Surface Colour is not a Perceptual Content

In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of the perceptual system. These conclusions contradict widely accepted views in both the philosophy of perception and colour science. I finish by considering and rejecting a competing account of the surface-matching results, according to which surface colour is represented indeterminately in perception.     

The Challenges of Extreme Moral Stress: Claudia Card's Contributions to the Formation of Nonideal Ethical Theory

This essay argues that Claudia Card numbers among important contributors to nonideal ethical theory (NET), and it advocates for the worth of NET. Following philosophers including Lisa Tessman and Charles Mills, the essay contends that it is important for ethical theory, and for feminist purposes, to carry forward the interrelationship that Mills identifies between nonideal theory and feminist ethics. Card's ethical theorizing assists in understanding that interrelationship. Card's philosophical work includes basic elements of NET indicated by Tessman, Mills, and others, and further offers two important and neglected elements to other nonideal ethical theorists: (i) her rejection of the “administrative point of view,” and (ii) her focus on “intolerable harms” as forms of “extreme moral stress” and obstacles to excellent ethical lives. The essay concludes that Card's insights are helpful to philosophers in developing nonideal ethical theory as a distinctive contribution to, and as a subset of, nonideal theory.     

Methodological Rigor in Journal of Counseling & Development Qualitative Research Articles: A 15‐Year Review

The authors conducted a content analysis on the type, frequency, and intensity of use of various indicators of rigor for 68 qualitative research articles published between 1999 and 2014 in the Journal of Counseling & Development. The authors identified the most frequently listed and implemented strategies for the research articles. The authors found a significant engagement in rigor strategies across time, variations in intensity in strategy use, and a significant positive relationship between intensity of strategy use across time.     

A Content Analysis of Research on Disability: American Counseling Association Journals Between 2003 and 2013

This content analysis provides an overview of disability articles published in 10 major American Counseling Association journals between 2003 and 2013. In addition to the number of disability articles published during this time period, other content areas such as authorship and institutional contributors; methodology, location, and application settings; target populations and sample characteristics; type of disabilities; and topics of interest are identified. Recommendations for counseling scholars to increase the scope of research on disability are provided. Este análisis de contenido proporciona una visión general de los artículos sobre discapacidad publicados en 10 revistas principales de la Asociación Americana de Consejería (American Counseling Association) entre 2003 y 2013. Además del número de artículos sobre discapacidad publicados durante este periodo, se identifican otras áreas de contenidos, como la autoría y contribuidores institucionales, la metodología, ubicación y lugares de aplicación, las poblaciones observadas y características de los grupos de muestra, los tipos de discapacidad, y los temas de interés. Se proporcionan recomendaciones para que los expertos académicos en consejería puedan ampliar el alcance de las investigaciones sobre discapacidad.     

Against Perceptual Conceptualism

This paper is concerned with the question of whether mature human experience is thoroughly conceptual, or whether it involves non-conceptual elements or layers. It has two central goals. The first goal is methodological. It aims to establish that that question is, to a large extent, an empirical question. The question cannot be answered by appealing to purely a priori and transcendental considerations. The second goal is to argue, inter alia by relying on empirical findings, that the view known as ‘state-conceptualism’ is false. We will argue that our experiences do involve non-conceptual elements. That is, a subject may enjoy an experience with a particular phenomenal aspect, without possessing the concept needed for the specification of the content of that aspect, and moreover, without being able to acquire that concept upon having that experience.     

Norms of judgement,naturalism, and normativism about content

David Papineau [1999. “Normativity and Judgement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (Sup. Vol.): 16–43.] argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates.     

Against the Additive View of Imagination

According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra-sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The view promises to give a simple and intuitive explanation of some puzzling features of imagination, and, further, to illuminate imagination's relation to modal knowledge. I contend that the additive view does not fulfil these two promises. The explanation of how images come to be determinate is redundant: the content constituting the indeterminate mental images on which the view relies is sufficient to deliver determinate images too, so the extra resources offered by the view are not required. When applied to modal epistemology, the view either delivers implausible results or offers no distinctive insight. Since the view is sold on its explanatory merits, and since these are dubious, the additive view should be rejected.     

A Content Analysis of the Offender Population in Counseling Journals

We discuss the findings of an exploratory content analysis related to the offender population by examining literature from 2008 to 2018 in 23 American Counseling Association (ACA) and ACA‐affiliated counseling journals. The findings and implications of the analysis are discussed.     

傅斯年的心理学探索及其贡献

傅斯年是被忽视的近代中国心理学人, 他与心理学渊源极深, 不仅是近代科学心理学思想的学习者、传播者, 也是科学心理学思想的践行者。傅斯年学习心理学前后共12年, 写有《心理分析导引》专著一部, 最早翻译麦独孤的《群体心理学》, 另有《性命古训辩证》等哲学著作和多篇文章阐述其心理学观点。傅斯年认为中国近代学术包括心理学研究必然走向科学化, 做出“科学化的东方学之正统在中国”的基本判断, 将“有群众无社会的无秩序取向” “心中无主义的心气薄弱性” “万恶之源的家庭教育”作为当时民众心理发展的三大障碍, 并倡导民众确定一个健康的、即物穷理的、积极努力和纪律约束并存的人性观。傅斯年参与了“中研院”心理研究所、中山大学和台湾大学心理系的创建, 与蔡元培、汪敬熙、唐钺、苏芗雨等心理学人关系密切, 共同推动了科学心理学在中国的传播和早期中国心理学学科建设, 其一生中存在一条选择心理学, 学习心理学, 离开心理学又助推心理学和运用心理学的心灵探索之路。