial properties of the routes. Some participants' knowledge improved fairly continuously over the sessions, but most participants either manifested accurate metric knowledge from the first session or never manifested accurate metric knowledge. Results are discussed in light of these large individual differences, particularly with respect to the accuracy and development of integrated configurational knowledge.     

Learning of letter names and sounds and their contribution to word recognition

This study investigated knowledge of letter names and letter sounds, their learning, and their contributions to word recognition. Of 123 preschoolers examined on letter knowledge, 65 underwent training on both letter names and letter sounds in a counterbalanced order. Prior to training, children were more advanced in associating letters with their names than with their sounds and could provide the sound of a letter only if they could name it. However, children learned more easily to associate letters with sounds than with names. Training just on names improved performance on sounds, but the sounds produced were extended (CV) rather than phonemic. Learning sounds facilitated later learning of the same letters' names, but not vice versa. Training either on names or on sounds improved word recognition and explanation of printed words. Results are discussed with reference to cognitive and societal factors affecting letter knowledge acquisition, features of the Hebrew alphabet and orthography, and educational implications.     

Dynamic categorization and slot-filler representation in 4- and 6-year-old children

This experiment was aimed at studying both the role of narrow/contextualized categories in the acquisition/organization of conceptual knowledge and the dynamics of categorization decisions. A forced-choice categorization task contrasting thematic and taxonomic responding was used in 4- and 6-year-old children. Before response alternatives were presented, a conceptual organization was pre-activated by means of a matching between the target stimulus and a thematically related, taxonomically related or slot-filler related object. Although taxonomic sorting was prominent overall, it varied as a function of age and of the nature of the pre-activated relation. Responses in accordance with the thematic or taxonomic activations occurred similarly in 4- and 6-year-old children. Age-related effects were however at work in the case of a slot-filler activation: 4-year-old children considered the contextual/contiguity relations between the stimuli but did not weight the equivalence relations (i.e., same occurrence of responses based on the kind of object in the slot-filler and in the thematic activation conditions). More diversified processes appeared to be at work in 6-year-old children. Slot-filler categories were this time considered throughout both their contextual/contiguity structure and their equivalence relations. Results were discussed in terms of availability of conceptual organizations, flexibility abilities, dynamic categorization and preferences. The focus was on implication of slot-filler representations in the construction of conceptual knowledge and in the development of categorization. An important point was to determine whether the age-related changes observed in the slot-filler activation condition could be consistent with Nelson's ( 1983 ) idea that slot-fillers would help passing from a schema-based to a conventional superordinate organization.