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91.
Alexander Skiles 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(1):100-112
Fine (1994 “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet, a number of philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the distinction Lewis (1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377; 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant properties and relations. 相似文献
92.
In a famous study of expert problem solving, de Groot (1946/1978) examined how chess players found the best move. He reported that there was little difference in the way that the best players (Grand Masters) and very good players (Candidate Masters) searched the board. Although this result has been regularly cited in studies of expertise, it is frequently misquoted. It is often claimed that de Groot found no difference in the way that experts and novices investigate a problem. Comparison of expert and novice chess players on de Groot's problem shows that there are clear differences in their search patterns. We discuss the troublesome theoretical and practical consequences of incorrectly reporting de Groot's findings. 相似文献
93.
The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective. 相似文献
94.
Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. In our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated by Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kind of experiments used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3), and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments. 相似文献
95.
96.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
97.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
相似文献
Valeriano IranzoEmail: |
98.
The tendency is strong to take the notion of "conflict of interests" for granted as if it had an invariant meaning and an ethical content independent of the historical context. It is doubtful however, from an historical and sociological point of view, that many of the cases now considered as instances of "conflicts of interests" would also have been conceived and perceived as such in, say, the 1930s. The idea of a "conflict of interests" presupposes that there are indeed interests in conflict. Conversely, as long as there is a consensus among the different groups involved, they will not conceive and even less denounce a given practice as being an instance of a "conflict of interests". In this article we will show that the content of the discussions over conflicts of interests has changed over time in close relation with the transformations of the research system. In other words: there are social conditions for the emergence of "conflicts of interests". The changing meaning of the notion is assessed by analyzing the presence of the expression "conflicts of interests" in the magazine Science over the past century. Three different meanings emerge and their content has evolved in close link with the changing structure of the relations between the scientific community first with the State and then with industry. It moved from a situation external to the scientific community to a debate going on inside the scientific community generated by the growing relations between university and industries. 相似文献
99.
Baronov D 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):235-254
Though ubiquitous across the medical social sciences literature, the term “biomedicine” as an analytical concept remains remarkably
slippery. It is argued here that this imprecision is due in part to the fact that biomedicine is comprised of three interrelated
ontological spheres, each of which frames biomedicine as a distinct subject of investigation. This suggests that, depending
upon one’s ontological commitment, the meaning of biomedicine will shift. From an empirical perspective, biomedicine takes
on the appearance of a scientific enterprise and is defined as a derivative category of Western science more generally. From
an interpretive perspective, biomedicine represents a symbolic-cultural expression whose adherence to the principles of scientific
objectivity conceals an ideological agenda. From a conceptual perspective, biomedicine represents an expression of social
power that reflects structures of power and privilege within capitalist society. No one perspective exists in isolation and
so the image of biomedicine from any one presents an incomplete understanding. It is the mutually-conditioning interrelations
between these ontological spheres that account for biomedicine’s ongoing development. Thus, the ontological dissection of
biomedicine that follows, with particular emphasis on the period of its formal crystallization in the latter nineteenth and
early twentieth century, is intended to deepen our understanding of biomedicine as an analytical concept across the medical
social sciences literature.
相似文献
David BaronovEmail: |
100.
Thomas M. Robinson 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(2):229-240
It is argued in this paper that the famous "Active Intellect" of De Anima 3.5 is not God, as Alexander of Aphrodisias held, but rather an unchanging, eternally cognizing Intellect which serves as the indispensable condition for the operation of human intellect. It is "at the door" for each individual, ready to flow in as a stream of light--a light which renders potential objects of cognition knowable, just as visible light makes potentially visible objects visible--from outside that door (thyrathen) any time it is opened. Its existence cannot serve, however, as a proof of the immortality of human intellect, since, being unchanging, it can never possess a feature of human intellect which is characterized by nothing if not change, and that is memory. 相似文献