The legal basis for the Danish committee on scientific dishonesty

The author, a High Court Judge, has chaired the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) since its establishment in 1992. The Committee has worked in the health sector, but from 1999 the scope has been broadened to cover all fields of science. The article describes how the work is organised and the experiences gained. It is stressed, that the difficulty in connection with scientific dishonesty is, first and foremost, to organise a system suitable for investigating cases effectively, professionally, and with proper respect to the fundamental legal rights of the parties involved. The Committee has also spent much effort in determining what can be termed scientific dishonesty and what falls outside this category but which may, nevertheless, be characterised as breaching of good scientific practice. It is emphasised that these rules are not arbitrarily established by the Committee, but formulated in accordance with norms general accepted by opinion leaders in the scientific community. An carlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct. An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998. The article is based on more comprehensive articles by the same author in DCSD’s Annual Reports for 1993 and 1995.     

Naturalized Epistemics and Conditional Reasoning

The continued predominance of SL-logic and deductive paradigms in the research on conditional-based reasoning by experimental psychologists is examined and criticized. After recounting the history and influence of the model, I note the emergence of trends in epistemology and other areas of theory that might provide a springboard for the critique of the model, and I argue that a new approach to examining reasoning with conditionals ought to be developed. I conclude that a superior approach would model such reasoning with sociolinguistic, inductive, and neurophysiological parameters, and that it would not involve any comparison of subjects' reasoning with the standard deductive rules of logic.     

The Virtue of Nussbaum's Essentialism

This paper shows that Nussbaum's Aristotelian essentialism effectively combines resources for constructive social criticism (even in "traditional" societies) with concern for the concrete particulars of realized ways of life. Many critics of Nussbaum's views have failed to appreciate its many virtues in this regard. Yet Nussbaum's confidence in the broad possibilities of internal social criticism demands a better account of the moral openness of human cultures than anything Nussbaum has herself provided. Even Nussbaum's reading of Aristotle – as well as the ethical antirelativism on which it depends – demands a richer account than Nussbaum has so far offered of the essential openness of human world interpretations.     

Religion and Science in America: Struggling for Coherence

James Gilbert has provided fascinating and valuable historical sketches of the interactions of science and religion in American culture in this century, especially those taking place between 1945 and 1962. Yet, taken together, it is unclear what conclusion is to be drawn from these interactions. Ambiguity about the variety of forms of the science-and-religion relationship and about the referent of the term religion make the task of apprehending a coherent pattern among these sketches very difficult.     

Valorisation de la recherche en santé humaine et protection des données à l’ère du numérique

Medical research collects a huge number of medical data sheltered in Data Centers. An European regulation rule (GDRP) or General Data Protection Regulation aims to give an ethic frame to protect personal data and delegate responsability to citizens.     

A Developmental Approach to Social Science: A Model for Analyzing Charles Alexander's Scientific Contributions

A seven-paradigm developmental model of social science is presented (behaviorism, gestalt sociologism, empirical positivism, multi-method eclecticism, postmodern interpretivism, cooperative ecological inquiry, and developmental action inquiry). Charles Alexander's research is interpreted as bridging aspects of several paradigms, using third-person empirical positivist experiments to demonstrate the effects of a first-person research/practice called Transcendental Meditiation. The author suggests the possibility of complementing current research on TM with explicit double- and triple-loop research on the second- and third-person practices within the TM movement.     

Congruence in Satir's Model: Its Spiritual and Religious Significance

This article casts into relief the essentialist-existential philosophy implicit in Satir's model of healing using Paul Tillich's systematic philosophical framework. Parallels between Satir's model of the person are drawn with Tillich's ontological categories of essence and existence, individualization and participation, and destiny and freedom. Congruence as the integration of elements in three vital human dimensions: the interpersonal, intrapsychic, and spiritual-universal, is correlated with Tillich's philosophical understanding of salvation. The religious quest is understood as a systemic, multidimensional process that brings the interactive and interdependent personal, interpersonal and spiritual dimensions into a restored unity. Thus Satir's rehumanization project and Tillich's religious quest are shown to coincide.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

The meaning of the h-index

The h-index originates from the assumption that the number of citations received by a scientist is a better indicator of the relevance of his or her work than the number of papers he or she publishes or the journals where they are published. It takes into account the number of papers published and the citations to those papers in a balanced way, and thus is useful to make comparisons between scientists. The present paper addresses the most frequent questions about the h-index. Specifically, it explains its origin, its advantages compared to other indices, the factors that can influence it (e.g. age, field of knowledge, topic of research and language of publication), its variants, and the injustices it may lead to. In short, this paper provides a clear exposition of the hoped-for role of the h-index in the evaluation of scientists: that it serves as a useful complement to other indicators that are more subjective, and that it contributes to the progress of science by aiding decision-making on allocation of research resources in a more effective way, and on rewarding researchers who contribute to scientific progress in a more fair way.