Aprendiendo a usar el Researcher-ID como indicador de la producción científica

The research focused on the development of scientific production measurements implies a detailed and quite accurately procedure to avoid errors and misinterpretations by third parties. The use of public researcher profiles such as the Researcher ID among others, may appeal to simplify the process of direct search on databases. The purpose of this research is to analyze the Researcher ID profile as an indicator of scientific productivity in a sample of 8 Spanish professors of Personality, Evaluation and Psychological Treatment area and compare these professors searching them in the Web of Science, also respond to a disagreement generated from a previous study published in Psicothema and culminated in a letter, as that there are unfounded arguments exposed. The results show that there are inaccuracies in the Researcher ID's and therefore cannot be used as an indicator of scientific production, since this tool allows to include any record type (letters, meeting abstracts, etc…) even unrelated content to the Web of Science. These findings are discussed a view to the disagreement and previously mentioned and generated in Psicothema.     

Reviews

Thomas Ryba, The Essence of Phenomenology and Its Meaning for the Scientific Study of Religion
Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life
Edited by Clifford N. Matthews and Roy A. Varghese, Cosmic Beginnings and Human Ends: Where Science and Religion Meet     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes

Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight relation among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures approach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.     

The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity. Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory. My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.     

Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning

Brain images are believed to have a particularly persuasive influence on the public perception of research on cognition. Three experiments are reported showing that presenting brain images with articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research resulted in higher ratings of scientific reasoning for arguments made in those articles, as compared to articles accompanied by bar graphs, a topographical map of brain activation, or no image. These data lend support to the notion that part of the fascination, and the credibility, of brain imaging research lies in the persuasive power of the actual brain images themselves. We argue that brain images are influential because they provide a physical basis for abstract cognitive processes, appealing to people's affinity for reductionistic explanations of cognitive phenomena.     

A Review of the Types of Scientific Misconduct in Biomedical Research

Biomedical research has increased in magnitude over the last two decades. Increasing number of researchers has led to increase in competition for scarce resources. Researchers have often tried to take the shortest route to success which may involve performing fraudulent research. Science suffers from unethical research as much time, effort and cost is involved in exposing fraud and setting the standards right. It is better for all students of science to be aware of the methods used in fraudulent research so that such research can be detected early. Biomedical research is one area that seems to have attracted maximum numbers of fraudulent researchers; hence this article devotes itself to biomedical research scenario.     

Choosing between hearts and minds: Children's understanding of moral advisors

Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly.     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.     

Against Teleological Essentialism

In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that humans represent category essences in terms of a telos, such as honey-making, and not in terms of scientific essences, such as bee DNA. Here, I challenge their interpretation of the evidence and show that it is directly predicted by the main theory they seek to undermine. I argue that their results can be explained as instances of diagnostic reasoning about scientific essences.