Gentzen Calculi for the Existence Predicate

We introduce Gentzen calculi for intuitionistic logic extended with an existence predicate. Such a logic was first introduced by Dana Scott, who provided a proof system for it in Hilbert style. We prove that the Gentzen calculus has cut elimination in so far that all cuts can be restricted to very simple ones. Applications of this logic to Skolemization, truth value logics and linear frames are also discussed.     

Adaptive behavior inventory for children: The need for local norms

This study investigates the need for local and/or separate racial-ethnic group norms on the Adaptive Behavior Inventory for Children (ABIC). A random sample of 420 children from the Corpus Christi (Texas) Independent School District, was stratified according to gender, age, racial-ethnic group (Black, Mexican-American, and Anglo), and low or middle socioeconomic status. The parent of each child was interviewed with the ABIC. Results indicated a need for local norms for only the low SES Mexican-Americans.     

A disconfirmation of the quantitative identity-quantitative equivalence sequence

Sixty-four kindergarten children received tests of quantitative identity and quantitative equivalence for the conservations of number and continuous quantity. Two types of identity trials were included: a standard version using a single stimulus, and a modified version which paralleled the equivalence task in its use of two stimuli. In addition, half of the children were asked two questions on each trial (one preceding and one following the transformation), whereas half were asked only the post-transformation question. Neither the number of stimuli used nor the number of questions asked had any effect on performance. In contrast to some previous reports, tests of quantitative identity were no easier than tests of quantitative equivalence. It was concluded that the identity-equivalence décalage, if it exists at all, is less important than previous authors have claimed.     

Kripke's sole route to the necessary a posteriori

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames' misinterpretation.     

Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience

Abstract

Phenomenology is considered a philosophy of experience. But in the wake of French post‐structuralism beginning in the 1970s, the concept of experience within phenomenology has fallen under heavy critique. Even today, in the context of feminist philosophy the phenomenological concept of experience has yet to recover from the poststructuralist critique.

In this article, I will closely examine the poststructuralist critique of the concept of experience within the context of feminist theory. I will thereby refer first and foremost to the poststructuralist theorist Joan Scott, and her influential text “‘Experience’”. In my examination of the poststructuralist critique of experience, the leading question will be whether or not this critique, down to its details, can in fact be applied to phenomenology. My thesis is that phenomenology is able to withstand the poststructuralist critique of experience. Further, I will argue that post‐structuralism and phenomenology have more in common as regards the concept of experience than is usually admitted. For several reasons, it seems – as I will maintain – that both poststructuralist feminism and phenomenology are equally interested in a strong concept of experience and thus do not promote doing away with the concept.     

Timmermann,Forschler, and The Attempt to Bridge the Kantian‐Consequentialist Gap

Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist‐universalizing‐utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist‐universalizing‐utilitarian approach, Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler.     

An Interview With the Association for Spiritual,Ethical, and Religious Values in Counseling Leaders: Craig S. Cashwell and J. Scott Young

American Counseling Association Fellows, past presidents of the Association for Spiritual, Ethical, and Religious Values in Counseling (ASERVIC), and close friends, Drs. Craig S. Cashwell and J. Scott Young have made a significant impact on the field of spirituality counseling over the past 20 years. This interview emphasizes their involvement in ASERVIC and the spirituality counseling field over the course of their careers and in the present, as well as the wisdom they have gained from their experiences.     

Prediction outcome and choice reaction time: Inhibition versus facilitation effects

In two-choice RT tasks Ss verbally predicted all stimulus presentations, two-thirds of the presentations, or none of the presentations. Effects of stimulus probability were similar for each type of prediction trial: Correct Prediction Outcome (PO), Incorrect PO, and No-Prediction (NP). When comparisons between Prediction and NP trials were between Ss, reactions on NP trials were significantly faster than reactions POs, but were not slower than reactions to Correct POs. However, when Prediction and NP trials occurred within Ss, reactions on NP trials were not faster than reactions to Incorrect POs, but were significantly slower than reactions to Correct POs. Speculations about Ss' implicit stimulus predictions are offered to interpret differential implications of inhibition and facilitation.     

Learning the functional significance of mnemonic actions: A microgenetic study of strategy acquisition

How children learn to use memory strategies in a microgenetic investigation of learning and metacognition is examined. Seven- and eight-year-olds were given two memory trials with 24 pictures on each of 5 consecutive days. Days 1 and 2 were baseline, practice trials; Day 3 included strategy training; and Days 4 and 5 were unprompted tests of strategy maintenance. All children were taught how to label, rehearse, and group the pictures as well as to self-test their own memories and use blocked recall. Half of the children were shown the actions and told to do them; the other half received elaborated feedback on the usefulness and appropriateness of the techniques for remembering. The elaborated instructional group exhibited significantly greater recall, clustering, strategic study behavior, and metamemory regarding the mnemonic techniques than the other group. Path analysis provided evidence of a causal role of training and metacognitive awareness that mediated the use of sorting and higher recall. The study illustrates how learning the significance and utility of mnemonic techniques can influence children's acquisition of the tactics as self-controlled strategies. In addition, the microgenetic method affords patterns of data across time and experience that permit richer interpretations of strategy learning and memory development.     

Toward a theory of apractic syndromes

Theoretical development on human motor behavior has occurred largely independently of data on pathological movement disorders. This paper represents an initial attempt to interface findings from studies of apraxia and those of normal motor behavior with a view to formulating a common theoretical framework. Such an integration may ultimately aid in understanding the nature of skill acquisition and provide insights into the organization of motor systems. Three putative theoretical models of movement control are discussed with reference to apractic syndromes. The most commonly accepted view—the hierarchy—possesses properties such as linear transitivity and unidirectionality of information flow that render it inadequate in explaining functional plasticity in the central nervous system. The heterarchy, which incorporates reciprocity of function and circular transitivity, is a more likely candidate but suffers from an inability to regulate the degrees of freedom of the system. Our favored candidate is the coalition model which embodies heterarchical principles, but in addition, offers a solution to the problems of degrees of freedom and context for motor systems. Evidence is reviewed from apraxia of speech and limbs in terms of a coalitional style of control and an experimental approach, consonant with coalitional organization, is developed. We promote the claim that an understanding of apractic behavior—and perhaps motor systems in general—will benefit when clinicians and experimenters embrace a theory of context and constraints rather than a theory of commands as is currently in vogue.