Systems Theory and Family Therapy: From a Critique on Systems Theory to a Theory on System Change

Some system therapists reject the systemic view for various reasons, often related to violence, victimisation and power. This critique is based on an outdated narrow and incomplete knowledge of linear systems theory. A better understanding of these linear systems theories and of systems levels of organisation already answers much of the critique, but does not explain change. For the latter, a theory of how systems change is necessary for systems therapy in general and family therapy in particular. Modern dynamic systems and chaos theory are most useful to understand change, chaos, history, unpredictability and flexibility.     

MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract. Scholars in religious studies, or "religionists," often mischaracterize the social-scientific study of religion. They assume that a social-scientific analysis of the origin, function, meaning, or truth of religion either opposes or disregards the believer's analysis, which religionists profess to present and defend. I do not argue that the social sciences analyze religion from the believer's point of view. I argue instead that a social scientific analysis is more akin and germane to the believer's point of view than religionists assume. I single out seven mischaracterizations of the social sciences typically held by religionists.     

Some properties of two measures of multivariate association

Two kinds of measures of multivariate association, based on Wilks' and the Bartlett-Nanda-Pillai trace criterionV, respectively, are compared in terms of properties of the univariateR ² which they generalize. A unified set of derivations of the properties is provided which are self-contained and not restricted to decompositions in canonical variates. One conclusion is that asymmetric index based on allows generalization of the multiplicative decomposition ofR ² in terms of squared partial correlations, but not the additive decomposition in terms of squared semipartial correlations, while the reverse is true for anasymmetric index based onV.We are indebted to Jos M. F. ten Berge for some fruitful discussions.     

应重视对马克思主义人生观的理论研究

马克思主义的人生观和世界观在马克思主义的历史唯物主义中是统一的。历史唯物主义明确反对从“抽象的人”、“人的当下存在”出发理解人生的有关问题,但这并不一定意味着坚持历史唯物论就要排斥从个体生命的视角研究人生的问题。我们的马克思主义理论研究和建设工作,应重视对马克思主义人生观理论的发掘和整理,为社会主义精神文明建设和和谐社会的构建作出贡献。     

深入研究马克思主义宗教观

当今世界,宗教在国际国内社会的影响力日益上升,正确认识和对待宗教问题,比以往任何时候都更加重要和紧迫。马克思主义宗教观是建立在现代自然科学、社会科学和思维科学基础之上的科学宗教观,是我们观察宗教问题的锐利思想武器、开展宗教工作的根本指导思想、搞好宗教研究的基本科学方法。当前,我们必须全面、深刻地理解马克思主义宗教观的精神实质,把握其历史唯物的基本原则、科学辩证的基本方法和与时俱进的理论品质,积极推进马克思主义宗教观中国化、时代化、大众化。     

依恋关系的形成：保护情境中母亲和婴儿的作用

母婴依恋是婴儿期形成的首要关系之一, 同时也是影响儿童早期社会化的关系性背景。以亲子互动中形成依恋安全感差异的相关研究为基础, 从特质观、领域特殊观和社会认知观的角度对它们进行梳理, 有助于提炼出母亲的敏感性、特定的互动情境以及儿童的社会预期分别在预测母婴依恋关系中的作用。3种研究取向的整合有赖于细致地区分特质观和社会认知观在看待亲子互动中双方情绪状态、认知能力和回应过程上的差别; 制定新的依恋干预方案应当以提高父母识别和应对婴儿消极情绪的能力, 以及为婴儿提供适当的依随性学习经验为目的。     

Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Abstract

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false.     

From women to objects: Appearance focus, target gender, and perceptions of warmth, morality and competence

Most literally, objectification refers to perceiving a person as an object, and consequently, less than fully human. Research on perceptions of humanness and the stereotype content model suggests that humanness is linked to perceptions of warmth, morality and competence. Merging these insights with objectification theory, we hypothesized that focusing on a woman's, but not a man's, appearance should induce objectification, and thus reduce perceptions of these characteristics. In three studies, females, but not males, were perceived as less competent (Studies 2 and 3) and less warm and moral (Studies 1, 2 and 3) when participants were instructed to focus on their appearance. These findings support our position and help rule out stereotype activation as an alternative explanation to dehumanization. Further, they generalized to targets of different races, familiarity, physical attractiveness and occupational status. Implications for gender inequity and the perpetuation of objectification of women are discussed.     

刻板印象内容模型：理论假设及研究

介绍了刻板印象内容模型(SCM)的来源、理论假设和在美国与欧洲(个人主义文化)、东亚(集体主义文化)样本中的实证研究。SCM假设:(1)用热情和能力区分不同群体的刻板印象;(2)对外群体的刻板印象是混合的;(3)高社会地位群体被刻板为具有高能力,竞争性群体被刻板为缺乏热情;(4)刻板印象中存在参照群体偏好和外群体贬抑。在比较和评价SCM与其他理论的基础上,提出了刻板印象内容研究进一步细化和扩展的方向     

Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.