Remembrance of things past: Cultural process and practice in the analysis of career stories

Stories can be a valuable tool for the career researcher. Questions arise, though, about how best to approach stories analytically such that their insights can be fully realised. In this paper I apply cultural theorist Raymond Williams’ analysis of cultural processes as dominant, residual and emergent (1977) to the narratives generated in a recent study into the careers of research scientists. I examine how these overlapping meaning systems are elucidated in individuals’ career narratives and consider implications for developing understanding.     

Morphological patterns in Hungarian children with Williams syndrome and the rule debates

Williams syndrome (WMS), a rare neurogenetic disorder, has been in the forefront of research in cognitive psychology for the last 10 years. Studies of grammatical development in 14 Hungarian WMS children are presented: they were examined on tasks testing regular and irregular morphology; measures of digit span were also obtained. Results on the production of accusative and plural forms confirmed for Hungarian that regardless of the frequency of the item, inflected forms of irregulars are harder to produce, and often regularized in WMS, revealing a dissociation between the rules of grammar vs. the mental lexicon. Overall performance on the morphology task is associated with the capacity of phonological short-term memory: subjects with higher span perform better on both tasks. The specification of the surprisingly close relation of phonological short-term memory with the linguistic measures awaits further study.     

Mackie on Practical Reason

I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.

Integrity and Demandingness

I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’

A cross-syndrome study of the development of holistic face recognition in children with autism, Down syndrome, and Williams syndrome

We report a cross-syndrome comparison of the development of holistic processing in face recognition in school-aged children with developmental disorders: autism, Down syndrome, and Williams syndrome. The autism group was split into two groups: one with high-functioning children and one with low-functioning children. The latter group has rarely been studied in this context. The four disorder groups were compared with typically developing children. Cross-sectional trajectory analyses were used to compare development in a modified version of Tanaka and Farah’s part–whole task. Trajectories were constructed linking part–whole performance either to chronological age or to several measures of mental age (receptive vocabulary, visuospatial construction, and the Benton Facial Recognition Test). In addition to variable delays in onset and rate of development, we found an atypical profile in all disorder groups. These profiles were atypical in different ways, indicating multiple pathways to, and variable outcomes in, the development of face recognition. We discuss the implications for theories of face recognition in both atypical and typical development, including the idea that part–whole and rotation manipulations may tap different aspects of holistic and/or configural processing.     

WHY RIGHTS? WHY ME?

That Jews are concerned about human rights is distinct from why Jews should be concerned about rights in the first place. This project analyzes the reasons Jews in the twentieth century put forward to convince co‐religionists to take rights seriously. Focusing on the content of these arguments facilitates dividing the proffered rationales into three broad categories—the temporal, the innate, and the philosophical. Analysis of each category reveals subdivisions, reflecting the many ways Jews try to persuade each other to care about human rights. This taxonomy, unlike others, highlights the different ways in which Jews conceptualize the burning ethical questions of our day: of how and why to be Jewish and modern. These rationales therefore are understood to function as moral reasons and, as such, can be assessed by their relative claims.     

Spatial breakdown in spatial construction: evidence from eye fixations in children with Williams syndrome

We investigated the role of executive and spatial representational processes in impaired performance of block construction tasks by children with Williams syndrome (WS), a rare genetic defect that results in severely impaired spatial cognition. In Experiment 1, we examined performance in two kinds of block construction tasks, Simple Puzzles, in which block faces contained a single color, and Complex, in which some block faces contained an arrangement of two colors. WS and control children were comparable in their ability to solve simple puzzles, and showed similar eye-fixation patterns, suggesting that basic executive processes were intact. However, WS children were severely impaired in their ability to solve complex puzzles. In these puzzles, WS children fixated the complex puzzle models and checked their partial solutions less often than normal children, but they were comparable in their ability to detect errors in their copies and almost exclusively made repairs to copies that were, in fact, incorrect. We conjecture that the abnormal fixation patterns were a consequence of impoverished spatial representations, rather than a cause of it. This conjecture was tested in Experiment 2, where we examined children's capacity to match and place individual blocks without engaging the complex executive processes required to carry out a complete puzzle solution. We found serious deficiency among WS children in both aspects of spatial representation. Moreover, estimates of the errors in representing the identity and location of model blocks derived from Experiment 2 provided a good account of the observed errors in the block construction task of Experiment 1.     

Developmental reversal in classification accuracy due to an increase with age in orientation-free judgments.

A complete developmental reversal in accuracy was obtained in Experiment I in which third graders, sixth graders, and adults judged the class membership of patterns presented in a same-different task. An examination of the task requirements and pattern classes employed led to the hypothesis that the reversal in accuracy resulted from an increase with age in orientation-free judgments. The results of Experiment II, in which adults were told to not rotate the patterns, and Experiment III, which was a replication of Experiment I using symmetric rather than areally skewed pattern classes, provided confirmation for that hypothesis.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.