Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

The morality of harm

In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117-131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.     

The effects of interpersonal relationship and character gender on adolescents' resolutions of moral dilemmas

An experimental study using two forms of the Defining Issues Test [Rest, J. R. (1979). Revised manual for the Defining Issues Test. Minneapolis: Moral Research Project, University of Minnesota.], modified to present either a high degree of relationship among characters or a low degree of relationship among characters, was conducted with 114 college students. The gender of the characters in the dilemmas was also systematically varied. Both male and female students evidenced principled (Stages 5 and 6) reasoning more often when dilemma characters were male than when story characters were female. Participant gender and relationship condition were significant factors in the frequency of Stage 4 reasoning. Male students in the low-relationship condition evidenced Stage 4 (“Law and order”) reasoning most often when story characters were male, while male students, like female students in all conditions, showed Stage 4 reasoning more often when female characters were presented in the high-relationship condition. The degree to which moral decisions were supportive of an affected character revealed more support when story characters were female than when they were male. Results indicate that even in hypothetical situations, moral judgments vary with the gender of the person being judged and to some degree with the relationships among those involved in the dilemma. These findings are consistent with a view that multiple, equally valid approaches to moral judgment might exist and affect the development of male and female students differently.     

Mereotopological Connection

The paper outlines a model-theoretic framework for investigating and comparing a variety of mereotopological theories. In the first part we consider different ways of characterizing a mereotopology with respect to (i) the intended interpretation of the connection primitive, and (ii) the composition of the admissible domains of quantification (e.g., whether or not they include boundary elements). The second part extends this study by considering two further dimensions along which different patterns of topological connection can be classified – the strength of the connection and its multiplicity.     

When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning.     

人格特质与认知操作关系的初步研究

本研究采用NEO PI R测试 ,以逻辑推理为认知操作指标 ,初步考察了人格特质与大学生认知操作的关系。结果表明 :①神经质、外倾性与逻辑推理有显著负相关 ,开放性则与之呈正相关 ;②人格特质和认知操作关系的偏相关分析与相关分析的结果基本一致 ;③多元逐步回归分析显示 ,外倾性与逻辑推理有负性预测关系 ,开放性及严谨性则与逻辑推理有正性预测关系 ;④人格特质与认知操作的关系受操作难度、认知任务和兴趣类型等因素制约。     

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

Combined reasoning by automated cooperation

Different reasoning systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and often it is useful to combine these systems to gain as much as possible from their strengths and retain as little as possible from their weaknesses. Of particular interest is the integration of first-order and higher-order techniques. First-order reasoning systems, on the one hand, have reached considerable strength in some niches, but in many areas of mathematics they still cannot reliably solve relatively simple problems, for example, when reasoning about sets, relations, or functions. Higher-order reasoning systems, on the other hand, can solve problems of this kind automatically. But the complexity inherent in their calculi prevents them from solving a whole range of problems. However, while many problems cannot be solved by any one system alone, they can be solved by a combination of these systems.We present a general agent-based methodology for integrating different reasoning systems. It provides a generic integration framework which facilitates the cooperation between diverse reasoners, but can also be refined to enable more efficient, specialist integrations. We empirically evaluate its usefulness, effectiveness and efficiency by case studies involving the integration of first-order and higher-order automated theorem provers, computer algebra systems, and model generators.     

任务情境和证据信息对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响研究

采用生活情境测查任务和经典测查任务探讨了任务情境对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响,以及生活情境测查任务中不同证据信息对青少年贝叶斯判断的影响作用.结果表明:(1)在生活情境测查任务中,从小学六年级到大学二年级,被试的贝叶斯推理能力稳步缓慢提升(相邻的两个被试组之间差异不显著,而不相邻的两个被试组之间差异更容易达到显著水平),发展没有出现加速期,而经典测查任务情境下没有表现出年龄差异;(2)贝叶斯推理作为条件概率的判断不仅受任务情境的影响,而且同一任务情境中不同证据信息也会影响贝叶斯判断.当证据信息与先验信念一致时,被试可以充分利用线索进行推理.