全文获取类型
收费全文 | 826篇 |
免费 | 31篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 5篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 13篇 |
2020年 | 12篇 |
2019年 | 16篇 |
2018年 | 18篇 |
2017年 | 19篇 |
2016年 | 16篇 |
2015年 | 15篇 |
2014年 | 18篇 |
2013年 | 67篇 |
2012年 | 14篇 |
2011年 | 10篇 |
2010年 | 12篇 |
2009年 | 27篇 |
2008年 | 26篇 |
2007年 | 30篇 |
2006年 | 23篇 |
2005年 | 28篇 |
2004年 | 10篇 |
2003年 | 12篇 |
2002年 | 15篇 |
2001年 | 7篇 |
2000年 | 6篇 |
1999年 | 2篇 |
1998年 | 5篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 25篇 |
1984年 | 33篇 |
1983年 | 35篇 |
1982年 | 43篇 |
1981年 | 41篇 |
1980年 | 38篇 |
1979年 | 32篇 |
1978年 | 46篇 |
1977年 | 29篇 |
1976年 | 27篇 |
1975年 | 21篇 |
1974年 | 24篇 |
1973年 | 29篇 |
排序方式: 共有857条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
161.
While most people may initially agree that justice is fairness,as an evangelical Protestant I argue that, for many religiouscomprehensive doctrines, the Rawlsean model does not possessthe resources necessary to sustain tolerance in moral decisionmaking. The weakness of Rawls's model centers on the reasonablepriority of convictions that arise from private comprehensivedoctrines. To attain a free and pluralistic society, peopleneed resources sufficient to provide reasons to tolerate actionsthat are otherwise intolerable. In addition to arguing for thedeficiency of the Rawlsean political model, I sketch out a preliminarymodel of ambassadorship that offers religious communities, andin particular Protestant evangelicals, the necessary resourcesto engage the broader society tolerantly while maintaining theirreligious convictions. As a citizen of the church and a memberof another kingdom, Christians serve as ambassadors to thosewho are not of the heavenly kingdom. I take this model to bemore ambitious than that of a sojourner who lives in the landbut is isolated as much as possible from society, while moremodest than that of reconstructionists who seek to implementtheir own sacred law on all others. 相似文献
162.
David A. Reidy 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):193-236
In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls does not discuss justice and the global economy at great length or in great detail. What he does say has not
been well-received. The prevailing view seems to be that what Rawls says in The Law of Peoples regarding global economic justice is both inconsistent with and a betrayal of his own liberal egalitarian commitments, an
unexpected and unacceptable defense of the status quo. This view is, I think, mistaken. Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice is richer, more nuanced, and
generally more compelling than his critics have been willing to acknowledge. My aim in this essay is to sympathetically set
out, and then defend against two common families of objection to, Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice.
Objections of the first sort reject Rawls’s position as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of individual
persons worldwide. Objections of the second sort reject it as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests
of well-ordered peoples. Throughout the paper I develop several arguments implicit in The Law of Peoples but not well-developed there as well as offer some additional arguments of my own consistent with the spirit of The Law of Peoples and Rawls’s work more generally. I conclude with some brief remarks expressing two worries I have about Rawls’s position
– one concerning global public goods, the other concerning the formation of a morally adequate and effective political will
within the international context under contemporary conditions.
I wish to thank Alyssa Bernstein, Allen Buchanan, Samuel Freeman, John Hardwig, John Mandle, Rex Martin, Jim Nickel, Walter
Riker, Kok-Chor Tan, and Leif Wenar for helpful comments or instructive conversation regarding earlier drafts of this paper. 相似文献
163.
Neal Judisch 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(4):357-375
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the
way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they
think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise
and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is
inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are
willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance
of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility. 相似文献
164.
Richard J. Arneson 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(1):31-63
Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? “No,” says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum’s view that to respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust. 相似文献
165.
Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed
toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role
here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence.
I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions
in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the
permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to
justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the
role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with
respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.
相似文献
Troy JollimoreEmail: |
166.
Matthew William McKeon 《Synthese》2009,167(1):163-182
An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional
account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism
of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical
and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional
accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing
to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking
that there are infinitely many logical objects. 相似文献
167.
Arvid Båve 《Synthese》2009,169(1):51-73
The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich),
and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds
to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I
then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x
iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about”
is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised
theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness
only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory
of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness
or reference. 相似文献
168.
John Lippitt 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(3):125-138
A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism
and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins’ argument. 相似文献
169.
This paper addresses recent examples of militant atheism. It considers the theistic reply that describes atheism as deriving
from a “God-shaped hole” in the human soul. The paper will argue that American pragmatism offers a middle path that avoids
militant atheism without suffering from this problem. The paper describes this middle path and considers the problem that
is seen in Rorty’s recent work: how the pragmatist can remain critical of religious fundamentalism without succumbing to a
militant version of atheism. The solution proposed is tolerant acceptance of religion along with melioristic criticism developed
within shared norms of inquiry. 相似文献
170.
A. J. Watson 《Dialog》2009,48(2):179-186
Abstract : Starting from the assertion that comparative theology is inherently dialogical in nature, this paper examines the use of non‐confessional meta‐terminology and its application in interfaith dialogue. In so doing, it examines potential meta‐terms for describing revelation as related in the Bhagavad‐Gita, the Qur’an, and the Gospel of John, and concludes that non‐confessional terms aid in the dismissal of normative viewpoints, leading to greater appreciation of commonality and meaning in the truth claims of other faiths and dialogue partners. 相似文献