Jung and White and the God of terrible double aspect

This paper discusses theoretical, historical and personal issues in the ill-fated friendship and intellectual collaboration between C.G. Jung and the Dominican scholar Victor White, O.P., based on primary documents in their correspondence, 1945 to 1960. The collaboration of Jung and White began with high expectations but fell into painful disagreements about the nature of God, the problem of evil, and shadow aspects of the Self. They made a rapid commitment to their working alliance based on personal and professional hopes, but paying scant attention to their divergent underlying assumptions. White hoped to build theoretical and practical connections between Jungian psychology and Catholic theology for the sake of modern Catholics. Jung needed learned theological support as he explored the psychological meanings of Christian symbols, including the central symbol of Christ. At the grandest level, they both hoped to transform the Christian West, after the moral disaster of World War II. Their collaboration was risky for both men, especially for White in his career as a Dominican, and it led to considerable suffering. The Self is prominent in the relationship, symbolically present in the text of the correspondence and consciously forming their major topic of debate. From the start, the Self is an archetypal field, drawing the friends into their visionary task at the risk of unconscious inflation. Later the Self is revealed with its shadow as a burden, a puzzle, and a basis for estrangement. Finally, with the intervention of feminine wisdom, mortal suffering is transformed by an attitude of conscious sacrifice.     

Analysing Personal Value

It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.     

On Modal <Emphasis Type="Italic">μ</Emphasis>-Calculus and Gödel-Löb Logic

We show that the modal μ-calculus over GL collapses to the modal fragment by showing that the fixpoint formula is reached after two iterations and answer to a question posed by van Benthem in [4]. Further, we introduce the modal μ ^~-calculus by allowing fixpoint constructors for any formula where the fixpoint variable appears guarded but not necessarily positive and show that this calculus over GL collapses to the modal fragment, too. The latter result allows us a new proof of the de Jongh, Sambin Theorem and provides a simple algorithm to construct the fixpoint formula. Presented by Melvin Fitting     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

奥尔波特人本主义心理学评价探新

奥尔波特是人本主义心理学的建立者之一 ,也是健康人格心理学的奠基者。其贡献 :( 1)参与创建人本主义心理学 ;( 2 )开创美国人格心理学 ;( 3)奠基人本主义自我论。其局限 :( 1)缺乏完整体系与确证 ;( 2 )忽视人格的社会根源 ;( 3)有些论述过于极端化     

儿童虐待与问题行为：基因与环境的作用

当前预防虐待之所以成为儿童保护的重要内容,不仅是法理上的儿童权益保护,也因虐待关联的基因与环境作用对人发展的长期影响。儿童虐待与问题行为关系复杂,已有研究显示,虐待特征、受害者特点是其关联因素,但其内在机制并不清楚。随着分子遗传学的兴起,MAOA、COMT、5-HTT等基因为解释儿童虐待与问题行为的机制提供新视角,重要候选基因可能调节这一关系。未来研究可从动物模型和纵向追踪角度去探究儿童虐待与问题行为关系的易感期、保护因子,完善儿童虐待与个体发展关系的研究图谱。     

Hemiretinal differences in face recognition: accuracy versus reaction time

A face-recognition task involving monocular presentation of laterally displaced stimuli yielded a nasal hemiretinal advantage for reaction time for correct identifications, but a temporal hemiretinal advantage for accuracy (d'). These hemiretinal effects, in conjunction with eye dominance, could in principle distort or obscure interpretations of hemispheric processing differences obtained with binocular stimulation.