Shared structure need not be shared set-structure

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos, Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful     

The phenonenological idealism controversy in light of possible worlds semantics

In the paper there is presented the semantic interpretation of idealism/realism controversy which is one of the most essential issues in Ingarden’s phenomenological project of ontology. The procedure of semantic paraphrase which is contemporary developed by Woleński, is the main interpretative tool. In the central part of the paper, there is formulated the formal theory of the semantic framework underlying idealism/realism discourse. Finally, there are formulated some notes showing that intentional conception of negation may be used for defending various idealistic positions.

Open answer set programming for the semantic web

We extend answer set programming (ASP) with, possibly infinite, open domains. Since this leads to undecidable reasoning, we restrict the syntax of programs, while carefully guarding knowledge representation mechanisms such as negation as failure and inequalities. Reasoning with the resulting extended forest logic programs (EFoLPs) can be reduced to finite answer set programming, for which reasoners are available.We argue that extended forest logic programming is a useful tool for uniformly representing and reasoning with both ontological and rule-based knowledge, as they can capture a large fragment of the OWL DL ontology language equipped with DL-safe rules. Furthermore, EFoLPs enable nonmonotonic reasoning, a desirable feature in locally closed subareas of the Semantic Web.     

How iconic gestures enhance communication: an ERP study

EEG was recorded as adults watched short segments of spontaneous discourse in which the speaker's gestures and utterances contained complementary information. Videos were followed by one of four types of picture probes: cross-modal related probes were congruent with both speech and gestures; speech-only related probes were congruent with information in the speech, but not the gesture; and two sorts of unrelated probes were created by pairing each related probe with a different discourse prime. Event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by picture probes were measured within the time windows of the N300 (250-350 ms post-stimulus) and N400 (350-550 ms post-stimulus). Cross-modal related probes elicited smaller N300 and N400 than speech-only related ones, indicating that pictures were easier to interpret when they corresponded with gestures. N300 and N400 effects were not due to differences in the visual complexity of each probe type, since the same cross-modal and speech-only picture probes elicited N300 and N400 with similar amplitudes when they appeared as unrelated items. These findings extend previous research on gesture comprehension by revealing how iconic co-speech gestures modulate conceptualization, enabling listeners to better represent visuo-spatial aspects of the speaker's meaning.     

Hemispheric differences in the time-course of semantic priming processes: evidence from event-related potentials (ERPs)

To investigate hemispheric differences in the timing of word priming, the modulation of event-related potentials by semantic word relationships was examined in each cerebral hemisphere. Primes and targets, either categorically (silk-wool) or associatively (needle-sewing) related, were presented to the left or right visual field in a go/no-go lexical decision task. The results revealed significant reaction-time and physiological differences in both visual fields only for associatively related word pairs, but an electrophysiological difference also tended to reach significance for categorically related words when presented in the left visual field. ERP waveforms showed a different time-course of associative priming effects according to the field of presentation. In the right visual field/left hemisphere, both N400 and Late Positive Component (LPC/P600) were modulated by semantic relatedness, while only a late effect was present in the left visual field/ right hemisphere.     

Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator's intention in naming and what's really what

Daily experience is filled with objects that have been created by humans to serve specific purposes. For such objects, the very act of creation may be a key element of how people understand them. But exactly how does creator's intention matter? We evaluated its contribution to two forms of categorization: the name selected for an artifact, and intuitions about what an artifact "really" is. To contrast the possibility that intention serves as an essence (Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29; Bloom, P. (1998). Theories of artifact categorization. Cognition, 66, 87-93.) determining an artifact's name with the possibility that it matters through its relevance to discourse goals, participants in three experiments read scenarios about people interacting with an artifact and then judged the suitability of different names for it. The intention of the creator was of differing degrees of relevance to the communication, and the relevance of other aspects of the entity varied in a complementary fashion. We found that name selection was altered by the communicative goals of a situation, and name choice was most consistent with creator's intention when the situation made intention relevant to achieving those goals. In a fourth experiment, we used the same scenarios to test the possibility that intention serves as an essence determining intuitions about what an object "really" is. The impact of creator's intention was modulated by the discourse context. These findings suggest that creator's intention influences both name choice and intuitions about what something "really" is by virtue of its impact on how communicative goals are best realized.     

Attention to endpoints: a cross-linguistic constraint on spatial meaning

We investigate a possible universal constraint on spatial meaning. It has been proposed that people attend preferentially to the endpoints of spatial motion events, and that languages may therefore make finer semantic distinctions at event endpoints than at event beginnings. We test this proposal. In Experiment 1, we show that people discriminate the endpoints of spatial motion events more readily than they do event beginnings-suggesting a non-linguistic attentional bias toward endpoints. In Experiment 2, speakers of Arabic, Chinese, and English each described a set of spatial events displayed in video clips. Although the spatial systems of these languages differ, speakers of all three languages made finer semantic distinctions at event endpoints, compared to event beginnings. These findings are consistent with the proposal that event endpoints are privileged over event beginnings, in both language and perception.     

Out of one's mind: a study of involuntary semantic memories

The study of memories that pop into one's mind without any conscious attempt to retrieve them began only recently. While there are some studies on involuntary autobiographical memories (e.g., ) research on involuntary semantic memories or mind-popping is virtually non-existent. The latter is defined as an involuntary conscious occurrence of brief items of one's network of semantic knowledge. The recall of these items (e.g., a word, a name, a tune) is not accompanied by additional contextual information and/or involvement of self-a standard feature of involuntary autobiographical memories. The paper reports several diary and questionnaire studies which looked into the nature and frequency of occurrence of these memories. The data show that people do experience involuntary semantic memories which tend to occur without any apparent cues while being engaged in relatively automatic activities. Possible mechanisms of involuntary semantic memories are discussed (e.g., very long-term priming), and the results of the study provide information on the possible duration of the priming effects in everyday life. Related theoretical and methodological issues and future avenues of research in this neglected area are outlined.     

Naming and categorization in young children: II. Listener behavior training

Following pretraining with everyday objects, 1- to 4-year-old children received listener training with three pairs of arbitrary stimuli of differing shapes. For each pair, 9 children were trained to select one stimulus in response to the spoken word /zog/ and the other to the spoken word /vek/. Next, in the look-at-sample category match-to-sample test, none categorized the six stimuli correctly when asked to look at the sample before selecting from five comparisons. Seven of these children failed a subsequent test of corresponding speaker behavior (tact test); following tact training, 5 of them passed either a repeat of the look-at-sample category test (2 subjects) or an alternative category test (3 subjects) in which they were required to tact the sample before selecting comparisons. The remaining 2 failed both category tests. Of the 2 who passed the tact test, 1 passed the tact-sample category test; the other failed to complete category testing. Two children were next given a second stimulus set. One passed the look-at-sample category test and the tact test; the other failed both tests but passed the tact-sample category test after tact training. The results show that 1- to 4-year-old children may learn listener behavior without corresponding speaker behavior. The results also show that common listener behavior is not sufficient to establish arbitrary stimulus classes, and they are consistent with the proposition that naming may be necessary for categorization of such stimuli.     

Neural responses to morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of single words: an fMRI study

Dissociations in the recognition of specific classes of words have been documented in brain-injured populations. These include deficits in the recognition and production of morphologically complex words as well as impairments specific to particular syntactic classes such as verbs. However, functional imaging evidence for distinctions among the neural systems underlying these dissociations has been inconclusive. We explored the neural systems involved in processing different word classes in a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging study, contrasting four groups of words co-varying morphological complexity (simple, monomorphemic words vs complex derived or inflected words) and syntactic class (verbs vs nouns/adjectives). Subtraction of word from letter string processing showed activation in left frontal and temporal lobe regions consistent with prior studies of visual word processing. No differences were observed for morphologically complex and simple words, despite adequate power to detect stimulus specific effects. A region of posterior left middle temporal gyrus showed significantly increased activation for verbs. Post hoc analyses showed that this elevated activation could also be related to semantic properties of the stimulus items (verbs have stronger action associations than nouns, and action association is correlated with activation). Results suggest that semantic as well as syntactic factors should be considered when assessing the neural systems involved in single word comprehension.