The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer

In their article, Is the Brain a Quantum Computer,? Litt, Eliasmith, Kroon, Weinstein, and Thagard (2006) criticize the Penrose–Hameroff “Orch OR” quantum computational model of consciousness, arguing instead for neurocomputation as an explanation for mental phenomena. Here I clarify and defend Orch OR, show how Orch OR and neurocomputation are compatible, and question whether neurocomputation alone can physiologically account for coherent gamma synchrony EEG, a candidate for the neural correlate of consciousness. Orch OR is based on quantum computation in microtubules within dendrites in cortex and other regions linked by dendritic–dendritic gap junctions (“dendritic webs”) acting as laterally connected input layers of the brain's neurocomputational architecture. Within dendritic webs, consciousness is proposed to occur as gamma EEG‐synchronized sequences of discrete quantum computational events acting in integration phases of neurocomputational “integrate‐and‐fire” cycles. Orch OR is a viable approach toward understanding how the brain produces consciousness.     

Developmental changes in face processing skills

Expertise in processing differences among faces in the spacing among facial features (second-order relations) is slower to develop than expertise in processing the shape of individual features or the shape of the external contour. To determine the impact of the slow development of sensitivity to second-order relations on various face-processing skills, we developed five computerized tasks that require matching faces on the basis of identity (with changed facial expression or head orientation), facial expression, gaze direction, and sound being spoken. In Experiment 1, we evaluated the influence of second-order relations on performance on each task by presenting them to adults (N=48) who viewed the faces either upright or inverted. Previous studies have shown that inversion has a larger effect on tasks that require processing the spacing among features than it does on tasks that can be solved by processing the shape of individual features. Adults showed an inversion effect for only one task: matching facial identity when there was a change in head orientation. In Experiment 2, we administered the same tasks to children aged 6, 8, and 10 years (N=72). Compared to adults, 6-year-olds made more errors on every task and 8-year-olds made more errors on three of the five tasks: matching direction of gaze and the two facial identity tasks. Ten-year-olds made more errors than adults on only one task: matching facial identity when there was a change in head orientation (e.g., from frontal to tilted up). Together, the results indicate that the slow development of sensitivity to second-order relations causes children to be especially poor at recognizing the identity of a face when it is seen in a new orientation.     

Recovering depth-order from orientation-defined junctions

This study investigated how visual systems recover depth-order from orientation-defined junctions. Stimuli were superimposed stripes defined by Gabor micro-patterns (Gabors). In one stripe (random stripe), Gabor orientation was randomly selected from a given range, while in the other (constant stripe) it was selected so as to be different from the mean orientation of the random stripe by 90 degrees . Observers reported which of the two stripes, the right- or left-tilted one, they perceived as "nearer" than the other. Observers frequently reported that the random stripe was nearer than the constant stripe. The results appeared to stem from detection of discontinuity of texture edges of the constant stripe due to masking by the random stripe at junctions. This idea was confirmed in the following experiments where discontinuity of the texture edges at junctions was introduced by changing the Gabor luminance contrast in one stripe but keeping it intact in the other. The results indicated that processing of texture edges at junctions can contribute to the perception of depth-order.     

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children’s elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children’s second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.