归类不确定时人们的推理方式研究

该研究采用集中呈现样例的研究范式,探讨了归类不确定情况下,人们的推理方式。实验1控制特征联结频次,考察人们的推理方式是否是基于类别的推理。实验2控制类别中特征的基本概率,考察人们推理方式是否是基于特征联结的推理。实验结果表明,特征推理前不预先归类直接推理时,人们的推理根据目标特征与预测特征联结的频次进行,是基于特征联结的推理;特征推理前预先要求被试归类时,人们的特征推理是基于类别的推理。     

The role of mechanism and covariation information in causal belief updating

The present study is aimed at identifying how prior causal beliefs and covariation information contribute to belief updating when evidence, either compatible or contradictory with those beliefs, is provided. Participants were presented with a cover story with which it was intended to activate or generate a causal belief. Variables related to the prior belief (the type of information, the strength of the cause-effect causal link, and how confident the participant was that the link existed) were assessed. Subsequently, participants were presented with covariational information and were asked to update their beliefs in light of the new evidence. Information reliability, prior belief's causal influence magnitude, and the cause-effect level of contingency portrayed by the new information--but not the type of the prior belief--are shown to directly determine belief updating.     

Response induction during the acquisition and maintenance of lever pressing with delayed reinforcement

The acquisition of lever pressing by rats and the occurrence of unreinforced presses at a location different from that of the reinforced response were studied using different delays of reinforcement. An experimental chamber containing seven identical adjoining levers was used. Only presses on the central (operative) lever produced food pellets. Groups of 3 rats were exposed to one of seven different tandem random-interval (RI) fixed-time (FT) schedules. The average RI duration was the complement of the FT duration such that their sum yielded a nominal 32-s interreinforcement interval on average. Response rate on the operative lever decreased as the FT value was lengthened. The spatial distribution of responses on the seven levers converged on the operative lever when the FT was 0 or 2 s and spread across the seven levers as the FT value was lengthened to 16 or 32 s. Presses on the seven levers were infrequent during the FT schedule. Both operative- and inoperative-lever pressing intertwined in repetitive patterns that were consistent within subjects but differed between subjects. These findings suggest that reinforcer delay determined the response-induction gradient.     

Memory for emotional faces in naturally occurring dysphoria and induced sadness

The aim was to establish if the memory bias for sad faces, reported in clinically depressed patients (Gilboa-Schechtman, Erhard Weiss, & Jeczemien, 2002; Ridout, Astell, Reid, Glen, & O'Carroll, 2003) generalises to sub-clinical depression (dysphoria) and experimentally induced sadness. Study 1: dysphoric (n = 24) and non-dysphoric (n = 20) participants were presented with facial stimuli, asked to identify the emotion portrayed and then given a recognition memory test for these faces. At encoding, dysphoric participants (DP) exhibited impaired identification of sadness and neutral affect relative to the non-dysphoric group (ND). At memory testing, DP exhibited superior memory for sad faces relative to happy and neutral. They also exhibited enhanced memory for sad faces and impaired memory for happy relative to the ND. Study 2: non-depressed participants underwent a positive (n = 24) or negative (n = 24) mood induction (MI) and were assessed on the same tests as Study 1. At encoding, negative MI participants showed superior identification of sadness, relative to neutral affect and compared to the positive MI group. At memory testing, the negative MI group exhibited enhanced memory for the sad faces relative to happy or neutral and compared to the positive MI group. Conclusion: MCM bias for sad faces generalises from clinical depression to these sub-clinical affective states.     

Monkey business: Children’s use of character identity to infer shared properties

Children’s toys provide a rich arena for investigating conceptual flexibility, because they often can be understood as possessing an individual identity at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, many dolls (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) and action figures (e.g., Batman) can be construed either as characters from a fictional world or as physical objects in the real world. In two experiments, 72 4- and 5-year-olds took part in a property extension task, the results of which provide evidence of an understanding that (1) two representations of a character share certain properties in virtue of their shared character identity, and this sharing does not stem simply from having the same name, and (2) one representation of a character is more likely to share properties with another representation of the character if the properties were acquired by the character than if they were acquired by the representation. Children’s understanding of a representational object’s abstract character identity thus enabled them to transcend using its unique spatio-temporal history as a sole basis for inferring its idiosyncratic properties.     

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality.     

Mindfulness induction and cognition: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Mindfulness meditation might improve a variety of cognitive processes, but the available evidence remains fragmented. This preregistered meta-analysis (PROSPERO-CRD42018100320) aimed to provide insight into this hypothesis by assessing the effects of brief mindful attention induction on cognition. Articles were retrieved from Pubmed, PsycInfo and Web of Science up until August 1, 2018. A total of 34 studies were included. The outcomes were categorized into four cognitive domains: attentional functioning, memory, executive functioning and higher-order function. A small effect was found across all cognitive domains (Hedges’ g = 0.18, 95% IC = 0.07–0.29). Separated analyses for each cognitive domain revealed an effect only in higher-order cognitive functions (k = 10, Hedges’ g = 0.35, 95% IC = 0.20–0.50). Results suggest that mindfulness induction improves cognitive performance in tasks involving complex higher-order functions. There was no evidence of publication bias, but studies generally presented many methodological flaws.     

Anger proneness in women: Development and validation of the anger situation questionnaire

In the present series of studies existing hostility and anger trait questionnaires were examined. We found them to be unsuitable for our subjects and purpose, A new questionnaire based on novel principles, the Anger Situation Questionnaire (ASQ), was developed to measure anger proneness in women. The ASQ consists of 33 vignettes or scenarios, Each vignette has three dimensions: emotional experience, intensity of emotional experience, and action readiness mode. The ASQ was administered to 146 female students. Out of this sample two extreme groups were selected of 30 subjects each: one group scoring low on self-reported anger and angry readiness, the other group scoring high on both aspects. An anger-induction paradigm was developed consisting of essentially three elements: a physically aversive situation, the performance of some frustrative tasks, as well as an unpleasantly acting female experimenter. The ASQ was validated in this paradigm: subjects scoring high on the ASQ became more angry due to these manipulations; moreover, in most of the subjects at one moment or another a state of anger was induced. © 1994 wiley-Liss, Inc.     

The Organization of Justificatory Discourse in Interaction: A Comparison Within and Across Cultures

Previous scholarship has focused on inductive and deductive patterns as the two predominant modes of reasoning. In this paper, we argue that there are many ways that people from diverse cultures organize their justificatory reasoning in conversation with others and that these patterns are connected, in part, to cultural beliefs and values. We report on a study of people who identify themselves as being in one of four cultural groups: African Americans, Asian Americans, Asians, and European Americans. The types of organization they used in their conversations included deductive, inductive, abductive, and narrative patterns. Abduction occurred as often as induction and deduction across groups. Narratives were used equally by all of the groups, but they occurred less frequently than the other types. Asian Americans used inductive patterns more than other types, and Asians were most likely to reason deductively. These choices did not appear to have an effect on partners' judgments, although Asians received the lowest appropriateness ratings, and both Asians and Asian Americans were given the lowest effectiveness ratings.