"What if…": The Use of Conceptual Simulations in Scientific Reasoning

The term conceptual simulation refers to a type of everyday reasoning strategy commonly called "what if" reasoning. It has been suggested in a number of contexts that this type of reasoning plays an important role in scientific discovery; however, little direct evidence exists to support this claim. This article proposes that conceptual simulation is likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty, and may be used to help scientists resolve that uncertainty. We conducted two studies to investigate the relationship between conceptual simulation and informational uncertainty. Study 1 was an in vivo study of expert scientists; the results suggest that scientists do use conceptual simulation in situations of informational uncertainty, and that they use conceptual simulation to make inferences from their data using the analogical reasoning process of alignment by similarity detection. Study 2 experimentally manipulated experts' level of uncertainty and provides further support for the hypothesis that conceptual simulation is more likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the relationship between conceptual simulation and other types of reasoning using qualitative mental models.     

Private Interests Count Too

Along with concerns about the deleterious effects of politically driven government intervention on science are the intrusion of private sector interests into the conduct of research and the reporting of its results. Scientists are generally unprepared for the challenges posed by private interests seeking to advance their economic, political, or ideological agendas. They must educate and prepare themselves for assaults on scientific freedom, not because it is a legal right, but rather because social progress depends on it.

Building to discover: a common coding model

I present a case study of scientific discovery, where building two functional and behavioral approximations of neurons, one physical and the other computational, led to conceptual and implementation breakthroughs in a neural engineering laboratory. Such building of external systems that mimic target phenomena, and the use of these external systems to generate novel concepts and control structures, is a standard strategy in the new engineering sciences. I develop a model of the cognitive mechanism that connects such built external systems with internal models, and I examine how new discoveries, and consensus on discoveries, could arise from this external-internal coupling and the building process. The model is based on the emerging framework of common coding, which proposes a shared representation in the brain between the execution, perception, and imagination of movement.     

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Elliott’s Ethics of Expertise Proposal and Application: A Dangerous Precedent

In a recent paper in Science and Engineering Ethics (SEE) Elliott proposed an ethics of expertise, providing its theoretical foundation along with its application in a case study devoted to the topic of hormesis. The application is based on a commentary in the journal Nature, and it includes assertions of ethical breaches. Elliott concludes that the authors of the commentary failed to promote the informed consent of decision makers by not providing representative information about alternative frequency estimates of hormesis in the literature, thereby hindering the capacity of the scientific community to promote informed consent relating to chemical regulation. This paper argues that Elliott should have incorporated due process into his system of evaluation. His argument is also seriously deficient technically, in that it misinterprets the toxicological issues, misrepresents the scientific literature with respect to the frequency of hormesis, and incorrectly assesses the extent to which the Nature paper revealed opposing/alternative views on hormesis. Given the seriousness of assertions of noncompliance to ethical norms, there must be procedures to protect those whose ethics were called into question, to fairly evaluate the technical justification for an assertion, and to enable corrections in the event of errors. If a journal is willing to publish assertions that individuals acted in an ethically questionable way, it should be guided by a documented code of ethics and meet a standard of responsibility far greater than normal peer-review processes for papers that do not entail such ethical judgments.     

Correction and use of biomedical literature affected by scientific misconduct

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe published research articles that were named in official findings of scientific misconduct and to investigate compliance with the administrative actions contained in these reports for corrections and retractions, as represented in PubMed. Between 1993 and 2001, 102 articles were named in either the NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts ("Findings of Scientific Misconduct") or the U.S. Office of Research Integrity annual reports as needing retraction or correction. In 2002, 98 of the 102 articles were indexed in PubMed. Eighty-five of these 98 articles had indexed corrections: 47 were retracted; 26 had an erratum; 12 had a correction described in the "comment" field. Thirteen had no correction, but 10 were linked to the NIH Guide "Findings of Scientific Misconduct", leaving only 3 articles with no indication of any sort of problem. As of May 2005, there were 5,393 citations to the 102 articles, with a median of 26 citations per article (range 0-592). Researchers should be alert to "Comments" linked to the NIH Guide as these are open access, and the "Findings of Scientific Misconduct' reports are often more informative than the statements about the retraction or correction found in the journals.     

Cultural Complexities and Scientific Development

Methodological issues in psychology consist of a key aspect for the scientific development of the discipline. In this paper I elaborate on the reasons why I partially agree with Toomela's ideas, and why I also disagree with some of his arguments. The convergence refers to the need for a radical change concerning the widespread use of methodologies that has been typical of mainstream psychology, which still flavors too positivist and pseudo-quantitative, overlooking the central relevance of theory for scientific development. The divergence resides in Toomela's insistence to oppose what he designates as "the North American" to "the German-Austrian" scientific thinking: from my perspective, the misuse of cultural categories can only lead to misguided and unconstructive dichotomies that entails a naive concept of culture, and do not contribute to scientific development. From a contemporary systemic approach, complex issues deserve more sophisticated analysis.     

The enduring relevance of Wachtel's “Investigation and its discontents”

Wachtel's [Wachtel, P. L. (1980). Investigation and its discontents: Some constraints on progress in psychological research. American Psychologist, 35, 399–408] essay “Investigation and its discontents” is as relevant today as when first published. Wachtel rightly defends the value of full-time theoretical inquiry, but his concerns about the adverse effects of an emphasis on productivity may be unwarranted.     

A visualization technique for Bayesian reasoning

We tested a method for solving Bayesian reasoning problems in terms of spatial relations as opposed to mathematical equations. Participants completed Bayesian problems in which they were given a prior probability and two conditional probabilities and were asked to report the posterior odds. After a pretraining phase in which participants completed problems with no instruction or external support, participants watched a video describing a visualization technique that used the length of bars to represent the probabilities provided in the problem. Participants then completed more problems with a chance to implement the technique by clicking interactive bars on the computer screen. Performance improved dramatically from the pretraining phase to the interactive‐bar phase. Participants maintained improved performance in transfer phases in which they were required to implement the visualization technique with either pencil‐and‐paper or no external medium. Accuracy levels for participants using the visualization technique were very similar to participants trained to solve the Bayes theorem equation. The results showed no evidence of learning across problems in the pretraining phase or for control participants who did not receive training, so the improved performance of participants using the visualization method could be uniquely attributed to the method itself. A classroom sample demonstrated that these benefits extend to instructional settings. The results show that people can quickly learn to perform Bayesian reasoning without using mathematical equations. We discuss ways that a spatial solution method can enhance classroom instruction on Bayesian inference and help students apply Bayesian reasoning in everyday settings.     

Recherche en santé et protection des données personnelles à l’heure du Règlement général relatif à la protection des données

France has a very rich legal framework, which defines the conditions of access and use of health data for scientific research purposes and ensures their protection. Currently, this legal framework is undergoing revision. The European regulation of April 27th 2016 on protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data came into effect in EU member states since 25th May 2018 and substitute a rationale of administrative process for a rationale that empowers the researchers to document and prove compliance with the regulation (“accountability”). This regulation must be coordinated with the other regulation applicable to research in UE and with national law.