Beyond the Sociobiological Dilemma: Social Emotions and the Evolution of Morality

Is morality biologically altruistic? Does it imply a disadvantage in the struggle for existence? A positive answer puts morality at odds with natural selection, unless natural selection operates at the level of groups. In this case, a trait that is good for groups though bad (reproductively) for individuals can evolve. Sociobiologists reject group selection and have adopted one of two horns of a dilemma. Either morality is based on an egoistic calculus, compatible with natural selection; or morality continues tied to psychological and biological altruism but not as a product of natural selection. The dilemma denies a third possibility—that psychological altruism evolves as a biologically selfish trait. I discuss the classical treatments of the paradox by Charles Darwin ([1871] 1989) and Robert Trivers (1971), focusing on the role they attribute to social emotions. The upshot is that both Darwin and Trivers sketch a natural‐selection process relying on innate emotional mechanisms that render morality adaptive for individuals as well as for groups. I give additional reasons for viewing it as a form of natural, instead of only cultural, selection.     

Reframing the Catholic Understanding of Just War: Two Contrasting Approaches in the Interwar Period

During the inter war period, European Catholic authors exhibited two different approaches to the question of just war. One approach was articulated at the “Fribourg Conventus,” a 1931 meeting of French, Swiss, and German theologians, whose subsequent declaration (Conventus de bello, published in 1932) called for a reformulation of Catholic teaching based on the premise that the traditional just‐war doctrine had been superseded by developments in international law. A competing approach was articulated by the Dutch Jesuit Robert Regout, who maintained that the just‐war doctrine could contribute to the formation of international law by providing a much‐needed normative foundation for the use of armed force by individual states in redress of their violated rights. After presenting these two approaches and explaining how they differ, this essay shows how the outlook of the Conventus de bello is reflected in subsequent papal statements on armed force—to the detriment of the traditional terminology of just war.     

Horribly Wrong

Moral horror is an extreme emotional response to that which violates things we regard as sacred. In Robert Merrihew Adams's view, horror is a response to badness and not to wrongness, and so one could properly regard some actions as horrible but not wrong. In contrast, I argue that horror, when directed toward actions, is only appropriate for wrong actions. The reason is that horror involves moral disgust, and agents who committed a horrible action would have self‐disgust, that is, they would be repulsive to themselves. I argue, with reference to killing in combat and in self‐defense, that those who have done no wrong should not be in such a state.     

Invitation to the Triune Conversation: Explorations of Prayer through the Theology of Robert Jenson

This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of prayer through an engagement with its crucial role in the systematic thought of Robert Jenson. I present prayer as our invitation to the triune conversation. Developing some of Jenson's categories, I work to show that a Christian understanding of prayer connects to a spectrum of systematic loci, especially creation and anthropology, the sacraments and ecclesiology, mission and eschatology. In these three modes, the anthropological, the ecclesial and the eschatological, prayer enters into the ultimate conversation that animates the world through faith, love and hope. This paper concludes by arguing that such an account of prayer, if authentic, supports a contemporary retrieval of the cataphatic dimension of theology.     

How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?

Libertarianism has, seemingly, always been in disrepute among philosophers. While throughout history philosophers have offered different reasons for their dissatisfaction with libertarianism, one worry is recurring: namely a worry about luck. To many, it seems that if our choices and actions are undetermined, then we cannot control them in a way that allows for freedom and responsibility. My fundamental aim in this paper is to place libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible libertarian theory. I begin by arguing that Robert Kane's influential formulation of libertarianism actually generates an acute worry about luck, showing specifically that Kane's recipe for solving the problem of luck and his attendant conception of the location and role of indeterminism derived from it are deeply problematic. I then offer a reformulation of libertarianism – particularly a new conception of the location and role of indeterminism – that is capable of avoiding the problems that beset Kane's theory and that, I argue, places libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible theory.     

Thomas Cromwell: a life

Abstract

This study shows how the rise of the English separatist movement in the latesixteenth century was characterized by a polemical struggle over the applicability of the epithet of ‘Donatism.’ A pejorative slur, the Donatist label was often utilized during the early-modern period against dissident movements which refused to recognize the legitimacy of the established church. It was a perfect polemical weapon, serving to connect such rogue congregations with all the dangerous implications, both theological and political, of the ancient schism. But what was ‘Donatism’ in the context of Elizabethan England? What were its characteristics and subversive doctrines? In this article, I will examine the portrait of the ancient sect as painted by both the opponents of separatism and the early separatist leaders themselves in order to assess what aspects of the Donatist label resonated with the polemical presuppositions of each side.     

Robert Persons’s Resolution(1582) and the issue of textual piracy in Protestant editions of Catholic devotional literature

Abstract

Despite current attention to continuing crypto-Catholics in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, less attention has been paid to the extent to which Catholic culture may have affected the Protestant mainstream. This study demonstrates the general neglect of this subject, and examines the role played, then and now, by the attack of Robert Persons SJ on Edmund Bunny, a Church of England minister, for publishing a Protestant adaptation of Persons’s work. This study argues that Bunny had a more serious intent than the ‘piracy’ he is widely credited with, and that his editorial practices resembled those employed by Roman Catholics, including Persons himself. While more serious cases of textual piracy have been largely overlooked, conventional condemnation of Bunny’s edition has done little more than contribute to a general misunderstanding of (and a paucity of interest in) the reception of Catholic literature in whatever format by Protestants.     

体外受精技术获得诺贝尔医学奖对临床科研的启示

英国生理学家罗伯特·爱德华兹因其对体外受精技术领域做出的开创性贡献而荣膺2010年度生理学和医学诺贝尔奖。回顾体外受精技术的历程带给我们一些启示：临床科研要有强烈的创新意识,执着精神,紧密结合基础研究,同时重视医学伦理。     

CHRIST AND EVOLUTION: A DRAMA OF WISDOM?1

Abstract This paper argues that a genuine engagement of Christianity with evolution needs to include a discussion of Christology. Further, it develops a particular approach to Christology through a theo‐dramatic account of incarnation. The somewhat static post‐Chalcedon theological categories of divine and human natures are hard to square with contemporary evolutionary accounts of human origins. Once the divine Logos is portrayed in the active categories of Wisdom it becomes easier to envisage divine and creaturely wisdom coexisting in the person of Christ. I argue, in particular, that a focus on God's agency through a modified version of Hans Urs von Balthasar's account of theo‐drama invites participation and affirms human agency in a way that grand narratives do not. More particularly, drawing on examples from hominid evolution, contemporary discussion of paleontology and cooperative evolutionary theories, I suggest that the most convincing accounts of evolutionary biology fit into this theo‐dramatic account more readily than alternatives. As such, in the spirit of Robert Boyle, this paper deliberately blurs the categories of revealed and natural theology by arguing that we can make sense of the former through concentration on the latter.