Imagination,Pop Culture and Ministry with Youth and Young Adults1

Abstract : In this article I raise the question of whether and how Christians can become captive to a kind of constricted imagination, and how this does not serve the church well in its work with youth and young adults. I draw on examples from pop music (Kanye West, U2) to portray the theological logic of ‘check‐list Christianity.’ As an alternative, I follow C. S. Lewis in reorienting the perspective from deciding if some cultural object (song, movie, TV show) is good or bad, to asking what sort of people we become by attending to this or that cultural object; specifically, does it enlarge our being‐before‐God or not? This requires that we also view pop culture as the domain of God's work in Christ, and that we confess that God is already working reconciliation in the midst of the world.     

TRUTH AS AN EPISTEMIC IDEAL

Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth” defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also upon one’s standards of warrant.     

The Method of Socratic Proofs for Modal Propositional Logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4F,S4R,S4M and G

The aim of this paper is to present the method of Socratic proofs for seven modal propositional logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4M, S4F, S4R and G. This work is an extension of [10] where the method was presented for the most common modal propositional logics: K, D, T, KB, K4, S4 and S5. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Variability and moral phenomenology

Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard.     

Visual problem solving in the absence of lexical semantics: Evidence from dementia

A case of dissociation between visual and praxic skills and linguistic, referential, and semantic skills is described in a case of dementia. Testing revealed that her visual processing was intact and that she was capable of a wide range of visually based tasks. These included copying geometric figures and block designs; matching items on the basis of number, color, or relative size, matching upper and lower case letters, sequencing numerals, orienting pictures, coins, and letters appropriately, and solving problems based on the identification of geometric patterns or on the identification of logical sequences based on pattern alternation, number, and size increases. In contrast, she was completely incapable of matching pictures on the basis of their semantic or referential meaning; similarly she had lost all comprehension of language. It was argued that this case demonstrates the capacities of a visual system cut off from all symbolic and semantic processes. When examined with other case studies this case provides information about the nature of and interaction between modality-specific perceptual processing and semantic processing, and information about the various cognitive factors involved in visual gnosis. The CT scan indicated frontal atrophy and marked anterior temporal atrophy, a pattern that is consistent with Pick's disease. The case was discussed in terms of the correlation between the pattern of observed strengths and deficits and the neurological pattern of atrophy.     

META‐HUMANS AND METANOIA: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF EXTRATERRESTRIALS

Abstract. Although we do not know whether intelligent extraterrestrials exist, they are a permanent fixture of literature and philosophical argument. Part of their appeal is that they watch us from above and thus serve as a metaphor for human self‐reflexivity. This makes fictional aliens especially useful when moral issues are at stake. In order to evaluate stories about aliens with respect to moral conclusions two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the stories have to be detailed enough that we can understand the circumstances of the aliens' moral choices. Therefore science fiction often is more useful than arguments involving aliens in short technical papers. Second, their fictional lives need to be possible in our own universe, or very nearly so, in order to be relevant for our own moral conduct. Taking as an example the unfallen aliens in C. S. Lewis's novels Out of the Silent Planet (1938) and Perelandra (1943), we can acknowledge the theological interest and literary subtlety. Nonetheless, the stories fail as moral parables in one important respect: The aliens depicted could not be a product of evolution in our universe, at least as we currently understand its scientific laws. This realization has important consequences for our self‐understanding and thus underlines how fictional aliens can be useful in making sense of the complexities involved in moral argumentation.     

HAWKING ON GOD AND PHYSICAL THEORY

Abstract. When queried about his objectives, the celebrated theoretical physicist and cosmologist Stephen Hawking has replied, “My goal is a complete understanding of the universe, why it is as it is and why it exists at all.” In this essay, I comment on what Hawking has to say about the role of God in the understanding he seeks. I draw from his popular writings and pronouncements, since both are peppered with references to God and with statements about what God can and cannot do. In particular, I focus on his most recent collection of essays intended for a general audience. I argue that the theological implications Hawking has drawn from his cosmological models are shallow and that the narrow naturalistic path he has taken is inadequate to the large task he has set for himself.     

The Psychodynamic Assumptions of the U.S. Constitution

The U.S. Constitution is a blueprint for the design of a government which reflects the consistent application of an understanding of the emotions and interests driving the political activity of individuals and groups. This understanding is articulated in the writings of key proponents of the Constitution, and clarified by its historical and philosophical context. Their theories are congruent with psychoanalytic perspectives on narcissism, leadership, group dynamics, and the role of transitional space in cultural life. The concept of interests, reformulated in psychoanalytic terms, is a useful addition to our understanding of political behavior.