Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things

ABSTRACT

I have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four.     

A serious misunderstanding: synchronicity and the generation of meaning

Abstract: This paper points to the problem caused by the fact that numerous academic ‘Jung studies’ are conducted on the basis of the English translation of Jung's works without any knowledge of his original texts and illustrates it with the misconstrual that Jung's concept of synchronicity suffered in the studies of many recent authors, as exemplified by two articles in the September 2011 issue of the JAP. The translation of ‘sinngemäße Koinzidenz’ as ‘meaningful coincidence’ seduced those writers to take synchronistic ‘meaning’ as meaning the meaningfulness of life or even as ‘transcendent meaning’, which is incompatible with Jung's synchronicity concept, and to replace Jung's strictly intellectual project of establishing an explanatory principle for synchronistic events (in addition to the principle of causality for all other events) by the fundamentally different project of focusing on the impact that such events may have for the experiencing subjective mind, on ‘human meaning‐making’, and, with a decidedly anti‐intellectual bias, of hoping for ‘shifts into non‐rational states of mind’.     

The hermeneutic background of C. G. Jung

Hermeneutics has been central to the practice of Jung's psychology from the beginning, although he never fully and consistently developed a hermeneutic method of inquiry and the literature addressing this aspect of his psychology is not extensive. In this paper(1) we undertake a critical re-examination of Jung's relationship to hermeneutic thought, based on his explicit references to hermeneutics in the Collected Works and his theoretical development of the notion of archetypes. Although Jung did not consistently formulate a hermeneutic approach to inquiry, his theoretical development of archetypes is rich in hermeneutic implications. In particular, his notion of the archetype as such can be understood hermeneutically as a form of non-conceptual background understanding. Some implications of this construal of archetypes for Jungian hermeneutics as a form of inquiry are considered.     

Professional relationships in dangerous times: C. G. Jung and the Society for Psychotherapy

Relying in part on previously unpublished documents of the 1930s, this paper(1) describes the origins and mission of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, both as it existed before Hitler's rise to power and as it was transformed afterward. Jung accepted the Society's presidency in 1933-34, on condition that it be restructured as an international, politically neutral organization, free from the laws of Gleichschaltung (Nazi conformity). The paper also contains a close study of Jung's collaboration with one interesting German colleague, Walter Cimbal. Cimbal, a neurologist, was briefly a member of the Nazi Party and, judging from his early letters to Jung, a Hitler enthusiast. Yet he also seems to have tried, together with Jung, to alleviate the difficulties of German Jewish colleagues whose lives were disrupted by the Hitler revolution. The paper includes translated passages from Cimbal's previously unpublished letters from 1933-36 and the post-war years. It also includes a first-person account by Wladimir Rosenbaum, the Zurich lawyer who assisted Jung in 1934, when Jung tried to mitigate the impact of anti-Jewish laws on his German Jewish colleagues. In the primary materials of this period one discovers more evidence of moral shadow-and also less-than is sometimes assumed.     

Agency and the Other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity

The essay argues that a systematic reconstruction of the intersubjective grounds of self-consciousness and self-identity will yield a complex non-reductive notion of agency. Core features of human agency include intentional causality, conscious understanding thereof, as well as the capacity to distinguish self-caused from externally caused phenomena. By analyzing how self-consciousness emerges from intersubjective perspective-taking and dialogue, a socially embedded and symbolically mediated notion of self-identity—one which is able to preserve the core features of human agency—becomes viable. G.H. Mead’s work serves as heuristic framework to articulate the extent to which the Other’s irreducible agency is constitutive of the self’s capacity to establish an identity, now understood as a socially situated narrative self-interpreting process. Self-identity reveals to be an essential open yet not fragmented dynamic, a socially situated yet agent-driven phenomenon, and ethically indebted to the Other as providing the essential gift of selfhood.     

TESTING LATOUR'S APP: A USER'S GUIDE

I reconstruct Bruno Latour's ideas about science and religion and compare them to Ian G. Barbour's and Mikael Stenmark's models, as well as to the discussion of technology and religion developed by John C. Caiazza and Antje Jackelén. I show how using “Latour's App” enlightens some aspects of said models which Barbour and Stenmark themselves were seemingly struggling with, and that Caiazza's and Jackelén's views can be reconciled despite their apparent opposition. The result of such tests is an overall assessment of Latour's proposal. I argue that, under the disguise of a flamboyant and original language, Latour's method is not that distant from those of the other authors analyzed here, and that his discussion might conceal some unwelcome philosophical shortcomings.     

Relationship between field dependence-independence and the g factor: What can problem-solving strategies tell us?

IntroductionField dependence-independence (FDI) has been the focus of a great deal of research. However, it is generally studied in relation to either personality or the g factor, with far fewer studies of the interconnections between FDI, the g factor and problem-solving strategies.ObjectiveOur first aim was to study the relationship between FDI and the g factor. Our second was to explain this relationship by analysing problem-solving strategies.MethodOne hundred and seventy 14-year-old performed three tests: the GEFT, the D-70, and a second, prototype g-factor test that enabled us to identify which strategies they used.ResultsResults confirmed the classic link between FDI and the g factor, and attributed this link to greater use of the most efficient strategies.     

Perception and practical knowledge

According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent's knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being known “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which it consists in the particular causal role of an agent's self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.     

Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism,Sentimentalism and Theism

While the last several decades have seen a renaissance of scholarship on J. G. Herder (1744–1804), his moral philosophy has not been carefully examined. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, and to point the way for further research, by reconstructing his original and systematically articulated views on morality. Three interrelated elements of his position are explored in detail: (1) his perfectionism, or theory of the human good; (2) his sentimentalism, which includes moral epistemology and a theory of moral education; and (3) his theism, which deepens and justifies these other elements.