Availability of Alternatives and the Processing of Scalar Implicatures: A Visual World Eye‐Tracking Study

Two visual world experiments investigated the processing of the implicature associated with some using a “gumball paradigm.” On each trial, participants saw an image of a gumball machine with an upper chamber with orange and blue gumballs and an empty lower chamber. Gumballs dropped to the lower chamber, creating a contrast between a partitioned set of gumballs of one color and an unpartitioned set of the other. Participants then evaluated spoken statements, such as “You got some of the blue gumballs.” Experiment 1 investigated the time course of the pragmatic enrichment from some to not all when the only utterance alternatives available to refer to the different sets were some and all. In Experiment 2, the number terms two, three, four, and five were also included in the set of alternatives. Scalar implicatures were delayed relative to the interpretation of literal statements with all only when number terms were available. The results are interpreted as evidence for a constraint‐based account of scalar implicature processing.     

Temporal generalization gradients following an interdimensional discrimination protocol

We investigated the effects of interdimensional discrimination training in the temporal generalization gradient. In a matching-to-sample task, pigeons learned to choose key S after a T–s houselight sample and key NS in the absence of the houselight sample. For one group of pigeons, T?=?20?s; for another, T?=?10?s. Subsequently, houselight duration was varied to obtain temporal generalization gradients. Results showed that (a) proportion S increased as houselight duration ranged from 0?s to T?s and then remained high for houselight durations longer than T; (b) the gradients were well described by negative-exponential functions; (c) these non-flat gradients were present from the beginning of testing, and; (d) the average gradients obtained with T?=?20?s and T?=?10?s overlapped when plotted in relative time. We conclude that temporal control does not require explicit discrimination training along the temporal dimension, and that temporal generalization gradients obtained with an interdimensional protocol show the scalar property of timing. We discuss how these findings challenge current models of timing.     

Vibrotactile timing: Are vibrotactile judgements of duration affected by repetitive stimulation?

Timing in the vibrotactile modality was explored. Previous research has shown that repetitive auditory stimulation (in the form of click-trains) and visual stimulation (in the form of flickers) can alter duration judgements in a manner consistent with a “speeding up” of an internal clock. In Experiments 1 and 2 we investigated whether repetitive vibrotactile stimulation in the form of vibration trains would also alter duration judgements of either vibrotactile stimuli or visual stimuli. Participants gave verbal estimates of the duration of vibrotactile and visual stimuli that were preceded either by five seconds of 5-Hz vibration trains, or, by a five-second period of no vibrotactile stimulation, the end of which was signalled by a single vibration pulse (control condition). The results showed that durations were overestimated in the vibrotactile train conditions relative to the control condition; however, the effects were not multiplicative (did not increase with increasing stimulus duration) and as such were not consistent with a speeding up of the internal clock, but rather with an additive attentional effect. An additional finding was that the slope of the vibrotactile psychometric (control condition) function was not significantly different from that of the visual (control condition) function, which replicates a finding from a previous cross-modal comparison of timing.     

Timing, remembering, and discrimination

Four pigeons were first trained in a timing procedure. In one condition, each trial began with the presentation of an X on the center key, followed by a delay (short or long), after which two side keys were lit. If the delay was short, pecks to the red side key were reinforced. If the delay was long, pecks to the green side key were reinforced. In a second condition, the opposite contingencies applied following presentation of a square on the center key. Choice responses were then tested at 10 time intervals ranging from short to long (1 to 4 s and 4 to 7 s in different conditions). The two timing conditions were combined to create a remembering condition in which correct responding depended upon discrimination of both the sample stimulus (X or square) and the delay interval (short or long). Choices varied systematically across delay in timing conditions, but in remembering conditions, accurate choice at the training delays did not initially generalize to intermediate delays. However, with prolonged training in the remembering task, the response pattern began to resemble that of the timing conditions. Generalization gradients were asymmetrical, in accordance with Weber's Law, in that greater generalization occurred with longer delays than with shorter delays.     

Interstimulus interval and delivery cues influence timed conditioned responding in rats

Appetitive contextual excitation supported by intertrial unconditioned stimuli was more easily overcome by timed conditioned responding in rats using quiet (Experiment 1) rather than noisy (Experiment 2) food pellet deliveries. Head-entry responding in acquisition peaked above the contextual baseline when pellet delivery occurred 10, 30, 60, or 90 s after the onset of the 120-s white-noise conditioned stimulus (CS). Special tests in extinction revealed CS onset and offset were conditioned by pellet delivery at 0 and 120 s, respectively. Responding was not undermined in Experiment 3 when noisy pellet deliveries replaced quiet pellet deliveries. Our results suggest that micro-stimuli occasioned at different times during the CS are vulnerable to overshadowing, but do not lose strength if they are already predictive.     

Personality Development from Age 12 to 25 and its Links with Life Transitions

During adolescence and young adulthood, individuals show personality changes and experience various life transitions. Whereas personality might affect the timing of life transitions, life transitions might also induce personality maturation. We examined Big Five personality maturation from age 12 to 25 using a 9-year longitudinal study of Dutch youths from two cohorts (n₁ = 683, M_ageT1 = 12.70; n₂ = 268, M_age T1 = 16.87). We linked personality maturation to the incidence and timing of four transitions: first romantic relationship, leaving the parental home, first job, and first cohabitation or marriage. Results indicated increases in mean levels, rank-order stabilities and profile stability of personality between age 12 and 25, which were largely replicated across the cohorts. Very few associations between personality and life transitions existed. However, higher mean-level Extraversion predicted leaving the parental home and starting the first romantic relationship, an earlier age when starting the first job, and an earlier average timing of transitions. Regarding social investment effects, we only found that those who never experienced a romantic relationship at age 25 decreased, while those who did increased in profile stability over time. These results suggest that personality consistently matures during adolescence and young adulthood and that higher Extraversion predict greater readiness for new steps towards adulthood.     

Relative versus absolute stimulus control in the temporal bisection task

When subjects learn to associate two sample durations with two comparison keys, do they learn to associate the keys with the short and long samples (relational hypothesis), or with the specific sample durations (absolute hypothesis)? We exposed 16 pigeons to an ABA design in which phases A and B corresponded to tasks using samples of 1 s and 4 s, or 4 s and 16 s. Across phases, we varied the mapping between the samples and the keys. For group Relative, short and long samples were always associated with the same keys (e.g., Phase A: ‘1s→ Left, 4s→ Right''; Phase B: ‘4s→ Left, 16s→ Right''); for group Absolute, the 4-s sample was associated always with the same key (e.g., Phase A: ‘1s→ Left, 4s→ Right''; Phase B: ‘16s→ Left, 4s→ Right’). If temporal control is relational, group Relative should learn the new task faster than group Absolute, but if temporal control is absolute, the opposite should occur. We compared the results with the predictions of the Learning-to-Time (LeT) model, which accounts for temporal discrimination in terms of absolute stimulus control and stimulus generalization. The acquisition curves of the two groups were generally consistent with LeT and therefore more consistent with the absolute than the relative hypothesis.     

Some but not all dispreferred turn markers help to interpret scalar terms in polite contexts

In polite contexts, people find it difficult to perceive whether they can derive scalar inferences from what others say (e.g., does “some people hated your idea” mean that not everyone hated it?). Because this uncertainty can lead to costly misunderstandings, it is important to identify the cues people can rely on to solve their interpretative problem. In this article, we consider two such cues: Making a long Pause before the statement, and prefacing the statement with Well. Data from eight experiments show that Pauses are more effective than Wells as cues to scalar inferences in polite contexts—because they appear to give a specific signal to switch expectations in the direction of bad news, whereas Well appears to give a generic signal to make extra processing effort. We consider the applied value of these findings for human–human and human–machine interaction, as well as their implications for the study of reasoning and discourse.     

Children's acceptance of underinformative sentences: The case of some as a determiner

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some, if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all/some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some/all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier.