Does integral affect influence intentions to use artificial intelligence for skin cancer screening? A test of the affect heuristic

Objective: This study investigated how affect influences people’s processing of messages about risks and benefits of using autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) technology to screen for skin cancer. We examined integral affect (emotion derived during decision making) separately from incidental affect (extraneous mood states).

Design: Using the affect heuristic framework, we randomly assigned 273 participants to conditions featuring risk (high, low, uncertain) or benefit (high, low, uncertain) messages about AI. Following ‘affect-as-spotlight’, we also explored whether people’s integral affect towards skin cancer moderated the relationship between risk/benefit messages and AI screening intentions.

Outcomes: Perceived risk, perceived benefit, positive and negative affect toward AI, intention to use AI screening.

Results: After controlling for incidental affect and risk perceptions, we found that compared to low risk messages, uncertain risk messages increased participants’ negative affect toward AI, decreased positive affect toward AI, increased AI risk evaluations and reduced AI benefit evaluations. Perceptual variables significantly mediated participants’ intentions to use AI for risk messages but not benefit messages. No moderation effects were found.

Conclusions: Results suggest extending the affect heuristic framework to include uncertain risk conditions. Integral AI affect influenced people’s interpretation of messages, which then impacted likelihood to use AI technology for health.     

Which components of processing speed are affected in ADHD subtypes?

The term “processing speed” (PS) encompasses many components including perceptual, cognitive and output speed. Despite evidence for reduced PS in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), little is known about which component(s) is most impacted in ADHD, or how it may vary by subtypes. Participants included 151 children, ages 8–12 years, with ADHD Predominantly Inattentive Type, ADHD Combined Type and typically developing controls using DSM-IV criteria. All children completed four measures of processing speed: Symbol Search, Coding, Decision Speed, and simple reaction time. We found children with ADHD-PI and ADHD-C had slower perceptual and psychomotor/incidental learning speed than controls and that ADHD-PI had slower decision speed than controls. The subtypes did not differ on any of these measures. Mean reaction time was intact in ADHD. Hence, at a very basic output level, children with ADHD do not have impaired speed overall, but as task demands increase their processing speed becomes less efficient than controls’. Further, perceptual and psychomotor speed were related to inattention, and psychomotor speed/incidental learning was related to hyperactivity/impulsivity. Thus, inattention may contribute to less efficient performance and worse attention to detail on tasks with a higher perceptual and/or psychomotor load; whereas hyperactivity/impulsivity may affect psychomotor speed/incidental learning, possibly via greater inaccuracy and/or reduced learning efficiency. Decision speed was not related to either dimension. Results suggest that PS deficits are primarily linked to the inattention dimension of ADHD but not exclusively. Findings also suggest PS is not a singular process but rather a multifaceted system that is differentially impacted in ADHD.     

“Seeing Rain”: Integrating phenomenological and Bayesian predictive coding approaches to visual hallucinations and self-disturbances (Ichstörungen) in schizophrenia

We present a schizophrenia patient who reports “seeing rain” with attendant somatosensory features which separate him from his surroundings. Because visual/multimodal hallucinations are understudied in schizophrenia, we examine a case history to determine the role of these hallucinations in self-disturbances (Ichstörungen). Developed by the early Heidelberg School, self-disturbances comprise two components: 1. The self experiences its own automatic processing as alien to self in a split-off, “doubled-I.” 2. In “I-paralysis,” the disruption to automatic processing is now outside the self in omnipotent agents. Self-disturbances (as indicated by visual/multimodal hallucinations) involve impairment in the ability to predict moment-to-moment experiences in the ongoing perception-action cycle. The phenomenological approach to subjective experience of self-disturbances complements efforts to model psychosis using the computational framework of hierarchical predictive coding. We conclude that self-disturbances play an adaptive, compensatory role following the uncoupling of perception and action, and possibly, other low-level perceptual anomalies.