Resisting Explanation

Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality.     

Farewell to certitude: Einstein's novelty on Induction and Deduction, Fallibilism

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice.     

Unconscious odour conditioning 25 years later: Revisiting and extending ‘Kirk-Smith, Van Toller and Dodd’

The pioneering work by Kirk-Smith, Van Toller, and Dodd [Kirk-Smith, M. D., Van Toller, C., & Dodd, G. H. (1983). Unconscious odour conditioning in human subjects. Biological Psychology, 17, 221–231], established that an unnoticed odorant paired with an emotionally meaningful task can influence mood and attitudes when the odorant alone is re-encountered subsequently. This study was particularly important in highlighting unconscious odour learning processes as they may happen in everyday life. However, it was severely criticized by Black and Smith [Black, S. L., & Smith, D. G. (1994). Has odor conditioning been demonstrated? A critique of “Unconscious odour conditioning in human subjects”. Biological Psychology, 37, 265–267] on methodological grounds. In the present paper, we replicated and extended Kirk-Smith et al.’s investigation taking into account Black and Smith’s criticisms and carrying out additional controls to improve the validity of the study. The results confirm the initial findings of Kirk-Smith and colleagues by demonstrating the effectiveness of olfactory stimuli in inducing conditioned hedonic reactions even when presented below the level of awareness.     

Compliance, conversion, and category induction

When children hear an object referred to with a label that is moderately discrepant from its appearance, they frequently make inferences about that object consistent with the label rather than its appearance. We asked whether 3-year-olds actually believe these unexpected labels (i.e., conversion) or whether their inferences simply reflect a desire to comply with the considerable experimental demands of the induction task (i.e., compliance). Specifically, we asked how likely children would be to pass an unexpected label on to another person who had not been present during the labeling event. Results showed that children who used an unexpected label as the basis for inference passed that label on to another person about as often as they could remember it. This suggests that children’s label-based inferences do reflect conversion rather than mere compliance.     

From exemplar to grammar: a probabilistic analogy-based model of language learning

While rules and exemplars are usually viewed as opposites, this paper argues that they form end points of the same distribution. By representing both rules and exemplars as (partial) trees, we can take into account the fluid middle ground between the two extremes. This insight is the starting point for a new theory of language learning that is based on the following idea: If a language learner does not know which phrase-structure trees should be assigned to initial sentences, s/he allows (implicitly) for all possible trees and lets linguistic experience decide which is the "best" tree for each sentence. The best tree is obtained by maximizing "structural analogy" between a sentence and previous sentences, which is formalized by the most probable shortest combination of subtrees from all trees of previous sentences. Corpus-based experiments with this model on the Penn Treebank and the Childes database indicate that it can learn both exemplar-based and rule-based aspects of language, ranging from phrasal verbs to auxiliary fronting. By having learned the syntactic structures of sentences, we have also learned the grammar implicit in these structures, which can in turn be used to produce new sentences. We show that our model mimicks children's language development from item-based constructions to abstract constructions, and that the model can simulate some of the errors made by children in producing complex questions.     

儿童早期分类与基于类别的归纳的一致性

传统的观点认为,儿童早期的分类是基于类别的归纳的基础。根据这种观点,儿童早期的分类与基于类别的归纳是一致的。该研究在不同材料条件下测试了4岁儿童面临知觉相似和概念冲突时的自由分类与归纳推理的一致性。研究结果显示,在照片条件下,4岁儿童的自由分类和基于类别的归纳是不一致的,儿童的分类主要是基于知觉相似的,而基于类别的归纳主要是基于概念的;在线条画条件下,儿童的分类与基于类别的归纳是一致的,都主要是基于知觉相似的。这些结果显示,儿童早期的分类和基于类别的关系是复杂的。     

Inducing signal-verified lucid dreams in 40% of untrained novice lucid dreamers within two nights in a sleep laboratory setting

Dreams in which the dreamer is aware of the dream state (lucid dreams, LD) are difficult to induce in naïve subjects in-laboratory. Recently, Stumbrys and Erlacher (2014) used a combination of existing induction techniques together with a self-developed experiment protocol and achieved comparatively high LD induction rates. In this study, we simplified their methodology slightly and repeated their experiment with twenty naïve subjects who spent one or two nights in our sleep laboratory. After about six hours of sleep, they were woken up during REM sleep and engaged in a series of cognitive tasks before going back to bed. Ten subjects reported a LD during the following period of sleep in one of the nights. Eight of these subjects gave a predefined eye signal, which was clearly visible in the electrooculogram during REM sleep. In summary, we replicated Stumbrys and Erlacher’s results using a simplified version of their induction protocol.     

Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties

Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates’ context-sensitive use of taxonomic and food web knowledge to guide reasoning about causal transmission and shows good qualitative agreement between model predictions and human inferences. A second experiment demonstrates strong quantitative and qualitative fits to inferences about a more complex artificial food web. A third experiment investigates human reasoning about complex novel food webs where species have known taxonomic relations. Results demonstrate a double-dissociation between the predictions of our causal model and a related taxonomic model [Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2003). Learning domain structures. In Proceedings of the 25th annual conference of the cognitive science society]: the causal model predicts human inferences about diseases but not genes, while the taxonomic model predicts human inferences about genes but not diseases. We contrast our framework with previous models of category-based induction and previous formal instantiations of intuitive theories, and outline challenges in developing a complete model of context-sensitive reasoning.     

The spacing effect in children's memory and category induction

The spacing effect describes the robust phenomenon whereby memory is enhanced when learning events are distributed, instead of being presented in succession. We investigated the effect of spacing on children's memory and category induction. Three-year-old children were presented with two tasks, a memory task and a category induction task. In the memory task, identical instances of an object were presented and then tested in a multiple choice test. In the category induction task, different instances of a category were presented and tested in a multiple choice test. In both tasks, presenting the instances in a spaced sequence resulted in more learning than presenting the instances in a massed sequence, despite the difficulty created by the spaced sequence. The spaced sequence increased the difficulty of the task by allowing children time to forget the previous instance during the spaced interval.