A comparison of two methods of assessing representation-mediated food aversions based on shock or illness

In experiments that measured food consumption, Holland (1981; Learning and Motivation, 12, 1-18) found that food aversions were formed when an exteroceptive associate of food was paired with illness, but not when such an associate was paired with shock. By contrast, measuring the ability of food to reinforce instrumental responding, Ward-Robinson and Hall (1999; Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52B, 335-350) found that pairing an associatively activated representation of food with shock readily established an aversion to that food. Two experiments considered the origins of these apparently discrepant results. The results did not support either the possibility that instrumental reinforcement power is a more sensitive measure of aversion learning than consumption, or the hypothesis that illness particularly devalues properties of food representations that determine consumption (such as palatability) whereas shock devalues more general properties critical to reinforcement. The results suggested instead that whereas the effects of pairings of a food associate with illness are mediated by changes in the value of the food itself, the effects of pairings with shock are mediated by the conditioning of fear or other competing responses to the site of food delivery, and not by modification of the value of food itself.     

Regret aversion and decision process quality: Effects of regret salience on decision process carefulness

A considerable amount of past research has examined the effects of regret aversion on which options decision makers choose. However, past research has largely neglected to address the effect of regret aversion on the decision process. We conducted five experiments to examine the effect of making regret salient on decision process quality. We predicted that increased regret aversion would lead to more careful decision processing. The results consistently supported this prediction across the different decision situations, incentive structures, regret salience manipulations, and dependent variables used. In all experiments making regret salient led decision makers to take significantly longer to reach a decision. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 4 it also led participants to collect significantly more information before making a choice. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

How Risk is Perceived, Constructed and Interpreted by Clients in Clinical Genetics, and the Effects on Decision Making: Systematic Review

As an individual’s understanding of their genetic risk may influence risk management decisions, it is important to understand the ways in which risk is constructed and interpreted. We systematically reviewed the literature, undertaking a narrative synthesis of 59 studies presenting data on the ways in which individuals perceive, construct and interpret their risk, and the subsequent effects. While most studies assessed perceived risk quantitatively, the combined evidence suggests individuals find risk difficult to accurately quantify, with a tendency to overestimate. Rather than being a stand-alone concept, risk is something lived and experienced and the process of constructing risk is complex and influenced by many factors. While evidence of the effects of perceived risk is limited and inconsistent, there is some evidence to suggest high risk estimations may adversely affect health and lead to inappropriate uptake of medical surveillance and preventative measures by some individuals. A more focused approach to research is needed with greater exploration of the ways in which risk is constructed, along with the development of stronger theoretical models, to facilitate effective and patient-centered counseling strategies.     

行为决策中模糊规避研究的回顾与展望

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会偏好有精确概率的事件而不是从主观上判断具有相同模糊概率的事件。自从Ellsberg提出模糊规避的概念以来,模糊规避已在行为决策研究的多个领域得到广泛验证。本文梳理了近五十年来关于模糊规避的研究文献,系统分析了模糊规避的研究范式、心理机制和影响因素,同时提出了未来的研究展望。     

模糊决策的情境依赖性

实验1采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的研究范式,探究被试对模糊的厌恶倾向以及在决策过程中所采用的决策策略。结果发现：被试对确定选项和模糊选项的选择存在差异;在肯定形式下倾向于确定选项,而在否定形式下则倾向于模糊选项,采用了利益最大化策略。实验2采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的变式,通过操纵概率和任务类型,发现：模糊决策具有情境依赖性,并非任何情况下个体都厌恶模糊。当风险选项不能满足自己的需要,即获胜机率比较小时,人们会偏向模糊选项。     

The effects of endowment on the demand for probabilistic information

Research shows that individuals are ambiguity averse: they choose unambiguous over equivalent ambiguous prospects and price them higher (either as buyers or sellers). Moreover, it is often assumed that ambiguity averse individuals are willing to pay an ambiguity premium for information that reduces ambiguity [Camerer, C. F., & Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 325–370]. However, when people are asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an equivalent unambiguous one, they prefer to retain the former [Roca, M., Hogarth, R. M., & Maule, A. J. (2006). Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32(3), 175–194]. We present three experiments investigating the economic effects of endowment on attitudes towards ambiguity and the ambiguity premium. The experiments, based on a [Becker, G., DeGroot, M., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Science, 9, 3] procedure, show that the value attributed to ambiguity reducing information is substantially affected by the status quo of the individual.     

Why do narcissists take more risks? Testing the roles of perceived risks and benefits of risky behaviors

Much prior research demonstrates that narcissists take more risks than others, but almost no research has examined what motivates this behavior. The present study tested two potential driving mechanisms of risk-taking by narcissists (i.e., heightened perceptions of benefits and diminished perceptions of risks stemming from risky behaviors) by administering survey measures of narcissism and risk-taking to a sample of 605 undergraduate college students. Contrary to what might be expected, the results suggest that narcissists appreciate the risks associated with risky behaviors just as much as do less narcissistic individuals. Their risk-taking appears to instead be fueled by heightened perceptions of benefits stemming from risky behaviors. These results are consistent with a growing body of evidence suggesting that narcissists engage in some forms of potentially problematic behaviors, such as risk-taking, because of a surplus of eagerness rather than a deficit of inhibition.     

Interpretation of Ambiguous Information in Girls at Risk for Depression

Research has consistently documented that depressed individuals process information in a negatively biased manner. There is little evidence, however, concerning whether these biases represent risk factors for depression, as is hypothesized by cognitive models. In the present study we investigated whether a particular cognitive bias observed in currently depressed individuals, the tendency to interpret ambiguous information negatively, characterizes daughters of depressed mothers, a population known to be at increased risk for depression. Following a negative mood induction, young daughters of depressed and never-disordered mothers completed two information-processing tasks in which their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous stimuli were evaluated. Daughters of depressed mothers interpreted ambiguous words more negatively and less positively, and ambiguous stories more negatively, than did daughters of never-disordered mothers. These results provide support for cognitive vulnerability models of depression.     

Elliott’s Ethics of Expertise Proposal and Application: A Dangerous Precedent

In a recent paper in Science and Engineering Ethics (SEE) Elliott proposed an ethics of expertise, providing its theoretical foundation along with its application in a case study devoted to the topic of hormesis. The application is based on a commentary in the journal Nature, and it includes assertions of ethical breaches. Elliott concludes that the authors of the commentary failed to promote the informed consent of decision makers by not providing representative information about alternative frequency estimates of hormesis in the literature, thereby hindering the capacity of the scientific community to promote informed consent relating to chemical regulation. This paper argues that Elliott should have incorporated due process into his system of evaluation. His argument is also seriously deficient technically, in that it misinterprets the toxicological issues, misrepresents the scientific literature with respect to the frequency of hormesis, and incorrectly assesses the extent to which the Nature paper revealed opposing/alternative views on hormesis. Given the seriousness of assertions of noncompliance to ethical norms, there must be procedures to protect those whose ethics were called into question, to fairly evaluate the technical justification for an assertion, and to enable corrections in the event of errors. If a journal is willing to publish assertions that individuals acted in an ethically questionable way, it should be guided by a documented code of ethics and meet a standard of responsibility far greater than normal peer-review processes for papers that do not entail such ethical judgments.