A computational model of spatial visualization capacity

Visualizing spatial material is a cornerstone of human problem solving, but human visualization capacity is sharply limited. To investigate the sources of this limit, we developed a new task to measure visualization accuracy for verbally-described spatial paths (similar to street directions), and implemented a computational process model to perform it. In this model, developed within the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) architecture, visualization capacity is limited by three mechanisms. Two of these (associative interference and decay) are longstanding characteristics of ACT-R’s declarative memory. A third (spatial interference) is a new mechanism motivated by spatial proximity effects in our data. We tested the model in two experiments, one with parameter-value fitting, and a replication without further fitting. Correspondence between model and data was close in both experiments, suggesting that the model may be useful for understanding why visualizing new, complex spatial material is so difficult.     

Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning

Brain images are believed to have a particularly persuasive influence on the public perception of research on cognition. Three experiments are reported showing that presenting brain images with articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research resulted in higher ratings of scientific reasoning for arguments made in those articles, as compared to articles accompanied by bar graphs, a topographical map of brain activation, or no image. These data lend support to the notion that part of the fascination, and the credibility, of brain imaging research lies in the persuasive power of the actual brain images themselves. We argue that brain images are influential because they provide a physical basis for abstract cognitive processes, appealing to people's affinity for reductionistic explanations of cognitive phenomena.     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

A Review of the Types of Scientific Misconduct in Biomedical Research

Biomedical research has increased in magnitude over the last two decades. Increasing number of researchers has led to increase in competition for scarce resources. Researchers have often tried to take the shortest route to success which may involve performing fraudulent research. Science suffers from unethical research as much time, effort and cost is involved in exposing fraud and setting the standards right. It is better for all students of science to be aware of the methods used in fraudulent research so that such research can be detected early. Biomedical research is one area that seems to have attracted maximum numbers of fraudulent researchers; hence this article devotes itself to biomedical research scenario.     

Choosing between hearts and minds: Children's understanding of moral advisors

Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly.     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.     

Visualization,pattern recognition,and forward search: effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors

A new approach examined two aspects of chess skill, long a popular topic in cognitive science. A powerful computer‐chess program calculated the number and magnitude of blunders made by the same 23 grandmasters in hundreds of serious games of slow (“classical”) chess, regular “rapid” chess, and rapid “blindfold” chess, in which opponents transmit moves without ever seeing the actual position. Rapid chess led to substantially more and larger blunders than classical chess. Perhaps more surprisingly, the frequency and magnitude of blunders did not differ in rapid versus blindfold play, despite the additional memory and visualization load imposed by the latter. We discuss the involvement of various cognitive processes in human problem‐solving and expertise, especially with respect to chess. Prior opposing views about the basis of general chess skill have emphasized the dominance of either (a) swift pattern recognition or (b) analyzing ahead, but both seem important and the controversy appears currently unresolvable and perhaps fruitless.     

Images of the disciplining of psychology, 1890–1940

Over the course of psychology’s first several decades, the language used to convey the subject matter gradually shifted from being free and literary to being strictly constrained and disciplined by increasingly focused theoretical demands. The project described here, “Disciplining Psychology,” aimed to depict this transformation by generating images of the faces of three highly influential psychologists—William James, Sigmund Freud, and B. F. Skinner. Each image is composed of the words used in one of each individual’s most important books. The tightening of the disciplinary vocabulary is revealed in the differences among the three arrays of words themselves, but I have also striven to reflect it in the aesthetic aspects of each image. The method used here could easily be extended to a wider array of authors, texts, and psychological topics.     

The legal basis for the Danish committee on scientific dishonesty

The author, a High Court Judge, has chaired the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) since its establishment in 1992. The Committee has worked in the health sector, but from 1999 the scope has been broadened to cover all fields of science. The article describes how the work is organised and the experiences gained. It is stressed, that the difficulty in connection with scientific dishonesty is, first and foremost, to organise a system suitable for investigating cases effectively, professionally, and with proper respect to the fundamental legal rights of the parties involved. The Committee has also spent much effort in determining what can be termed scientific dishonesty and what falls outside this category but which may, nevertheless, be characterised as breaching of good scientific practice. It is emphasised that these rules are not arbitrarily established by the Committee, but formulated in accordance with norms general accepted by opinion leaders in the scientific community. An carlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct. An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998. The article is based on more comprehensive articles by the same author in DCSD’s Annual Reports for 1993 and 1995.