Poverty in Russia

This paper is intended to shed light on the extent of poverty in the Russian Federation. We present estimates of poverty lines and poverty ratios derived from subjective questions used in a data collection for a large household panel (RUSSET). We estimate poverty using a subjective approach, where the level of the poverty line is derived using the opinion of the individual, rich or poor, on poverty. This approach differs from the objective approach to poverty, which defines poverty according to the opinion of experts. Three subjective poverty lines are presented: one the Financial Satisfaction Poverty Line, two the Leyden Poverty Line, and three the Subjective Well-Being Poverty Line. The first two poverty lines are based on subjective questions regarding income and economic welfare while the last concept focuses on satisfaction with life as a whole. The results obtained are compared with each other and with results derived using objective measures and official figures.     

See the devil and tame him

Born in 1921, professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw and art theory in the Polish Academy of Sciences; has published twelve books and more than three hundred articles (bibliography in volume 14 of A. Mercier (ed.).Philosophers on Their Own Work. Bern: 1990) ranging over the history of aesthetics, Marxist and Soviet aesthetics, and issues related to the status of the arts in contemporary Western culture.     

Skinner on cognition

One of the most controversial, if not the most controversial, aspect of behaviorism is its claims (actual and putative) concerning cognition. Part of this controversy is caused by egregious exegetical errors on the part of Skinner's critics. Critics can then easily refute behaviorism by attributing these problematic claims to Skinner. This paper attempts to faithfully describe Skinner's claims regarding cognition. Skinner advances several arguments regarding the role of cognitions in human behavior and in the science of human behavior. We suggest that there are two distinct kinds of claims in this web: 1) claims regarding the proper relation between science and cognitions and 2) claims regarding the status of cognitions as natural events. Due to the multiplicity and interdependence of many of these arguments, it is best to view Skinner's position on cognition as consisting of a web of interdependent claims.     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF RELIGION IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE

Abstract. In replying to the four thoughtful critiques of my first Gifford volume I try to clarify the differences among us. I defend my use of Kuhn's concept of paradigms against Nancey Murphy's use of Lakatos's concept of research programs and then compare both of us with advocates of the “strong program” in the social construction of science. Sallie McFague identifies me with the empiricist, objectivist, “modernist” tradition and contrasts it to her own “postmodernist” acceptance of cultural relativism and the social construction of science, but I argue that I am seeking an intermediate position that redefines objectivity rather than rejecting it. Some themes common to feminist and process theology are also examin ed. In dialogue with Bob Russell I discuss the metaphysical and theological implications of the unity of space and time in relativity, the beginning of time in recent cosmology, and the thesis that God acts by determining events in indeterminate quantum systems. Finally I compare John Cobb's indebtedness to Whitehead with my own and suggest that I am more willing to adapt or modify process thought in the interpretation of scientific theories and religious experience.     

THE STORY OF THE MIND: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Abstract. Persons have a curious dual nature. On the one hand, they are subjects, whose actions must be explained in terms of beliefs, desires, plans, and goals. At the same time, however, they also are physical objects, whose actions must be explicable in terms of physical laws. So far no satisfying account of this duality has been offered. Both Cartesian dualism and the modern materialist alternatives (reductionist and antireductionist) have failed to capture the full range of our experience of persons. I argue that an exciting new approach to this difficulty can be found by considering developments in clinical psychology. The clinical debate between those endorsing biological models of mental illness and those endorsing psychodynamic models mirrors broader debates in the philosophy of mind. The possible resolution of this debate through the development of integrated psychobiological models suggests a promising way to reconcile the dual nature of persons in a far more appealing way than any yet proposed.     

Culture change: A training program for recent immigrant professionals from the former Soviet Union

The article describes a training program in structural/integrative family therapy for immigrant professionals from the former Soviet Union at the Training Center of the Shiluv Institute for Family and Couple Therapy in Jerusalem. The program was instituted to meet the pressing needs of a mass immigration of half a million people that came to Israel between 1990 and 1992. This is a retrospective look at the journey of the initial group of psychiatrists and psychologists who changed country, culture, language, and professional orientation in just two years. The authors state their conclusions as to the most expedient way to organize therapy for families from the former Soviet Union — a population in need of help but lacking an awareness of therapy and suspicious of the outsider.     

AFRICANA PHILOSOPHY

“Africana Philosophy” is a gathering notion used to cover collectively particular articulations, and traditions of particular articulations, of persons African and African-descended that are to be regarded as instances of philosophizing. (The notion is meant to cover, as well, the philosophizing efforts of persons not African or African-descended, efforts that are, nonetheless, contributions to the philosophizing endeavors that constitute Africana philosophy.) A central concern of the essay is the question whether there are characteristics of the philosophizing practices of persons identified as members of social groups thought to comprise a geographically and historically dispersed and ethnically diverse race that do, or should, distinguish the practices by virtue of being those of persons African and/or African-descended. Is there, can there be, should there be a properly determined field of philosophy that is constituted, first and foremost, by the efforts of persons of a particular race and its ethnic groups?     

The anthropological tradition in the philosophy of medicine

The tradition of anthropological medicine in philosophy of medicine is analyzed in relation to the earlier interest in epistemological issues in medicine around the turn of the century as well as to the current interest in medical ethics. It is argued that there is a continuity between epistemological, anthropological and ethical approaches in philosophy of medicine. Three basic ideas of anthropologically-oriented medicine are discussed: the rejection of Cartesian dualism, the notion of medicine as science of the human person, and the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of disease. Next, it is discussed why the anthropological movement has been superseded by the increasing interest in medical ethics. It is concluded that the present-day moral issues cannot be interpreted and resolved without clarification of the underlying anthropological images.     

On the Argument for Divine Timelessness from the Incompleteness of Temporal Life

A promising argument for divine timelessness is that temporal life is possessed only moment by moment, which is incompatible with the existence of a perfect being.
Since the argument is based on the experience of time's passage, it cannot be circumvented by appeal to a tenseless theory of time.
Neither can the argument be subverted by appeals to a temporal deity's possession of a specious present of infinite duration.
Nonetheless, because the argument concerns one's experience of time's passage rather than the objective reality of temporal becoming itself, it is considerably weakened by the fact that an omniscient being possessing perfect memory and foreknowledge, need not find such experience to be an imperfection.