Misprojection of landmarks onto the spatial map

It has been suggested that neglect patients misrepresent the metric spatial relations along the horizontal axis (anisometry). The "fabric" of their internal spatial medium would be distorted in such a way that physically equal distances appear relatively shorter on the contralesional side (canonical anisometry). The case of GL, a 76-year-old lady with left neglect on visual search tasks, is presented. GL showed severe relative overestimation on the left (contralesional) side on two independent tasks evaluating the metrics of her internal representation. A qualitatively similar pattern was found in two out of 10 other neglect patients who performed the second task. This behavior cannot be accounted for by the canonical anisometry hypothesis. Nevertheless, GL produced a relative left overextension (underestimation) when trying to set the endpoints of a virtual line given its midpoint (Endpoints Task). An interpretation of these results is offered in terms of a misprojection of relevant landmarks onto the internal representation without assuming distortion of its "fabric."     

No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness

A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.     

Recasting Gendered Paradigms: An Indonesian Cleric and Muslim Women in the Malay World

This essay examines the ideas of a prominent Indonesian cleric, Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka), about the place of women in Islam and in Southeast Asian Muslim societies. I argue that Hamka was engaged in the project of “recasting gendered paradigms,” which involves reinterpreting, reconceptualizing and reconfiguring various dominant understandings about the roles, functions and responsibilities of women in Islam as reflected not only in the Qur'an and the adat (traditional customs), but also in modern discourses about women's empowerment. I show that Hamka's commitment to advocating for women's rights and critiquing prevailing ideas about the place of women in religion and society was a product both of his personal experiences and of the profound social and intellectual shifts that characterized his day and age.     

Conceptual Organization of Self-representation: A Self-similarity Heuristic for Novel Person Representations

Implicit measures have revealed that cognitive representations of familiar individuals share associations with self-concept; however, this has yet to be established for novel individuals. We examined how self-similarity affects representation of information learned about new individuals. A novel version of the implicit association test (IAT), the self-similarity IAT, was developed to estimate the extent to which cognitive representations of new self-similar and self-dissimilar individuals are associated with self-representation. Categorization was faster when the self-similar individual was paired with self, not only for trait words related to the novel individuals, but also for unrelated demographic information pertaining only to self. This provides the first evidence using an implicit task that self-similarity may act as a heuristic for creating representations of new individuals.     

Both sides of the story: explaining events in a narrative

Our experience of narrative has an internal and an external aspect--the content of the narrative’s representations, and its intentional, communicative aetiology. The interaction of these two things is crucial to understanding how narrative works. I begin by laying out what I think we can reasonably expect from a narrative by way of causal information, and how causality interacts with other attributes we think of as central to narrative. At a certain point this discussion will strike a problem: our judgements about what is a relevant possibility within the narrative’s story depend on our judgements of probability; but these latter judgements depend, in turn, on factors external to the world of the story, and cannot be explained in terms of causal relations available within the story. We need the external, author-centred perspective at this point. These different perspectives, the internal and the external, correspond to different types of explanations we may give of events in a story; I call these internal and external explanations. I show how these different explanations are made use of in two contrasting arthistorical projects. I use these examples as the basis for a generalisation about the structure of the two explanatory forms. Finally, I suggest some ways in which explanations of these two kinds relate to one another, and to our thinking when we are engaged by a narrative.

Developing PFC representations using reinforcement learning

From both functional and biological considerations, it is widely believed that action production, planning, and goal-oriented behaviors supported by the frontal cortex are organized hierarchically [Fuster (1991); Koechlin, E., Ody, C., & Kouneiher, F. (2003). Neuroscience: The architecture of cognitive control in the human prefrontal cortex. Science, 424, 1181-1184; Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt]. However, the nature of the different levels of the hierarchy remains unclear, and little attention has been paid to the origins of such a hierarchy. We address these issues through biologically-inspired computational models that develop representations through reinforcement learning. We explore several different factors in these models that might plausibly give rise to a hierarchical organization of representations within the PFC, including an initial connectivity hierarchy within PFC, a hierarchical set of connections between PFC and subcortical structures controlling it, and differential synaptic plasticity schedules. Simulation results indicate that architectural constraints contribute to the segregation of different types of representations, and that this segregation facilitates learning. These findings are consistent with the idea that there is a functional hierarchy in PFC, as captured in our earlier computational models of PFC function and a growing body of empirical data.     

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing.     

The effect of psychological distance on perceptual level of construal

Three studies examined the effect of primed psychological distance on level of perceptual construal, using Navon's paradigm of composite letters (global letters that are made of local letters). Relative to a control group, thinking of the more distant future (Study 1), about more distant spatial locations (Study 2), and about more distant social relations (Study 3) facilitated perception of global letters relative to local letters. Proximal times, spatial locations, and social relations had the opposite effect. The results are discussed within the framework of Construal Level Theory of psychological distance ( Liberman & Trope, 2008 ; Trope & Liberman, 2003 ).     

Wittgenstein and not-just-in-the-head cognition

Wittgenstein's later writings criticize the idea that the mind is an intrinsically representational device. More or less clearly apprehending certain limitations of identifying all aspects of cognition with ‘internal representation’, certain theorists in a variety of disciplines have mostly independently reached similar conclusions, which are reflected in notions like ‘distributed,’ ‘extended,’ and ‘situated’ cognition. We explore the variety of purposes for which these terms have been introduced into psychological theorizing and relate these to Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology.     

Attunement in the Modern Age

This contribution starts from Max Scheler’s claim that modern philosophy holds two differing views on feelings. The first view, which Scheler attributes to René Descartes, presents them in their intentional role but rejects their independence; the other view, which Scheler attributes to Immanuel Kant, holds that they cannot be reduced to the rational part of the soul and thus affirms their independence, but deprives them of all cognitive powers. After considering both views, I discuss the views of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Husserl takes an ambivalent approach to attunement, which opens the possibility of understanding Martin Heidegger’s thought of fundamental attunement.