Emotions help memory for faces: Role of whole and parts

The role of holistic or parts-based processing in face identification has been explored mostly with neutral faces. In the current study, we investigated the nature of processing (holistic vs. parts) in recognition memory for faces with emotional expressions. There were two phases in this experiment: learning phase and test phase. In the learning phase participants learned face–name associations of happy, neutral, and sad faces. The test phase consisted of a two-choice recognition test (whole face, eyes, or mouth) given either immediately or after a 24-hour delay. Results indicate that emotional faces were remembered better than neutral faces and performance was better with whole faces as compared to isolated parts. The performance in immediate and delayed recognition interacted with emotional information. Sad eyes and happy mouth were remembered better in the delayed recognition condition. These results suggest that in addition to holistic processing, specific parts–emotion combinations play a critical role in delayed recognition memory.     

Positive mood boosts the expression of a dispositional need for closure

Three studies (N=539) examined the hypothesis that positive mood increases the degree to which epistemic motivation, i.e., the need for closure (NFC), affects the way in which an individual processes information (heuristic vs. systematic processing). In each of the studies, different methods of operationalising mood were used: in Study 1, mood was measured as a state; in Study 2, mood was induced by asking participants to recall emotional events; and in Study 3, mood was induced by emotional pictures. The styles of information processing that were utilised by our participants were operationalised in terms of their preferences for (Study 1) and ability to recall (Studies 2 and 3) schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information. Taken together, the results of the three studies show that only under positive mood, NFC level of an individual is consistent with his or her style of information processing, that is, only under positive mood is there a negative relationship between the NFC level of an individual and the utilisation of schema-inconsistent information. Our results can be explained in terms of the effect that mood has on an individual's perceived ability to achieve NFC.     

Psychological Interventions and Genetic Testing: Facilitating Informed Decisions About BRCA1/2 Cancer Susceptibility

Genetic testing for inherited cancer susceptibility, based on the recently identified. BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, will soon be available on a large scale. However, at present, genetic test results do not lead to clearly indicated diagnostic or preventive measures, and the nature of the psychological impact of BRCA1/2 testing is still largely unknown. This uncertainty, combined with preliminary evidence suggesting significant individual differences in reactions to genetic susceptibility feedback, constitutes a unique challenge for any individual contemplating such testing. We outline the nature of this challenge and then propose an intervention strategy designed to help individuals make deeply processed and psychologically well-informed decisions with regard to their genetic susceptibility. The intervention is guided by recent research findings and theory on the cognitive–emotional processing of cancer-risk information. Specifically, the goal is to prepare the individual for genetic testing by (1) cognitively and emotionally activating, or preliving, the individual's potential reactions to testing feedback; (2) facilitating accurate appraisal of the individual's cognitive–emotional reactions; and (3) enabling the individual to process these reactions through the use of well-established clinical techniques.     

The cost of seeing the meaning: Conceptual processing of distractors triggers localized target suppression

It is often assumed that conceptual information impacts visual experience only after perceptual information has been extracted. However, the present study suggests that conceptual processing can interfere with perceptual processes, as reflected in target perception impairments that are specific to the location of conceptually salient distractors. Experiment 1 replicated previous findings that emotional distractors in a rapid serial visual presentation cause a spontaneous, spatially localized impairment in target perception, further finding that distractors that are merely featurally salient do not. Experiment 2 suggested that conceptually salient distractors that are non-emotional also elicit such spatially localized impairments, which are shorter lived than those following emotional distractors. Experiment 3 suggested that featurally salient distractors that are not conceptually salient engage a different, spatial attention mechanism. Together, these findings suggest that, whereas featurally salient distractors can capture spatial attention, conceptual distractors additionally engage mechanisms that suppress spatiotemporally competing targets.     

Shame,guilt, and facial emotion processing: initial evidence for a positive relationship between guilt-proneness and facial emotion recognition ability

Shame and guilt are closely related self-conscious emotions of negative affect that give rise to divergent self-regulatory and motivational behaviours. While guilt-proneness has demonstrated positive relationships with self-report measures of empathy and adaptive interpersonal functioning, shame-proneness tends to be unrelated or inversely related to empathy and is associated with interpersonal difficulties. At present, no research has examined relationships between shame and guilt-proneness with facial emotion recognition ability. Participants (N?=?363) completed measures of shame and guilt-proneness along with a facial emotion recognition task which assessed the ability to identify displays of anger, sadness, happiness, fear, disgust, and shame. Guilt-proneness was consistently positively associated with facial emotion recognition ability. In contrast, shame-proneness was unrelated to capacity for facial emotion recognition. Findings provide support for theory arguing that guilt and empathy operate synergistically and may also help explain the inverse relationship between guilt-proneness and propensity for aggressive behaviour.     

Visuospatial and mathematical dysfunction in major depressive disorder and/or panic disorder: A study of parietal functioning

The parietal cortex is critical for several different cognitive functions, including visuospatial processing and mathematical abilities. There is strong evidence indicating parietal dysfunction in depression. However, it is less clear whether anxiety is associated with parietal dysfunction and whether comorbid depression and anxiety are associated with greater impairment. The present study compared participants with major depression (MDD), panic disorder (PD), comorbid MDD/PD and controls on neuropsychological measures of visuospatial processing, Judgement of Line Orientation (JLO), and mathematical abilities, Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) Arithmetic. Only comorbid MDD/PD was associated with decreased performance on JLO, whereas all psychopathological groups exhibited comparably decreased performance on WRAT Arithmetic. Furthermore, the results were not accounted for by other comorbid disorders, medication use or psychopathology severity. The present study suggests comorbid depression and anxious arousal are associated with impairment in visuospatial processing and provides novel evidence indicating mathematical deficits across depression and/or anxiety. Implications for understanding parietal dysfunction in internalising psychopathology are discussed.     

Social anxiety and information processing biases: An integrated theoretical perspective

Models of anxiety disorders posit that information processing biases towards threat may result from an imbalance between top-down attentional control processes and bottom-up attentional processes, such that anxiety could reduce the influence of the former and increase the influence of the latter. However, researchers have recently pointed to limitations of the top-down/bottom-up terminology and outlined the additional contribution of memory processes to attention guidance. The goal of this paper is to provide bridges between recent findings from cognitive psychology and anxiety disorders research. We first provide an integrative overview of the processes influencing the content of working memory, including the availability of attentional control, and the strengths of task goals, stimulus salience, selection history and long-term memory. We then illustrate the interest of this formulation to the study of information processing biases in anxiety disorders, with a specific focus on social anxiety.     

Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts

According to one view of linguistic information (Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974), a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: (a) by asserting the content as new information; or (b) by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it (e.g., von Fintel, 2008; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002). A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to challenge (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992). Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self‐paced reading experiments with an on‐line stops‐making‐sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate (makes less sense) relative to non‐presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition‐assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions.     

Feature Statistics Modulate the Activation of Meaning During Spoken Word Processing

Understanding spoken words involves a rapid mapping from speech to conceptual representations. One distributed feature‐based conceptual account assumes that the statistical characteristics of concepts’ features—the number of concepts they occur in (distinctiveness/sharedness) and likelihood of co‐occurrence (correlational strength)—determine conceptual activation. To test these claims, we investigated the role of distinctiveness/sharedness and correlational strength in speech‐to‐meaning mapping, using a lexical decision task and computational simulations. Responses were faster for concepts with higher sharedness, suggesting that shared features are facilitatory in tasks like lexical decision that require access to them. Correlational strength facilitated responses for slower participants, suggesting a time‐sensitive co‐occurrence‐driven settling mechanism. The computational simulation showed similar effects, with early effects of shared features and later effects of correlational strength. These results support a general‐to‐specific account of conceptual processing, whereby early activation of shared features is followed by the gradual emergence of a specific target representation.     

Making Sense of Dynamic Systems: How Our Understanding of Stocks and Flows Depends on a Global Perspective

Stocks and flows (SF) are building blocks of dynamic systems: Stocks change through inflows and outflows, such as our bank balance changing with withdrawals and deposits, or atmospheric CO₂ with absorptions and emissions. However, people make systematic errors when trying to infer the behavior of dynamic systems, termed SF failure, whose cognitive explanations are yet unknown. We argue that SF failure appears when people focus on specific system elements (local processing), rather than on the system structure and gestalt (global processing). Using a standard SF task (n = 148), SF failure decreased by (a) a global as opposed to local task format; (b) individual global as opposed to local processing styles; and (c) global as opposed to local perceptual priming. These results converge toward local processing as an explanation for SF failure. We discuss theoretical and practical implications on the connections between the scope of attention and understanding of dynamic systems.