Equally attending but still not seeing: An eye-tracking study of change detection in own- and other-race faces

The present study aimed to investigate whether the faster change detection in own-race faces in a change blindness paradigm, reported by Humphreys, Hodsoll, and Campbell (2005) and explained in terms of people's poorer ability to discriminate other-race faces, may be explained by people's preferential attention towards own-race faces. The study by Humphreys et al. was replicated using the same stimuli, while participants’ eye movements were recorded. These revealed that there was no attentional bias towards own-race faces (analysed in terms of fixation order, number, and duration), but people still detected changes in own-race faces faster than in other-race faces. The current results therefore give further support for the original claim that people are less sensitive to changes made in other-race faces, when own and other-race faces are equally attended.     

Gaze bias: Selective encoding and liking effects

People look longer at things that they choose than things they do not choose. How much of this tendency—the gaze bias effect—is due to a liking effect compared to the information encoding aspect of the decision-making process? Do these processes compete under certain conditions? We monitored eye movements during a visual decision-making task with four decision prompts: Like, dislike, older, and newer. The gaze bias effect was present during the first dwell in all conditions except the dislike condition, when the preference to look at the liked item and the goal to identify the disliked item compete. Colour content (whether a photograph was colour or black-and-white), not decision type, influenced the gaze bias effect in the older/newer decisions because colour is a relevant feature for such decisions. These interactions appear early in the eye movement record, indicating that gaze bias is influenced during information encoding.     

Reasoning from uncertain premises: Effects of expertise and conversational context

Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty about the conclusion was higher when the major premise was uttered by a novice and an alternative premise by an expert, compared to when the major premise was uttered by an expert and the alternative by a novice (Experiment 2). Similarly, the believability of a conclusion was considerably lower when the minor premise was uttered by a novice and denied by an expert, as opposed to when an expert uttered the minor premise and a novice denied it (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that the nature of the uncertainty induced by a denial of the minor premise depended on whether or not the context was a conversation. These results pose difficult problems for current theories of reasoning, as current theories are based on the results of experiments in which the premises are treated as certain. Our discussion of the results emphasises the importance of pragmatics in reasoning, namely, the role of general knowledge about the world in assessing the probability of a premise uttered by an expert or a novice and the role of interpretations of the premise based on pragmatic inferences in revising these initial probabilities.     

Identity-based inhibitory processing during focused attention

Recent data suggest that the operating principles governing inhibition of distractor-related activity may deviate from dominant models describing inhibitory processing during selective attention. Here we aimed to gain a better understanding of these data in order to determine whether they actually defy premises of current models. In addition to providing evidence against noninhibitory accounts of the data (see especially Experiment 6), the results support three main novel findings that challenge current theories. First, the data provide evidence that inhibition overpowered excitation from ongoing external input (Experiments 1–4), which suggests that inhibitory control processes are more powerful than current models indicate. Second, negative effects emerged even when targets appeared alone (Experiment 5), which suggests that selection does not play an essential role in triggering inhibitory processing. Third, relatively early distractor-related activity was affected, which supports a role for inhibition prior to action control (Experiment 3). These findings suggest a need to revise current models describing inhibition of distracting information during selective attention.     

Intentional attention switching in dichotic listening: Exploring the efficiency of nonspatial and spatial selection

Using an auditory variant of task switching, we examined the ability to intentionally switch attention in a dichotic-listening task. In our study, participants responded selectively to one of two simultaneously presented auditory number words (spoken by a female and a male, one for each ear) by categorizing its numerical magnitude. The mapping of gender (female vs. male) and ear (left vs. right) was unpredictable. The to-be-attended feature for gender or ear, respectively, was indicated by a visual selection cue prior to auditory stimulus onset. In Experiment 1, explicitly cued switches of the relevant feature dimension (e.g., from gender to ear) and switches of the relevant feature within a dimension (e.g., from male to female) occurred in an unpredictable manner. We found large performance costs when the relevant feature switched, but switches of the relevant feature dimension incurred only small additional costs. The feature-switch costs were larger in ear-relevant than in gender-relevant trials. In Experiment 2, we replicated these findings using a simplified design (i.e., only within-dimension switches with blocked dimensions). In Experiment 3, we examined preparation effects by manipulating the cueing interval and found a preparation benefit only when ear was cued. Together, our data suggest that the large part of attentional switch costs arises from reconfiguration at the level of relevant auditory features (e.g., left vs. right) rather than feature dimensions (ear vs. gender). Additionally, our findings suggest that ear-based target selection benefits more from preparation time (i.e., time to direct attention to one ear) than gender-based target selection.     

Load theory of selective attention and the role of perceptual load: Is it time for revision?

Perceptual load hypothesis is proposed as a compromise between early and late theory of selective attention which states that the selection will operate early when the load on perception is high and it will operate late when the load on perception is low. Experimental findings have shown that the perceptual load hypothesis is too simplistic in nature as perceptual load is not the only determinant of selection processes. It is difficult to apply the load hypothesis to explain the occurrence of early selection in low load displays as well as the selection processes that operate on distractor and target stimuli that are a part of the same object. Factors like spatial proximity, cues that manipulate the spatial extent of attentional focus, salience of targets as well as the distractors, and perceptual grouping between the target and the distractors should be taken into account while explaining the selective control of attention. Thus, the perceptual load of the display is one such factor that affects selective attention and goal-directed behaviour, but it is not the only factor to affect the selective control of attention.     

Preconscious effects of temporary goals on attention

Two experiments examined whether accessible goals preconsciously direct selective attention. Goal activation was manipulated by one's goal pursuit being either undermined or affirmed (resulting in an experienced state of either incompleteness or completeness). Attention responses were assessed through a Stroop-like task (Experiment 1) and a response-time task in which participants indicated a stimulus' direction of motion (Experiment 2). Results showed that when goals were accessible, attention was drawn toward goal-relevant items—even when these items were to be ignored and when responses occurred too fast for conscious control. Accessible goals directed implicit cognition (i.e., attention toward stimuli associated with the goal), despite the fact that these goals were not chronically held, but manipulated in the lab.     

Candidate Vulnerability and Exposure to Counterattitudinal Information: Evidence From Two U.S. Presidential Elections

Politically motivated selective exposure has traditionally been understood through the lens of long‐standing attitudes and beliefs, but the role of environment in shaping information exposure practices merits further consideration. Citizens might respond to the political environment in their information‐seeking behavior for numerous reasons. Citizens who believe their position is politically vulnerable have specific cognitive and affective needs that may make them uniquely attuned to counterattitudinal information. In the context of a presidential election, this means that as the defeat of a supported candidate appears more likely, attention to counterattitudinal content will increase. Data collected in the 2008 and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections support this prediction, although this relationship was observed primarily among supporters of the Republican candidate in both elections.     

Affective and cognitive predictors of affective response to exercise: Examining unique and overlapping variance

ObjectivesAffective response to exercise has been suggested as an important factor in determining regular exercise. However, it is unclear the extent to which anticipatory affect factors (affective attitudes, implicit associations, and affective associations), anticipated affect factors (anticipated regret, anticipated pride), and cognitive factors (self-efficacy, intentions) explain overlapping or unique variance in affective response to exercise.DesignWe systematically examined the extent to which these various affective and cognitive factors relevant to exercise predict affective response, and determined the extent to which these factors account for unique or overlapping variance in affective response.MethodHealthy young adults (N = 69) completed measures of affective attitudes, affective associations, implicit associations, anticipated affect, self-efficacy, and exercise intentions. Participants then exercised for 20-min at moderate intensity on a treadmill, during and after which they reported their affective response. Using variables that were independent predictors, we conducted multivariate analyses to determine which factors account for unique variance in affective response to exercise.ResultsIn three of four multivariate models, both anticipated and anticipatory affect variables explained unique variance in affective response during exercise. Only anticipatory affect variables accounted for unique variance in affective response immediately post-exercise. Finally, the association between exercise self-efficacy and affective response during-exercise was rendered non-significant after controlling for affective factors in all three multivariate models.ConclusionsThe unique associations between affective response to exercise and affective, but not cognitive, factors elucidate key predictors of affective response during- and post-exercise.     

Evaluations versus stereotypes in emotion recognition: a replication and extension of Craig and Lipp’s (2018) study on facial age cues

Recently, Cognition and Emotion published an article demonstrating that age cues affect the speed and accuracy of emotion recognition. The authors claimed that the observed effect of target age on emotion recognition is better explained by evaluative than stereotype associations. Although we agree with their conclusion, we believe that with the research method the authors employed, it was impossible to detect a stereotype effect to begin with. In the current research, we successfully replicate previous findings (Study 1). Furthermore, by changing the comparative context, Study 2 provides a first test of age-stereotypes affecting emotions recognition. We discuss recommendations for future studies in the domain of social categorisation and emotion recognition.