The influence of environmental context in interpersonal observation–execution

Cyclical upper-limb movements involuntarily deviate from a primary movement direction when the actor concurrently observes incongruent biological motion. We examined whether environmental context influences such motor interference during interpersonal observation–execution. Participants executed continuous horizontal arm movements while observing congruent horizontal or incongruent curvilinear biological movements with or without the presence of an object positioned as an obstacle or distractor. When participants were observing a curvilinear movement, an object located within the movement space became an obstacle, and, thus, the curvilinear trajectory was essential to reach into horizontal space. When acting as a distractor, or with no object, the curvilinear trajectory was no longer essential. For observing horizontal movements, objects were located at the same relative locations as in the curvilinear movement condition. We found greater involuntary movement deviation when observing curvilinear than horizontal movements. Also, there was an influence of context only when observing horizontal movements, with greater deviation exhibited in the presence of a large obstacle. These findings suggest that the influence of environmental context is underpinned by the (mis-)matching of observed and executed actions as incongruent biological motion is primarily coded via bottom-up sensorimotor processes, whilst the congruent condition incorporates surrounding environmental features to modulate the bottom-up sensorimotor processes.     

More human than others? A critique of Cypryańska et al. (2017)

Cypryańska and colleagues offer a critique of existing work on the self-humanizing effect and present some empirical findings motivated by their critique. In this commentary, I question their overly restrictive understanding of self-humanizing and argue that the phenomenon does not stand or fall on a definition based on a strict analogy to the better-than-average effect. I argue that defining self-humanizing exclusively in these terms is inappropriate: It fails to recognize the relationship between self-humanizing and self-enhancement, as well as the primary role of trait valence in comparative self-ratings. Finally, I observe that Cypryańska et al.’s empirical findings are highly consistent with past work rather than offering the deep challenge that the authors suppose.