The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology and evidence

Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.

Are self-explanations always beneficial?

We present evidence suggesting that the effect of self-explanations on learning is not always beneficial and, in fact, in some contexts has a detrimental effect. Over eight sessions, fourth-graders engaged in investigation of a database with the goal of identifying causal effects. In a separate task, children in one condition also generated self-explanations regarding the mechanisms underlying the causal effects they believed to be present. In a comparison condition, they did not. On a transfer task, children in the no-explanations condition showed superior causal inference performance. The findings are discussed as reflecting the development of “data-reading” skill with which an emphasis on explanations may interfere.     

When Stereotypes Become ‘Scientific’ Statements: Dealing with Gender Issues

The theoretical analysis by Watzlawik (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 2009) demonstrates the scientific fragility of the constructs of masculinity and femininity based on the oversimplification and overlapping between three levels of analysis: group differences, inter-individual differences and intra-individual differences. Watzlawik presents fresh and relevant contributions in terms of methodological issues, especially about the construction of scientific generalizations. Here I focus on issues related to the transformation of stereotypes in statements about gender differences that claim to be ‘scientific’—outlining the socio-political agendas of such statements.

帛书《周易》以史解经刍议

1973年长沙马王堆出土的帛书《周易》中的《缪和》篇中,有六则以历史故事解说《易经》卦爻辞的例子。本文分析这六则历史故事用以解经的符合程度,以证明用历史故事解经并不始于南宋的杨万里等人,而四库馆臣所谓"一变而胡瑗、程子,始阐明儒理;再变而李光、杨万里,又参证史事,《易》遂日启其论端",并非历史事实。     

Making psychology incorruptible

This paper is a response to criticisms, by Peterson (1995) and others, of positions I took in an earlier article, “Manifesto for a science of clinical psychology” (McFall, 1991). I had argued that professional practice and training in clinical psychology must be governed by a scientific epistemology, and had outlined some of the specific reasons and implications. In this article, I attempt to correct misinterpretations of my previous arguments, to clarify ambiguities, and to fill any serious omissions. The fundamental points of the original Manifesto are defended, buttressed, and extended. In response to issues highlighted by the criticisms, two new corollaries are added to those offered in the original article. These summarize the arguments presented in this paper, with special emphasis on the essential role of skepticism as the best protection against the corruption of knowledge and practice in psychology.     

第三种生命形式的诞生与科学哲学

美国科学家卡尔·戊斯发现了生命的第三种形式－古生菌域,并将生物分成三大分支,即真核生物域、细菌域和古生菌域。这一理论被称为戊斯革命。但是,他的理论历经艰辛才得到同行的认可,从科学哲学研究的方法论和认识论讨论这一重大发现带给我们有关思维方式和科学评价体系的思考。     

What is a Natural Conception of the World?

Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson.     

Using logic programming for theory representation and scientific inference

The aim of this paper is to show that logic programming is a powerful tool for representing scientific theories and for scientific inference. In a logic program it is possible to encode the qualitative and quantitative components of a theory in first order predicate logic, which is a highly expressive formal language. A theory program can then be handed to an algorithm that reasons about the theory. We discuss the advantages of logic programming with regard to building formal theories and present a novel software package for scientific inference: Theory Toolbox. Theory Toolbox can derive any conclusions that are entailed by a theory, explain why a certain conclusion follows from a theory, and evaluate a theory with regard to its internal coherence and generalizability. Because logic is, or should be, a cornerstone of scientific practice, we believe that our paper can make an important contribution to scientific psychology.     

Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism

According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion. I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.

科技人员创造动机与创造力的研究

本研究初步探讨了我国科技人员创造动机与创造力的关系及其基本特征。 1 74名科技人员回答了成就目标、内部动机与外部动机、创造动机和创造力问卷。研究结果表明我国科技人员有较高的创造力和创造动机水平 ,在动机中内部动机水平最高。在动机与创造力的关系上 ,内部动机对创造力的直接与间接影响均达到了显著水平 ,外部动机对创造力的负面影响没有达到显著水平 ,任务目标对创造力无影响 ,自我目标对创造力的积极影响未达到显著水平。