PHILOSOPHY,MYTH, AND THE “SIGNIFICANCE” OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

Abstract: A close examination of the relation between philosophy and myth reveals important functional parallels in some of their basic means of operation that helps shed some light on philosophy's overall task. A crucial aspect of the structural similarity between philosophy and myth is the generation of what Hans Blumenberg calls “significance.” I argue that the preservation and enhancement of significance (through a strong affinity to myth) is an essential and overlooked aspect of philosophy's task, one best accomplished through the world‐orienting work of speculative philosophy. By weaving the fragmented insights, criticisms, lessons, and methods of the more “specialized” analytic, pragmatic, critical, postmodern, deconstructivist, and other methods of thought together in a systematic way, speculative philosophy may be able to provide us with the kind of world orientation needed for developing a healthier, richer, more profound understanding of ourselves and our proper place within the world.     

舍斯托夫对哲学定义的理解

哲学是什么？胡塞尔认为哲学是反思,俄罗斯宗教哲学家舍斯托夫却认为哲学是一种斗争。实际上,这是理性哲学思维和圣经思维的对立。理性哲学思维基于人是“理性的人”的认识,通过“逻辑”的手段来寻找事物背后的根据,哲学是“爱智慧”。圣经思维却从人是“神性的人”出发,把“雷霆和闪电”作为自己的“逻辑”,把哲学当作“生死事业”,因而哲学是斗争。舍斯托夫对理性哲学思维进行了抨击,他对哲学定义的理解是基于俄罗斯宗教存在哲学的立场。     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: Interest,Self, and Moral Vision

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.     

Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time

Abstract

This article challenges Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory (2001/2010). Focusing on Hegel’s method, I argue that this text hardly offers support for the theory of mutual recognition that Honneth purports to derive from it. After critically considering Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s account of the family and civil society, I argue that Hegel’s text does not warrant Honneth’s tacit identification of mutual recognition with symmetrical instances of mutual recognition, let alone his subsequent projection of symmetrical forms of mutual recognition onto the various spheres of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. I conclude by indicating an alternative way in which Hegel’s text might be used to understand contemporary society.     

A Moorean paradox of desire

A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.     

浅析神经外科中的诊疗思路和思维方式

应该注重培训年轻医生在临床中学会应用哲学思想和思维方式,真正认识事物的本质。这对于诊断、治疗、科研、创新有事半功倍的作用,可避免片面性、盲目性,减少医源性偏差与失误,提高治愈率和生活质量。一般通过三种思维方式即理论、工程及评价思维思考疾病,如蛛网膜下腔出血的病因、临床特点、检查方法、诊疗思路、预后和转归,最终达到预期的疗效。     

ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

骨科疾病诊治中的临床思维

医学哲学是对医学科学成就总的概括,并以此为基础探讨生命活动和病程的一般规律,研究医学科学的思维方式,直至疾病预防、诊断治疗。同时研究辩证规律和范畴在医学科学中的表现,从而指导骨科医师解决在骨科疾病诊治中遇到的诸多问题,并有助于形成正确的临床思维。结合临床工作体会,探讨医学哲学在骨科疾病诊治临床思维中的应用。