Projecting the self into the future in individuals with schizophrenia: a preliminary cross-sectional study

The ability to project oneself into the future contributes to development and maintenance of a coherent sense of identity. If recent research has revealed that schizophrenia is associated with difficulties envisioning the future, little is known about patients’ future self-representations. In this study, 27 participants with schizophrenia and 26 healthy controls were asked to simulate mental representations of plausible and highly significant future events (self-defining future projections, SDFPs) that they anticipate to happen in their personal future. Main results showed that schizophrenia patients had difficulties in reflecting on the broader meaning and implications of imagined future events. In addition, and contrary to our hypothesis, a large majority of SDFPs in schizophrenia patients were positive events, including achievements, relationship, and leisure contents. Interestingly, patients and controls did not differ on the perceived probability that these events will occur in the future. Our results suggest that schizophrenia patients have an exaggerated positive perception of their future selves. Together, these findings lend support to the idea that past and future self-defining representations have both similar and distinct characteristics in schizophrenia.     

When do people bet on their selves? The role of global self-concepts in decision making

Previous research suggests that behavior is generally predicted by specific self-concepts but not global self-concepts. A study was conducted to examine the conditions under which global conceptions of self are predictive of decision-making. Participants were given the opportunity to bet lottery tickets on their performance in the “Utah Challenge” competition. Both global and specific self-concepts independently predicted betting on specific known contests and betting on a contest that was unknown. Global but not specific self-concepts independently predicted betting on a multi-faceted contest. Mediation analyses suggest that self-concepts guide decisions by influencing the perceived likelihood of success. Participants’ were more overconfident about their chances of winning when a task was unknown rather than familiar.     

You'll change more than I will: Adults’ predictions about their own and others’ future preferences

It has been argued that adults underestimate the extent to which their preferences will change over time. We sought to determine whether such mispredictions are the result of a difficulty imagining that one's own current and future preferences may differ or whether it also characterizes our predictions about the future preferences of others. We used a perspective-taking task in which we asked young people how much they liked stereotypically young-person items (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) and stereotypically old-person items (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) now, and how much they would like them in the distant future (i.e., when they are 70 years old). Participants also made these same predictions for a generic same-age, same-sex peer. In a third condition, participants predicted how much a generic older (i.e., age 70) same-sex adult would like items from both categories today. Participants predicted less change between their own current and future preferences than between the current and future preferences of a peer. However, participants estimated that, compared to a current older adult today, their peer would like stereotypically young items more in the future and stereotypically old items less. The fact that peers’ distant-future estimated preferences were different from the ones they made for “current” older adults suggests that even though underestimation of change of preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others, a bias still exists.     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

The pattern theory of self in artificial general intelligence: A theoretical framework for modeling self in biologically inspired cognitive architectures

In an attempt to provide a unified account for a vast literature discussing a multiplicity of selves, Gallagher (2013) has proposed a pattern theory of self. Subsequent discussion on this account has led to a concern that the pattern theory, as originally presented, stands as a mere list of aspects that fails to explain how they are related in real-time. We suggest that one way to address these criticisms, and further develop the pattern theory of self is by exploring how it can be used to aid research on self in artificial general intelligence, especially in the context of biologically inspired cognitive architectures. We furthermore propose a conceptual implementation for actualizing such research in regards to the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) cognitive model.     

Implicit and explicit evaluations of a mass media physical activity campaign: Does everything get better?

The purpose of this research was to evaluate a population level mass media campaign using implicit (i.e., automatic) and explicit (i.e., non-automatic) measures of evaluations and to determine if discrepant or summed evaluations were associated with endorsing campaign objectives: that physical activity can improve relationship-related, mind-related, or body-related outcomes. Participants (N = 1600) completed an online survey which included a single-category implicit association task that measured more automatic or implicit evaluative responses of images from the campaign. The survey also included questions assessing prompted awareness of the campaign, explicitly measured evaluations of the advertisements, and evaluations of whether participating in physical activity makes one’s relationships, mind, or body better. Results showed participants who rated the advertisements as more appealing exhibited more positive implicit evaluations of the campaign. Evaluating the ads as offensive was negatively related to explicit evaluations of whether physical activity makes relationships, mind, or body better; past behaviour and sum and discrepancy scores were positively related to endorsing relationship, mind, and body outcomes. By including implicit evaluation of a playful and creative campaign designed to influence perceptions of what physical activity can make better, this research highlighted that campaign creators should carefully consider what to include. Discrepant evaluations may indicate benefits that could be highlighted because evaluation of them is more amenable to change. Based on current findings, one possible focus of such campaigns may be the relationship-related benefits of PA.     

Intentional embarrassment: a look at embarrassors' and targets' perspectives

Two thousand, one hundred and seven participants recounted situations in which they intentionally embarrassed another person (embarrassor accounts) or in which they perceived that they were intentionally embarrassed (target accounts). Specifically, this paper focused on differences in individuals' accounts of: (1) embarrassors' goals; (2) embarrassors' goal achievement; and (3) the degree of embarrassment felt by targets from embarrassors' and targets' perspectives. We asked 1136 participants to report a situation when they intentionally embarrassed another person. We asked another 971 participants to report a situation when they perceived that they were intentionally embarrassed by someone. Chi-square tests revealed strong effects for the perspective of the respondents on goals attempted and goals achieved. As expected, embarrassors were more likely than targets to report using embarrassment to negatively sanction another's behavior; targets were more likely than embarrassors to report that the embarrassors attempted the goal of self-satisfaction; embarrassors were more likely than targets to report that they were successful at achieving their goal; and embarrassors reported lower levels of target embarrassment than did targets. Implications and suggestions for future research are provided.     

Self‐concept: a tourism application

Although well accepted by consumer behaviourists in general, self‐concept has received relatively little attention from tourism researchers. This is despite the potential it would appear to offer in terms of enabling an enhanced understanding of how tourists feel and what they seek from the tourism experience. The application of a model of self‐concept in this study suggests self‐concept may provide an alternative segmentation base, giving insights into how people perceive themselves in the tourist role and their consequent behaviour. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications.