动机对高一学生创造性的科学问题提出能力的影响

选取了360名高一学生,采用直接和间接激发内外动机的方式,通过两个研究考察了内外动机和不同水平的外部动机对中学生创造性的科学问题提出能力的影响,结果发现:(1)直接激发条件下,内部动机能够促进创造性的科学问题提出能力,尤其表现在流畅性以及独创性维度上;(2)直接激发条件下,外部动机能够抑制创造性的科学问题提出能力,尤其表现在独创性维度上;(3)评价情境不同引起的不同的动机水平对于创造性的科学问题提出能力的影响是不同的,期待正性评价不影响创造性的科学问题提出能力,但避免负性评价对创造性的科学问题提出能力有着显著的抑制作用.     

Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism

According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion. I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.

A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Scientific Realism

Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist alternative does not aim at the truth.     

Expert and “novice” problem solving strategies in chess: Sixty years of citing de Groot (1946)

In a famous study of expert problem solving, de Groot (1946 de Groot, A. D. 1946. Het denken van den schaker, Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche.  [Google Scholar]/1978 de Groot, A. D. 1965. Thought and choice in chess, The Hague: Mouton Publishers.  [Google Scholar]) examined how chess players found the best move. He reported that there was little difference in the way that the best players (Grand Masters) and very good players (Candidate Masters) searched the board. Although this result has been regularly cited in studies of expertise, it is frequently misquoted. It is often claimed that de Groot found no difference in the way that experts and novices investigate a problem. Comparison of expert and novice chess players on de Groot's problem shows that there are clear differences in their search patterns. We discuss the troublesome theoretical and practical consequences of incorrectly reporting de Groot's findings.