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31.
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(2):291-314
“There is a thought in me which is not mine.” This is, roughly, the complaint of patients suffering from thought insertion. This first-rank symptom of schizophrenia is particularly puzzling for it seems to challenge a very well entrenched principle to the effect that our conscious thoughts are necessarily subjective, that we necessarily have a sense of ownership for them (Cartesian principle). Despite their wide disagreement, classical accounts of the symptom save the Cartesian principle by interpreting thought insertion as a problem of the sense of agency for thought rather than as a problem of subjectivity. I argue that those accounts fail and that thought insertion really is a problem of subjectivity. We can nevertheless save the Cartesian principle if we realize that the presupposition, shared by classical accounts, to the effect that inserted thoughts are unequivocally conscious, is ill-grounded. Distinguishing between reflexive awareness and phenomenal consciousness, and relying on a careful comparison between thought insertion and other pathologies of agency, I propose a novel account of the symptom which is compatible with the Cartesian principle and which allows to take the patient's reports seriously. This account, I conclude, opens up novel perspectives on the comprehension of schizophrenia, and reveals a common confusion between two different dimensions of the mind. 相似文献
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33.
Haim Gaifman 《Journal of Applied Logic》2013,11(4):373-385
The common theme that unites the four sections is STP, the sure thing principle. But the paper can be divided neatly into two parts. The first, consisting of the first two sections, contains an analysis of STP as it figures in Savage?s system and proposals of changes to that system. Also possibilities for partially ordered acts are considered. The second, consisting of the last two sections, is about imprecise probabilities, dilations and objective probabilities. Variants of STP are considered but this part is self-contained and can be read separately. The main claim there is that dilations, which can have extremely counterintuitive consequences, can be eliminated by a more careful analysis of the phenomenon. It outlines a proposal of how to do it. Here the concept of objective probabilities plays a crucial role. 相似文献
34.
The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely that two inhabitants have the exact same number of hair. This failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle might be due to the large numbers used, or to the cardinal rather than nominal presentation of these numbers. We show that performance improved both when the numbers are presented nominally, and when they are small, albeit less so. We discuss potential interpretations of these results in terms of intuition and reasoning. 相似文献
35.
Silver Bronzo 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(4):750-771
This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’ propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional attempt to take a dubious shortcut in the justification of his conception of propositional structure. 相似文献
36.
Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon choices reveal stronger preferences. Together, these two lines of research suggest that we have two distinct capacities for inferring preferences. Here we propose that this is not the case, and that spatial‐based and statistical‐based preference inferences can be explained by the assumption that agents are efficient alone. We show that people's sensitivity to spatial and statistical information when they infer preferences is best predicted by a computational model of the principle of efficiency, and that this model outperforms dual‐system models, even when the latter are fit to participant judgments. Our results suggest that, as adults, a unified understanding of agency under the principle of efficiency underlies our ability to infer preferences. 相似文献
37.
《Journal of aggression, maltreatment & trauma》2013,22(2):79-93
ABSTRACT The College Date Rape Attitude Survey (CDRAS), a measure intended to assess attitudes related to risk for committing rape in adolescents and young adults, was examined to determine the principal component structure of rape-related attitudes in data collected on an undergraduate college sample. Results provide evidence that responses to the instrument are reliable with regard to internal consistency, and that the CDRAS measures four rape-related attitudes: Entitlement, Blame Shifting, Traditional Roles, and Overwhelming Sexual Arousal. The CDRAS could be used to elicit information about student's attitudes, which could then be used to develop, implement, and evaluate an intervention specific to the needs of that population. 相似文献
38.
Summary If we are to constrain our place in the world, two principles are often appealed to in science. According to the Copernican
Principle, we do not occupy a privileged position within the Universe. The Cosmological Principle, on the other hand, says
that our observations would roughly be the same, if we were located at any other place in the Universe. In our paper we analyze
these principles from a logical and philosophical point of view. We show how they are related, how they can be supported and
what use is made of them. Our main results are: 1. There is a logical gap between both principles insofar as the Cosmological
Principle is significantly stronger than the Copernican Principle. 2. A step that is often taken for establishing the Cosmological
Principle on the base of the Copernican Principle and observations is not incontestable as it stands, but can be supplemented
with a different argument. 3. The Cosmological Principle might be crucial for cosmology to the extent it is not supported by empirical evidence. 相似文献
39.
Carl Ginet 《The Journal of Ethics》1997,1(1):85-98
This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent's determining or controlling her action (if it's not the action's being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O'Connor's agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O'Connor's objections to it and offers objections to O'Connor's view. 相似文献
40.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3):322-340
Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem,’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account. 相似文献