Simulating Natural History: Walking with Dinosaurs as Hyper-Real Edutainment

Abstract

Real-world experiments that test new technologies can affect policy and practice by introducing new objects of intervention through tinkering; the ad hoc work of realigning relations in the face of frictions, surprises, and disturbances that occur when introducing a technology. In a pilot study on aggression detection, tinkering moved aggression in and out of the human body. In the end, the pilot defined aggression as a set of acoustic-physical variables representing the aroused human body, alongside other signals of aggression. How aggression as an object intervention was shaped by tinkering is relevant because it involved inclusions and exclusions by the authorities who identified aggression, the methods they applied, and mandate for intervention. A focus on relations that are tinkered within a real-world experiment permits critical engagement with this format. Although the real-world experimental format is credited with producing knowledge about a technology's ‘actual’ performance, actors and events at the pilot study location were made only selectively relevant. Analyses of real-world experiments should therefore explain how experiments selectively make the world relevant, giving only particular objects of intervention a truth status.     

The retrieval of self-defining memories is associated with the activation of specific working selves

This article presents two studies that investigated the impact of the retrieval of self-defining memories on individuals' sense of self. Participants recalled positive and/or negative self-defining memories, rated memory characteristics and completed measures focusing on different self-aspects. Study 1 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported lower negative self-consistency and higher state self-concept clarity and positive self-consistency, but this result became non-significant after controlling for state self-esteem. Study 2 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem, a marginally higher proportion of recreation/exploration, goals and a marginally lower proportion of achievement goals after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported a higher proportion of self-cognitions referring to emotional states after recalling memories from which they had not abstracted meaning than after recalling memories from which they had done this. These findings suggest that the retrieval of vivid, emotional and highly self-relevant memories may be accompanied by the activation of specific self-representations or working selves. They also suggest that the experience of memory-related intrusive images may temporarily influence individuals' sense of self. The implications of these findings for clinical practice are discussed.     

Changing the working self alters the emotions prompted by recall

Results from three studies indicated that emotional responses to memories can be changed by altering the working self. In particular, these results showed that emotional reactions to memories: (1) were especially positive when memories were perceived to be central to the working self (Experiment 1); (2) were muted when the working self was changed by adopting a third-person perspective during recall (Experiment 1); (3) of an event in the life of each participant's mother weakened when an individual was induced to experience a self that felt less close to their mother (Experiment 2) and (4) of a childhood event provoked especially positive emotional reactions after exposure to a mortality salience manipulation that increased perceived self-worth (Experiment 3). The extent to which mother was included in the self (Experiment 2) and self-worth (Experiment 3) plausibly mediated the effects of the manipulations on participants' emotional reactions to recalled events.     

Hans Jonas's diagnosis of nihilism: The case of Heidegger

This paper is concerned with the implications of Husserl's phenomenological reformulation of the problem of error. Following Husserl, I argue that the phenomenon of error should not be understood as the accidental failure of a fully constituted cogito, but that it is itself constitutive of the cogito's formation. I thus show that the phenomenon of error plays a crucial role in our self-understanding as unified subjects of experience. In order to unpack this 'hermeneutical function' of error, I focus on three inter-related notions which are recurrently used by Husserl to refer to the central aspects of error apprehension: explosion (Explosion), replacement (Ersatz), and cancellation (Durchstreichung). My discussion, however, does not remain committed to the Husserlian framework as such. This is not only because Husserl's notion of explosion proves itself untenable, but because the Husserlian paradigm does not make room for a linguistic dimension intrinsic, in my view, to the realization of error. Hence, I proceed by reconstructing the Husserlian terms as tropes of realization, as narratological devices in the 'language game' of error. I argue that these hermeneutical devices are necessary for maintaining what Nietzsche would call the self's 'semblance of unity'. The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis for our thought and our consciousness in general? (Nietzsche, The Will to Power #490)     

早期目标血糖管理下严重脓毒症患者HMGB1的变化及其临床意义

探讨早期目标血糖管理对严重脓毒症患者HMGB1变化的影响.严重脓毒症患者随机分为血糖控制A（4.4mmol/L~6.1mmol/L）、B（6.2mmol/L~8.3mmol/L）、C（8.4mmol/L~10.0mmol/L）三组.给予早期目标血糖管理,入ICU后0d、1d、3d、5d、7d采血测TNF-α、HMGB1浓度.三组TNF-α、HMGB1浓度及APACHEⅡ评分均呈下降趋势,A组HMGB1浓度及APACHEⅡ评分在第7d较B、C组明显降低（P＜0.05）.A组28d病死率较B、C组降低（P＆gt;0.05）.严重脓毒症患者在早期目标血糖管理下,显著降低HMGB1浓度,降低病死率和改善预后,HMGB1可用来评价脓毒症的严重程度及预后.     

中国控烟状况与干预对策

目前国内控烟文献从人群吸烟状况及吸烟影响因素、控烟干预策略及其效果、控烟能力等多角度,探讨了我国的烟草控制问题.在综合已有有效地控烟策略基础上,提出加强控烟教育和宣传、发挥医务人员在控烟中的表率作用、综合使用各种措施控烟等针对性建议,对中国长期有效的控烟具有深远意义.     

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.     

Resource depletion does not influence prospective memory in college students

This paper reports an experiment designed to investigate the potential influence of prior acts of self-control on subsequent prospective memory performance. College undergraduates (n = 146) performed either a cognitively depleting initial task (e.g., mostly incongruent Stroop task) or a less resource-consuming version of that task (e.g., all congruent Stroop task). Subsequently, participants completed a prospective memory task that required attentionally demanding monitoring processes. The results demonstrated that prior acts of self-control do not impair the ability to execute a future intention in college-aged adults. We conceptually replicated these results in three additional depletion and prospective memory experiments. This research extends a growing number of studies demonstrating the boundary conditions of the resource depletion effect in cognitive tasks.     

Sense of identity in advanced Alzheimer’s dementia: A cognitive dissociation between sameness and selfhood?

We looked at whether sense of identity persists in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and if its profile remains the same between two examinations. A specifically designed protocol was administered to 16 AD patients in the mild to severe stages of dementia and to 16 matched healthy controls, both living in the same institution. We showed that sense of identity was broadly preserved in AD patients. The patterns of their responses were similar to those of controls, and remained consistent over a two-week period. However, some qualitative characteristics of sense of identity in AD patients differed significantly from those of controls, suggesting that AD patients may not be able to update their self-knowledge, probably because of their episodic memory deficit. These results are discussed in the light of both current models of the self and philosophical concepts such as sameness and selfhood.