Generalization of skills between operant control and discrimination of EEG alpha

While biofeedback is often said to increase self-control of physiological states by increasing awareness of their subjective correlates, relatively few studies have analyzed the relationship between control (standard biofeedback) and awareness (a discrimination paradigm). We hypothesized that the two skills would generalize and facilitate each other for 8–12 Hz EEG amplitude (alpha). Participants were given 7 sessions of training to either control or discriminate Pz alpha followed by 3 sessions of the other paradigm. Another group was given 7 sessions with time divided equally between the two types of training. The control-training first group showed significant generalization of skills to the discrimination task. However, the reverse was not true, and the combined task group did no better in either task than the other two groups. These results provide ambivalent support for the role of awareness in biofeedback, and suggest possible improvements in the discrimination paradigm.     

Reducing postural sway by concurrently performing challenging cognitive tasks

The present experiment varied cognitive complexity and sensory modality on postural control in young adults. Seventeen participants (23.71 ± 1.99 years) were instructed to stand feet together on a force platform while concurrently performing cognitive tasks of varying degrees of difficulty (easy, moderate and difficult). The cognitive tasks were presented both, auditorily and visually. Auditory tasks consisted of counting the occurrence of one or two letters and repeating a string of words. Visual tasks consisted of counting the occurrence of one or two numbers. With increasing cognitive demand, area of 95% confidence ellipse and ML sway variability was significantly reduced. The visual tasks reduced ML sway variability, whereas the auditory tasks increased COP irregularity. We suggest that these findings are primarily due to an increase in sensorimotor integration as a result of a shift in attentional focus.     

A teleological account of Cartesian sensations?

Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have.     

Crossmodal change blindness between vision and touch

Change blindness is the name given to people's inability to detect changes introduced between two consecutively-presented scenes when they are separated by a distractor that masks the transients that are typically associated with change. Change blindness has been reported within vision, audition, and touch, but has never before been investigated when successive patterns are presented to different sensory modalities. In the study reported here, we investigated change detection performance when the two to-be-compared stimulus patterns were presented in the same sensory modality (i.e., both visual or both tactile) and when one stimulus pattern was tactile while the other was presented visually or vice versa. The two to-be-compared patterns were presented consecutively, separated by an empty interval, or else separated by a masked interval. In the latter case, the masked interval could either be tactile or visual. The first experiment investigated visual-tactile and tactile-visual change detection performance. The results showed that in the absence of masking, participants detected changes in position accurately, despite the fact that the two to-be-compared displays were presented in different sensory modalities. Furthermore, when a mask was presented between the two to-be-compared displays, crossmodal change blindness was elicited no matter whether the mask was visual or tactile. The results of two further experiments showed that performance was better overall in the unimodal (visual or tactile) conditions than in the crossmodal conditions. These results suggest that certain of the processes underlying change blindness are multisensory in nature. We discuss these findings in relation to recent claims regarding the crossmodal nature of spatial attention.     

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing.     

Insights into a molecular switch that gates sensory neuron synapses during habituation in Aplysia

This review focuses on synaptic depression at sensory neuron-to-motor neuron synapses in the defensive withdrawal circuit of Aplysia as a model system for analysis of molecular mechanisms of sensory gating and habituation. We address the following topics:1. Of various possible mechanisms that might underlie depression at these sensory neuron-to-motor neuron synapses in Aplysia, historically the most widely-accepted explanation has been depletion of the readily releasable pool of vesicles. Depletion is also believed to account for synaptic depression at long interstimulus intervals in a variety of other systems.2. Multiple lines of evidence now indicate that vesicle depletion is not an important contributing mechanism to synaptic depression at Aplysia sensory neuron-to-motor neuron synapses. More generally, it appears that vesicle depletion does not contribute substantially to depression that occurs with those stimulus patterns that are typically used in studying behavioral habituation.3. Recent evidence suggests that at these sensory neuron-to-motor neuron synapses in Aplysia, synaptic depression is mediated by an activity-dependent, but release-independent, switching of individual release sites to a silent state. This switching off of release sites is initiated by Ca²⁺ influx during individual action potentials. We discuss signaling proteins that may be regulated by Ca²⁺ during the silencing of release sites that underlies synaptic depression.4. Bursts of 2–4 action potentials in presynaptic sensory neurons in Aplysia prevent the switching off of release sites via a mechanism called “burst-dependent protection” from synaptic depression.5. This molecular switch may explain the sensory gating that allows animals to discriminate which stimuli are innocuous and appropriate to ignore and which stimuli are more important and should continue to elicit responses.     

A Review of Sensory Imagery for Consumer Psychology

This review of mental imagery research has the core objective of fostering more research on the topic of sensory imagery. The review is organized around a conceptual framework highlighting (a) how mental imagery is formed, (b) the elicitation and elaboration of mental imagery, (c) the multi-modal nature of sensory imagery, and (d) the consumer behavior consequences of mental imagery. This conceptual framework provides many new lenses through which researchers can view prior findings, and thereby motivates innovative new research ideas. Future research directions are provided in each section of the review, with additional unexplored opportunities presented in a final section.     

Descartes' Causal Principle and the Case of Body-to-Mind Causation1

It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes (as opposed, or in addition, to God) contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate or caused by bodies.     

Hand–foot motor priming in the presence of temporary inability to use hands

To verify if the link between observed hand actions and executed foot actions found in aplasics is essentially induced by the constant use of foot substituting the hand, we investigated if the vision of a grasping hand is able to prime a foot response in normals. Participants were required to detect the time-to-contact of a hand grasping an object either with a suitable or a less suitable movement, an experimental paradigm known to induce a priming effect. Participants responded either with the hand or the foot, while having free or bound hands. Results showed that for hand responses motor priming effect was stronger when the hands were free, whereas for foot responses it was stronger when the hands were bound. These data are interpreted as a further evidence that a difficulty to move affects specific cognitive functions and that the vision of a grasping hand may prime a foot response.