A plea for logical objects

An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many logical objects.     

A deflationary theory of reference

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference.     

True self-love and true self-sacrifice

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins’ argument.     

On the consequences of priming: Assimilation and contrast effects

Two experiments investigated the effects of priming (activation of a category by unobtrusive exposure to exemplars of that category) on subsequent judgments in an unrelated task. Subjects were primed with one of four levels of ferocity (size) in the course of a “color perception” experiment, and were later asked to judge the ferocity (size) of real (unambiguous) and unreal (ambiguous) animals. An interaction between ambiguity of judged stimuli (real vs unreal animals) and extremity of primed exemplars (moderate vs extreme levels of ferocity or size) was revealed. Assimilation effects (judgments consistent with the primed category) occurred only when moderate exemplars were primed and ambiguous stimuli judged. Contrast effects occurred when extreme exemplars were primed and ambiguous stimuli judged and, irrespective of extremity of the primed exemplar, when unambiguous stimuli were judged. The results are interpreted in terms of an integration of social judgment and social cognition perspectives.     

The meaning of observed violence: Real vs. fictional violence and consequent effects on aggression and emotional arousal

Sixty male subjects were either attacked or treated neutrally by a confederate, after which each saw a videotape of two men fighting. Subjects were informed that fight was either real or fictitious or were given no explanation of it. Subjects who had previously been attacked and had observed the fight under a set to perceive it as real were subsequently more punitive in their treatment of the confederate than subjects in all other conditions. The combination of prior attack and observation of real violence also sustained blood pressure (BP) at near the level produced by the attack, whereas BP of attacked subjects in the other conditions declined during the time the fight was observed. Palmar sweat measures revealed that observation of real violence was more arousing than observation of fictitious fighting. The results are discussed in terms of the effects that the reality of observed violence has on emotional arousal.     

Discriminability and criterion differences between extraverts and introverts during vigilance

In a signal detection task introverts were better able than extraverts to distinguish between the signal and noise distribution (p < .001) and also set a higher criterion point for their responses (p < .01). The results show that superior vigilance in introverts reported by other investigators is due to two processes.     

Attitude accessibility,attitude-behavior consistency,and the strength of the object-evaluation association

Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the accessibility of attitudes from memory as a function of the manner of attitude formation. The findings of the first experiment indicated that subjects could respond more quickly in a response-time task to inquiries about their attitudes when the attitudes were based upon direct behavioral experience with the attitude objects than when they were based upon nonbehavioral experience. It was suggested that, relative to indirect experience, behavioral experience may facilitate the attitude formation process and increase attitude accessibility once the attitude is formed. A second experiment found support for both of these notions. Two additional experiments indicated that repeated association of the attitude object and the attitudinal evaluation enhanced both attitude accessibility and attitude-behavior consistency. It was suggested that the strength of the object-evaluation association is a critical determinant of accessibility, which, in turn, acts as a central factor in the process by which attitudes affect later behavior. It was further suggested that the manner of attitude formation affects attitude-behavior consistency because direct experience produces a stronger object-evaluation association and, hence, a more accessible attitude than does indirect experience.     

Embodied AI, Creation, and Cog

This is a reply to comments on my paper Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Questions of the Image of God ; one was written by Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, and another one by Helmut Reich. I will start with the suggested analogy of the relationship between God and us and the one between us and the humanoid robot Cog and will show why this analogy is not helpful for the dialogue between theology and artificial intelligence (AI). Such a dialogue can succeed only if both our fascination for humanoids and our fear of them are equally accepted. Any avoidance of these emotions, as well as any rejection of the possibility that Cog might one day be humanlike, destroy the dialogue. The interpretation of both scientific theories and religious metaphors as stories replaces seemingly "rational" arguments with the confession of the respective commitments to a body of stories and opens up a space for exchange and friendship between AI-researchers and theologians—an option that usually remains closed.     

A Comparison of Dewey’s and Russell’s Influences on China

John Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China at around the same time in 1920. Both profoundly influenced China during the great transition period of this country. This article will focus on the differences between the two great figures that influenced China in the 1920s. This comparison will examine the following five aspects: 1. Deweyanization vs. Russellization; 2. Dewey’s “Populism” vs. Russell’s “Aristocraticism”; 3. Dewey’s “Syntheticalism” vs. Russell’s “Analyticalism”; 4. Dewey’s “Realism” vs. Russell’s “Romanticism”; 5. Dewey’s “Conservatism” vs. Russell’s “Radicalism”. This examination will highlight that, although their visit left indelible impressions among Chinese intellecturals, for the radical Marx–Leninists, any Western philosophy and socio-political theories, including Dewey’s and Russell’s, were prejudicial, outworn, and even counterrevolutionary. Soon “Marxi–Leninization” was gradually substituted for “Deweyanization” and “Russellization.”