Generalization and maintenance of the reduction of self-injurious behavior maintained by two types of reinforcement

The self-injurious forehead-gouging behavior that had resulted in blindness for a profoundly retarded 27-yr-old male was successfully treated using a combination of differential reinforcement of incompatible behavior during unstructured situations and prevention of escape during compliance situations. After self-injurious behavior was reduced to a low frequency, a reduction of his daily dose of chloral hydrate was accompanied by a large increase in self-injury, but the behavior gradually returned to its previous low level. A large increase in self-injury also occurred following transfer to another living unit, but the behavior again decreased to a low frequency. Treatment gains were maintained following transfer to another residential facility with follow-up observations occurring at 1, 2, 8, 15, 22, 27 and 35 months. The multiple determination of self-injurious behavior in this one S highlights the behavioral complexity of some of these behaviors.     

Physiological and psychological effects of acute intentional hyperventilation

Research is reviewed which suggests that hyperventilation syndrome is an underdiagnosed disorder for the presentation of many patients experiencing apparent anxiety states. In a test of this hypothesis, 21 normal individuals (9 female) underwent a 2 min period of intentional hyperventilation following a 10 min baseline phase. Hyperventilation was accompanied by increased subjective anxiety and tachycardia, and indications of peripheral vasoconstriction. Following hyperventilation, Ss experienced increased levels of state anxiety and perceived autonomic arousal, as indexed by self-report instruments. These results support the hypothesis that undiagnosed hyperventilatory phenomena may be etiologically implicated in states of pathologic anxiety.     

Spatial knowledge in a young blind child

A set of eight experiments demonstrate spatial knowledge in a 2-year-old congenitally blind child and sighted blindfolded controls. Once the blind child had traveled along specific paths between objects in a novel array, she was able to make spatial inferences, finding new routes between those objects (Experiment 1). She could also do so when the routes were between places in space, not occupied by objects (Experiment II). Deviations from precisely straight routes in Experiments I and II were not due to faulty inferences, but probably came from imprecise motor control, since the same deviations occured when inferences were not required—when the child moved to a place designated by a sound source (Experiment III). This child's performances could not be accounted for by artifactual explanations: sound cues, experimenter bias, and echolocation were ruled out (Experiments IV, V, VI). Further, sighted blindfolded controls performed at roughly the same level (Experiment VII). Finally, Experiment VIII shows that the blind child could access her spatial knowledge for use in a simple map-reading task. We conclude that the young blind child has a system of spatial knowledge, including abstract, amodal rules     

Integration of melody and text in memory for songs

Two experiments examined whether the memory representation for songs consists of independent or integrated components (melody and text). Subjects heard a serial presentation of excerpts from largely unfamiliar folksongs, followed by a recognition test. The test required subjects to recognize songs, melodies, or texts and consisted of five types of items: (a) exact songs heard in the presentation; (b) new songs; (c) old tunes with new words; (d) new tunes with old words; and (e) old tunes with old words of a different song from the same presentation (‘mismatch songs’). Experiment 1 supported the integration hypothesis: Subjects' recognition of components was higher in exact songs (a) than in songs with familiar but mismatched components (e). Melody recognition, in particular, was near chance unless the original words were present. Experiment 2 showed that this integration of melody and text occurred also across different performance renditions of a song and that it could not be eliminated by voluntary attention to the melody.     

Infant sensitivity to figural coherence in biomechanical motions

Two experiments assessed infant sensitivity to figural coherence in point-light displays moving as if attached to the major joints of a walking person. Experiment 1 tested whether 3- and 5-month-old infants could discriminate between upright and inverted versions of the walker in both moving and static displays. Using an infant-control habituation paradigm, it was found that both ages discriminated the moving but not the static displays. Experiment 2 was designed to clarify whether or not structural invariants were extracted from these displays. The results revealed that (1) moving point-light displays with equivalent motions but different topographic relations were discriminated while (2) static versions were not, and (3) arrays that varied in the amount of motion present in different portions of the display were also not discriminated. These results are interpreted as indicating that young infants are sensitive to figural coherence in displays of biomechanical motion.     

Trading relations in the perception of speech by 5-year-old children

Five-year-old children were tested for perceptual trading relations between a temporal cue (silence duration) and a spectral cue (F₁ onset frequency) for the “say-stay” distinction. Identification functions were obtained for two synthetic “say-stay” continua, each containing systematic variations in the amount of silence following the /s/ noise. In one continuum, the vocalic portion had a lower F₁ onset than in the other continuum. Children showed a smaller trading relation than has been found with adults. They did not differ from adults, however, in their perception of an “ay-day” continuum formed by varying F₁ onset frequency only. The results of a discrimination task in which the two acoustic cues were made to “cooperate” or “conflict” phonetically supported the notion of perceptual equivalence of the temporal and spectral cues along a single phonetic dimension. The results indicate that young children, like adults, perceptually integrate multiple cues to a speech contrast in a phonetically relevant manner, but that they may not give the same perceptual weights to the various cues as do adults.     

A comparison of monocular and binocular depth perception in 5- and 7-month-old infants

Monocular depth perception was compared with binocular depth perception in 5- and 7-month-old infants. Reaching was used as the dependent measure. Two objects, identical except in size, were presented simultaneously to each infant. The smaller object was within reach for the infants while the larger object was just beyond reach. The two objects subtended equal visual angles from the infants' observation point. With binocular presentation, 96% of the 7-month-olds' reaches and 89% of the 5-month-olds' reaches were for the nearer object. With monocular presentation, 58% of the 7-month-olds' reaches and 65% of the 5-month-olds' reaches were for the nearer object. The reaching preferences observed in the monocular condition indicated sensitivity to monocular depth information (motion parallax, accommodation, and relative size information were available). Binocular viewing, however, resulted in a far more consistent tendency to reach for the nearer object. This result suggests that the infants' perception of the objects' distances was more veridical in the binocular condition than in the monocular condition.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.