Honneth and the Communitarians: Towards a Recognitive Critical Theory of Community

This paper attempts to sketch a critical model of political community by drawing upon recent contributions to the theory of ‘recognition’, particularly in the work of Axel Honneth. The paper proceeds by, first, delineating key features shared by a range of positions associated with ‘communitarianism’, along with the limitations and problems incurred by these commitments. The second part of the paper attempts to mobilise Honneth’s theoretical work to develop a conception of community that shares a number of the basic premisesvis-á-vis political life associated with communitarianism, but which nevertheless accommodates the reservations expressed by communitarianism’s liberal and radical critics. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts

There are great goods desired by all of us, and the lack of themmakes for bad lives. One sample of bad African lives involves aloss of 20 million years of living time. The questions raised bythese and other facts are to be answered by the Principle ofHumanity, about bad lives and rationality. It is superior tomorality of relationship and all else, and in a way is undeniable.The principle together with other things issues in six propositions.One gives us a moral responsibility, our politicians at our head,for the terrorism of September 11. To be ordinary is not to beinnocent. Another proposition is that the Palestinians have a moralright to their terrorism. The latter proposition can be given stillmore support than in the book from which this paper derives.     

简论社会主义道德的核心和原则

社会主义道德的核心和原则,是理解和把握社会主义道德的本质特征、先进性、高尚性、科学性的关键。为人民服务的丰富内涵及其作为社会主义道德核心的内在根据。集体主义的科学含又及其作为社会主义道德原则的全面分析。     

原始道德的自制力从何而来?

原始道德的自制力,主要表现为原始人对其生物本能的克制和调整。它来源于原始先民的精神心理与其群体社会生活的互动机制。具体包括两种生产活动的社会制约,神灵信仰的敬畏心理,自我观念的发生与发展,原始理解的能力与机制等因素。     

The development of children's preferences for equality and equity across 13 individualistic and collectivist cultures

A concern for fairness is a fundamental and universal element of morality. To examine the extent to which cultural norms are integrated into fairness cognitions and influence social preferences regarding equality and equity, a large sample of children (N 2,163) aged 4–11 were tested in 13 diverse countries. Children participated in three versions of a third‐party, contextualized distributive justice game between two hypothetical recipients differing in terms of wealth, merit, and empathy. Social decision‐making in these games revealed universal age‐related shifts from equality‐based to equity‐based distribution motivations across cultures. However, differences in levels of individualism and collectivism between the 13 countries predicted the age and extent to which children favor equity in each condition. Children from the most individualistic cultures endorsed equitable distributions to a greater degree than children from more collectivist cultures when recipients differed in regards to wealth and merit. However, in an empathy context where recipients differed in injury, children from the most collectivist cultures exhibited greater preferences to distribute resource equitably compared to children from more individualistic cultures. Children from the more individualistic cultures also favored equitable distributions at an earlier age than children from more collectivist cultures overall. These results demonstrate aspects of both cross‐cultural similarity and divergence in the development of fairness preferences.     

宗教启动会使人更加道德吗?

通过启动被试的宗教信仰状态, 进而探讨宗教对个体道德的影响作用, 这是近年来宗教心理学研究的热点问题, 但是围绕此问题的研究结论并不统一。有研究发现, 宗教启动可以增强个体的道德。但也有研究表明宗教启动会使个体更不道德。宗教启动对道德的影响是通过宗教信念的中介作用而实现的, 被试的信仰类型、性别、实验启动的方式及内容、以及被试的人格倾向则会因为影响中介信念的激活而调节宗教启动与道德的关系。未来研究需要进一步创新启动实验研究方法, 探索影响宗教与道德的关系的调节变量, 结合跨文化、跨学科的研究视角, 更深入地挖掘这一问题。     

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions—that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

The psychology of hate: Moral concerns differentiate hate from dislike

We investigated whether any differences in the psychological conceptualization of hate and dislike were simply a matter of degree of negativity (i.e., hate falls on the end of the continuum of dislike) or also morality (i.e., hate is imbued with distinct moral components that distinguish it from dislike). In three lab studies in Canada and the United States, participants reported disliked and hated attitude objects and rated each on dimensions including valence, attitude strength, morality, and emotional content. Quantitative and qualitative measures revealed that hated attitude objects were more negative than disliked attitude objects and associated with moral beliefs and emotions, even after adjusting for differences in negativity. In Study 4, we analysed the rhetoric on real hate sites and complaint forums and found that the language used on prominent hate websites contained more words related to morality, but not negativity, relative to complaint forums.