Being watched: The effect of social self-focus on interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory perception

We become aware of our bodies interoceptively, by processing signals arising from within the body, and exteroceptively, by processing signals arising on or outside the body. Recent research highlights the importance of the interaction of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals in modulating bodily self-consciousness. The current study investigated the effect of social self-focus, manipulated via a video camera that was facing the participants and that was either switched on or off, on interoceptive sensitivity (using a heartbeat perception task) and on tactile perception (using the Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT)). The results indicated a significant effect of self-focus on SSDT performance, but not on interoception. SSDT performance was not moderated by interoceptive sensitivity, although interoceptive sensitivity scores were positively correlated with false alarms, independently of self-focus. Together with previous research, our results suggest that self-focus may exert different effects on body perception depending on its mode (private versus social). While interoception has been previously shown to be enhanced by private self-focus, the current study failed to find an effect of social self-focus on interoceptive sensitivity, instead demonstrating that social self-focus improves exteroceptive somatosensory processing.     

Performance and decision making of a complex skill under monitoring and outcome pressure conditions: Which of them can reinvestment predict?

Despite a huge amount of research conducted on performance under competitive pressure, the different components of a competitive environment such as outcome pressure or monitoring pressure, have less been investigated. The present study aimed to investigate the performance and decision making of a complex skill and their link with reinvestment (a type of self-focus behavior) under different conditions of pressure using a table tennis task. The topspin forehand and backhand shots of 20 expert table tennis athletes were examined under low, monitoring, and outcome pressure conditions in a within-group design. In addition, predictive validities of Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale (DSRS) and Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS) with the changes of performance and decision making from low- to high-pressure conditions as dependent variables were examined. The repeated measures ANOVA results showed that the effects of pressure conditions on anxiety were significant. Decision accuracy under outcome pressure and decision speed under monitoring and outcome pressure conditions were decreased. The performance of athletes was decreased under monitoring pressure while no changes was observed in their performance under outcome pressure. Decision Reinvestment (a factor of DSRS) could predict decision speed changes under both pressure conditions, while Movement Self-Consciousness (a factor of MSRS) could predict performance changes only under monitoring pressure. Our Findings highlight that the subscales of MSRS and DSRS were activated independently and a competitive pressure situation has different effects on the cognitive and motor aspects of complex skills. It is suggested that expert athletes and coaches consider separate pressure conditions and their relationships with the ongoing task.     

Within-person variations in self-focused attention and negative affect in depression and anxiety: A diary study

This study examined within-person co-occurrence of self-focus, negative affect, and stress in a community sample of adolescents with or without emotional disorders. As part of a larger study, 278 adolescents were interviewed about emotional disorders. Later, they completed diary measures over three days, six times a day, reporting their current thoughts, affect, and levels of stress. Negative affect was independently related to both concurrent stress and self-focus. Importantly, the association between negative affect and self-focus was stronger among participants with a recent unipolar mood disorder, compared to those with an anxiety disorder, comorbid anxiety and depression, or those without an emotional disorder. The implications of these findings to theories of self-focus and its role in emotional disorders are discussed.     

Effects of analytical and experiential self-focus on stress-induced cognitive reactivity in eating disorder psychopathology

Previous research suggests distinct modes of self-focus, each with distinct functional properties: Analytical self-focus appears maladaptive, with experiential self-focus having more adaptive effects on indices of cognitive-affective functioning (e.g., Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). The authors applied this framework to eating disorder (ED) psychopathology and manipulated the mode of self-focus prior to exposure to a stressor (imagining eating a large meal; Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, & Rachman, 1999). Study 1 showed that students high in ED psychopathology reported lower post-stressor feelings of weight or shape change and less subsequent attempts to neutralise (e.g., imagining exercising) after experiential relative to analytical self-focus. Study 2 found that partially weight restored patients with anorexia nervosa had lower post-stressor estimates of their own weight and reported lower urge to cancel stressor effects following experiential compared to analytical self-focus. Experiential self-focus was also followed by less neutralisation than analytical self-focus. Results suggest that the mode of self-focus affects cognitive reactivity following a stressor in individuals with ED psychopathology. Examining the mode within which individuals with ED psychopathology focus on self and body may raise important implications for understanding of psychopathology and open new possibilities for augmenting current treatments.     

Comorbid social anxiety disorder in clients with depressive disorders: predicting changes in depressive symptoms, therapeutic relationships, and focus of attention in group treatment

The current study examined whether depressed outpatients with comorbid SAD respond differently to a cognitive-behavioral group intervention and if so, how and why. Using growth curve modeling, we found evidence that depressed clients with comorbid SAD had rapid improvement in depressive symptoms over the course of treatment and generally did not differ from those without comorbidity in developing close therapeutic relationships and modifying the direction of attentional focus away from the self. Non-linear effects demonstrated that rates of change in depressive symptoms, relationship variables, and focus of attention, were most rapid early in treatment. In contrast to hypotheses, trajectories of change in therapeutic relationships and attentional focus did not mediate the effect of SAD on treatment improvement in depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that comorbid SAD does not have a detrimental effect on the course of depression treatment and group-based treatments can be as beneficial for depressed individuals with comorbid SAD. It may be that group-based treatments for depression provide explicit opportunity for emotional processing in social situations (i.e., exposure) and hence mimic efficacious therapies for SAD.     

Rumination, experiential avoidance, and dysfunctional thinking in eating disorders

The majority of research in eating disorders (ED) has investigated the content of disorder-specific thoughts, while few studies have addressed underlying cognitive-affective processes. A better understanding of processes underpinning ED may have important implications for treatment development. Two studies were conducted that investigated levels of rumination, beliefs about rumination, experiential avoidance, and aspects of schematic thinking in individuals with eating pathology. The latter was assessed with a newly designed ED-Sentence Completion Task (ED-SCT). Study 1 (N = 177) examined relations between ED psychopathology and these variables in a student population. Extending this, Study 2 (N = 26) assessed differences between patients with anorexia nervosa and healthy control participants. The results showed that ED psychopathology was related to disorder-specific cognitions, experiential avoidance as well as ruminative brooding but not reflection. A follow-up of anorexia nervosa patients indicated that changes in ED psychopathology were associated with changes in dysfunctional attitudes and maladaptive cognitive-affective processes. These findings highlight cognitive processes that may play an important role in the maintenance of eating pathology.     

Who am I and who are you? Priming and the influence of self versus other focused attention

Recent research has demonstrated that primes can affect self-perceptions, and that subsequent behavior is typically in line with these changed self-perceptions. However, a wide range of other priming effects have been documented, including changes in person perception, motivation, and so forth. The conditions under which a given prime affects the self as opposed to creating one of these other outcomes remains unclear. The present research seeks to offer insight into this question by examining attentional factors as one determinant of whether the self or another target will be biased by a prime. Across two studies, manipulating attention to the self (or an irrelevant target) immediately following a prime produced assimilation in behavior (Experiment 1) and self-perceptions (Experiment 2) when participants thought about themselves, but not an irrelevant target. In addition, when participants thought about an unrelated target, perceptions of this target, but not the self, were changed (Experiment 2).     

The biology of visual perspective and depression: A reply to Sutin

A recent meta-analysis by Munafò, Durrant, Lewis, and Flint (2009) [Munafò, M. R., Durrant, C., Lewis, G., & Flint, J. (2009). Gene × environment interactions at the serotonin transporter locus. Biological Psychiatry, 65, 211–219] questioned the meaning of studies searching for endophenotypes associated with the serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region (5-HTTLPR) polymorphism, including our study on visual perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval. However, the association of 3rd person perspective with vulnerability for depression does not rely only on genetics. External consistency is provided by the influence of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism on brain regions involved in emotion regulation and autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g. the medial prefrontal cortex). Internal consistency is provided by the increased prevalence of 3rd person perspective in both currently and previously depressed patients, as well as in depression-prone individuals. Further studies should examine therapeutic opportunities.     

A meta-analysis of correlations between depression and first person singular pronoun use

Depression is a burden. We discuss how theories, identification, assessment, and treatment of depression are at least partially tied to the correlation between first person singular pronoun use and individual differences in depression. We conducted a meta-analysis (k = 21, N = 3758) of these correlations, including numerous unpublished correlations from the file drawer. Our fixed effects analysis revealed a small correlation (r = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.10–0.16]) by modern standards. The correlation was not moderated by gender, nor by whether the effect had been published. These results more firmly establish first person singular pronoun use as a linguistic marker of depression—a marker that appears to be useful across demographic lines.     

The effects of self-focused rumination on global negative self-judgements in depression

Previous research in dysphoric participants has found that compared with distraction, rumination inductions are associated with increased levels of cognitive distortions and overgeneral autobiographical memories. Watkins and Teasdale ((2001) Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 353–357) investigated which component of rumination was responsible for this effect in overgeneral memory, and found two distinct modes of ruminative self-focus, with analytical, evaluative self-focus maintaining overgeneral memory, whereas self-focus low in analytical thinking reduced overgeneral memory. The present study compared the effects of these two distinct forms of self-focused rumination with another measure of overgeneral thinking—global negative self-judgements. Thirty depressed participants and thirty never-depressed participants were randomly allocated to ‘analytic’ (high analysis) or ‘experiential’ (low analysis) self-focused manipulations. As predicted, in depressed participants, the analytical self-focus condition increased ratings of the self as worthless and incompetent pre- to post-manipulation, whereas the experiential self-focus condition resulted in no significant change in such judgements. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that an analytical mode of self-focused rumination may be particularly maladaptive in depression.