Religion,the Royal Society,and the Rise of Science1

Accounts of the role of religion in the rise of modern science often focus on the way in which religion provided the intellectual foundations for scientific enquiry, motivated particular individuals, or provided the substantive content of approaches to nature. These relate to the origins of science and assume that, once established, modern science becomes self-justifying. However, seventeenth-century criticisms of science—attacks on the Royal Society being one example—suggest that science remained a marginal and precarious activity for some time. The rise of science to cultural prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was possible only because science was eventually able to establish itself as a religiously useful enterprise. Religion thus played a key role not only in the origins of modern science, but in providing the ongoing social sanctions that ensured its persistence and rise to prominence.     

A Letter to Mom During CPE

This article is a fictional letter. A seminarian writes to his mother during his Clinical Pastoral Education internship at a mental hospital, and the letter raises a number of issues, including the nature of the Bible, the essence of salvation (and Hell), the role of evangelism, and the sexual dynamics of the counseling relationship. William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience is mentioned, and cultural questions regarding psychology are raised. There are other avenues to be explored, but the reader might start by reflecting on the issues noted.Nathan S. Carlin has been a graduate student at Princeton Seminary and has worked closely with Donald Capps and Robert Dykstra, leading scholars in the field of pastoral psychology. Carlin has published numerous articles as a Master of Divinity student. He is now a graduate student in Religious Studies at Rice University. Correspondence to Nathan Steven Carlin, 1515 Bissonnet Street, Unit 186, Houston, TX 77005-1629, USA; e-mail: Nathan.Carlin@rice.edu     

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood is proposed. The theory comprises three parts: a contextual part that emphasizes the role of intelligence in successful adaptation to the environment; a componential part that specifies the mental mechanisms and processes underlying intelligent behavior; and an experiential part that indicates that intelligence is best manifested in instances in which the task or situation requiring the application of these processes is relatively novel or is becoming automatized. A selective and brief review of the literature on adult intellectual development is provided as evidence for the triarchic theory. The triarchic theory is then compared with four other theoretical approaches to adult intellectual development. It is argued that the triarchic theory provides new insights regarding the ways in which intelligence changes from early to middle to late adulthood and suggests certain properties of tasks and situations that make them more or less useful as measures of intelligence at various points in adult intellectual development.     

The Trinity in Christian‐Muslim Conversation

Abstract :  Christians need to recognize more fully the force of Muslim arguments on behalf of the oneness of God against the doctrine of the Trinity. Christians could benefit from the Islamic concept of shirk , proscribing the association of something that is not God in the honor and respect due to God alone. Christian trinitarian theology may be improved thereby; and certainly Christian‐Muslim conversation will be enriched.     

Spatial localization in children after changes in position

Five experiments investigated the young child's ability to retrieve a target after a change in the position of the child or the target. In Experiments I–IV 2- to 4-year-old children were rotated 90, 180, 270, or 360° about a stationary square table containing four identical hiding locations at each of the cardinal locations. The children tested performed this task significantly better than chance, but their errors reflected either their response biases in the absence of any information as to the location of the target, or the repetition of a response which had been successful in retrieving the target prior to the change in position. When the children were forced to respond rapidly, these errors increased significantly. In Experiment V a table top was rotated 90, 180, 270, or 360° in front of 3- to 10-year-old children. There were two cue situations. The child saw the rotation, or the child had to infer the rotation. Young children made errors of the types observed in Experiments I–IV. The ability to inhibit these errors increased with age. By 7 years of age performance was virtually perfect when the child could observe the change in position of the hidden object. The ability to infer the positional change developed more slowly and was good but not perfect at 10 years of age.     

ON McCAULEY'S WHY RELIGION IS NATURAL AND SCIENCE IS NOT: SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS

Robert McCauley's Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not provides a summary interpretive statement of the standard model in cognitive science of religion, what I have previously called the HADD + ToM + Cultural Epidemiology model, along with a more general argument comparing religious cognition to scientific thinking and a novel framework for understanding both in terms of the concept of the maturationally natural. I here follow up on some observations made in a previous paper, developing them in light of McCauley's own response to my previous arguments.     

Healthy Conflict in an Era of Intractability

The essay responds to four critical essays by Rosemary Kellison, Ebrahim Moosa, Joseph Winters, and Martin Kavka on the author’s recent book, Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (2018). Parts 1 and 2 work in tandem to further develop my accounts of strategic empathy and agonistic political friendship. I defend these accounts against criticisms that my argument for moral imagination obligates oppressed people to empathize with their oppressors. I argue, further, that healthy conflict can be motivated by a kind of “secular” love. This enables my position to immanently critique and mediate the claims that one must either love (agapically) one’s opponent in order to engage them in “healthy conflict,” on one hand, or that one must vanquish, exclude, or “cancel” one’s opponent, on the other. In Part 3, I demonstrate how my account mediates the challenge of an alleged standing opposition between moral imagination and socio-theoretical critique. I defend a methodologically pragmatist account of immanent prophetic criticism, resistance, and conflict transformation. Finally, I respond to one critic’s vindication of a strong enemy/adversary opposition that takes up the case of white supremacist violence in the U.S. I argue that the time horizon for healthy conflict must be simultaneously immediate and also long-term, provided that such engagements remain socio-critically self-reflexive and seek to cultivate transformational responses.     

Language and speech recovery in a case of viral encephalitis

The speech and language recovery course of a 47-year-old man with viral encephalitis is described. Over a 3-month period, the patient was evaluated six times using the same selected battery of tests. Results show that viral encephalitis can deleteriously affect communicative performance and that improvement in medical status is accompanied by rapid and dramatic gains on most standard speech and language measures. For this case changes appeared related to improved auditory attention and retention, increased efficiency in word retrieval, and improved mental status.