Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) succeed in a test of quantity conservation

Nonhuman animals demonstrate a number of impressive quantitative skills such as counting sets of items, comparing sets on the basis of the number of items or amount of material, and even responding to simple arithmetic manipulations. In this experiment, capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized task designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Monkeys first were trained to select from two horizontal arrays of stimuli the one with the larger number of items. On some trials, after a correct selection there was no feedback but instead an additional manipulation of one of those arrays. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array but not the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made a second selection from the two arrays of items. Previous research had shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeeded with this task. However, there was no condition in that study in which items were added to the smaller array without increasing its quantity to a point where it became the new larger array. This new condition was added in the present experiment. Capuchin monkeys were sensitive to all of these manipulations, changing their selections when the manipulations changed which array contained the larger number of items but not when the manipulations changed the physical arrangement of items or increased the quantity in one array without also reversing which of the two arrays had more items. Therefore, capuchin monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the arrays. The data indicate that capuchins are sensitive to simply arithmetic manipulations that involve addition of items to arrays and also that they can conserve quantity.     

A Psychometric Analysis of the “Divide and Conquer” Principle in Multicriteria Decision Making

The principle of “Divide and Conquer” (DAC) suggests that: (1) complex decision problems should be decomposed into smaller, more manageable parts and (2) these smaller parts should be logically aggregated to derive an overall value for each alternative. Typically, decompositional procedures have been compared to holistic evaluations that require decision makers to simultaneously consider all of the relevant attributes in the evaluation of the objects under consideration. These comparisons between decompositional and holistic judgments have primarily used a variant of Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT).We presented a general experimental framework that allows for a more extensive assessment of the DAC principle, as well as the effects of decision complexity on both holistic and decompositional procedures. We illustrate this approach with a study that uses the Simple Multiattribute Rating Technique with Swing Weights (SMARTS; Edwards & Barron, 1994) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP; Saaty, 1980). We report data comparing the convergent validity (e.g the agreement between decompositional and holistic strategies) and the temporal stability for decompositional and holistic judgments on a variety of dependent measures. Decision complexity did not significantly affect the correspondence between decompositional and holistic judgments for both SMARTS and AHP judgments. Results from an ordinal measure of temporal stability indicated the DAC principle was violated for the AHP judgments. For a linear measure of temporal stability, trends in the data indicated that the predicted effects of decision complexity on the DAC principle was violated for the SMARTS judgments.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

A dissociation between selective attention and conscious awareness in the representation of temporal order information

Previous electrophysiological studies have shown that attentional selection processes are highly sensitive to the temporal order of task-relevant visual events. When two successively presented colour-defined target stimuli are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of only 10 ms, the onset latencies of N2pc components to these stimuli (which reflect their attentional selection) precisely match their objective temporal separation. We tested whether such small onset differences are accessible to conscious awareness by instructing participants to report the category (letter or digit) of the first of two target-colour items that were separated by an SOA of 10, 20, or 30 ms. Performance was at chance level for the 10 ms SOA, demonstrating that temporal order information which is available to attentional control processes cannot be utilized for conscious temporal order judgments. These results provide new evidence that selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally separable, and support the hypothesis that attention and awareness operate at different stages of cognitive processing.     

Fairness lies in the heart of the beholder: How the social emotions of third parties influence reactions to injustice

The present research explores third parties’ (e.g., jurors, ombudsmen, auditors, and employees observing others’ encounters) ability to objectively judge fairness. More specifically, the current research suggests that third parties’ justice judgments and reactions are biased by their attitudes toward the decision recipient and, in particular, the affective aspect of those attitudes as characterized by their felt social emotions. We explore how the congruence of a social emotion (i.e., the extent to which the emotion reflects feeling a subjective sense of alignment with the target of the emotion) can influence their evaluations of recipients’ decision outcomes. The five studies presented show that congruence can lead third parties to react positively to objectively unfair decision outcomes and, importantly, that the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions to decisions, decision makers, and even national policies.     

State-Dependent Memory Effects Using Caffeine and Placebo Do Not Extend to Metamemory

The authors examined the impact of caffeine on human memory and predictions of memory (i.e., metamemory). On Day 1, 83 college students drank a sweetened beverage containing either caffeine (4 mg/kg body weight) or a placebo before they studied 40 pairs of words. While the participants studied, they predicted their future memory performance for each word pair. On Day 2, the participants again received caffeine or a placebo before the memory test. The participants who drank the same beverage on both days (either caffeine or a placebo) recalled more word pairs than did those who drank different beverages (caffeine on 1 day and a placebo on the other day). In contrast, memory predictions were more accurate when the beverages did not match on both days. These data provide evidence for state-dependent memory when caffeine is used, but not for state-dependent metamemory. People's memory and their predictions of memory can be influenced in different ways if they drink caffeine before they study or take a test.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Metacognitive Judgments and Control of Study

ABSTRACT— Recent evidence indicates that people's judgments of their own learning are causally related to their study behavior and not epiphenomenal. I argue here that people use these metacognitions in an effort to selectively study material in their own region of proximal learning. First they attempt to eliminate materials that are already well learned. Then they progress successively from studying easier to more difficult materials. Successful implementation of this metacognitively guided strategy enhances learning. The necessary components are, first, that the metacognitions be accurate, and second, that the appropriate choices are implemented for study. With these parts in place, the individual is in position to effectively take control of his or her own learning.