Neurogenetic approaches to habituation and dishabituation in Drosophila

We review work in the major model systems for habituation in Drosophila melanogaster, encompassing several sensory modalities and behavioral contexts: visual (giant fiber escape response, landing response); chemical (proboscis extension reflex, olfactory jump response, locomotory startle response, odor-induced leg response, experience-dependent courtship modification); electric (shock avoidance); and mechanical (leg resistance reflex, cleaning reflex). Each model system shows several of Thompson and Spencer’s [Thompson, R. F., & Spencer, W. A. (1966). Habituation: A model phenomenon for the study of neuronal substrates of behavior. Psychological Review, 73, 16–43] parametric criteria for habituation: spontaneous recovery and dishabituation have been described in almost all of them and dependence of habituation upon stimulus frequency and stimulus intensity in the majority. Stimulus generalization (and conversely, the delineation of stimulus specificity) has given insights into the localization of habituation or the neural architecture underlying sensory processing.The strength of Drosophila for studying habituation is the range of genetic approaches available. Mutations have been used to modify specific neuroanatomical structures, ion channels, elements of synaptic transmission, and second-messenger pathways. rutabaga and dunce, genes of the cAMP signal pathway that have been studied most often in the reviewed experiments, have also been implicated in synaptic plasticity and associative conditioning in Drosophila and other species including mammals. The use of the Gal4/UAS system for targeting gene expression has enabled genetic perturbation of defined sets of neurons. One clear lesson is that a gene may affect habituation differently in different behaviors, depending on the expression, processing, and localization of the gene product in specific circuits. Mutations of specific genes not only provide links between physiology and behavior in the same circuit, but also reveal common mechanisms in different paradigms of behavioral plasticity. The rich repertoire of models for habituation in the fly is an asset for combining a genetic approach with behavioral, anatomical and physiological methods with the promise of a more complete understanding.     

Facilitation of learning of a simultaneous discrimination between rotated patterns by bumblebees

The failure to discriminate between a pattern consisting of four orthogonal bars and the same pattern rotated by 45° has been interpreted in the literature as evidence against pictorial representations in honeybees. This study determines whether prior training can facilitate the discrimination. In Experiment 1, one group of bumblebees was trained with a rewarding spiral pattern (S+) vs. its unrewarding 45° rotation (S−). A second group was trained with two different patterns, the spiral (S+) and the chevron (S−). Both groups were then tested with the spiral and its rotation, both of which were unrewarding. The first group failed in the discrimination while the second succeeded. The same was true when the training period was defined by choice frequency instead of time (Experiment 2). The facilitation due to prior experience was pattern specific (Experiments 3 and 4). These results show perceptual learning in bumblebees and weaken the case against pictorial representations.     

Intentionality,Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis

Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.

How Can Experts See the Invisible? Reply to Bilalić and Gobet

Experts in all fields are able to see what is invisible to others. Experts are also able to see what is visible to all—and this is explored by Bilalić and Gobet. We question the method of normalizing all subjects in an experimental condition, and asking experts to behave as if they were novices. We claim that method leads Bilalić and Gobet to a nonsequitur .     

Changing Structures in Midstream: Learning Along the Statistical Garden Path

Previous studies of auditory statistical learning have typically presented learners with sequential structural information that is uniformly distributed across the entire exposure corpus. Here we present learners with nonuniform distributions of structural information by altering the organization of trisyllabic nonsense words at midstream. When this structural change was unmarked by low-level acoustic cues, or even when cued by a pitch change, only the first of the two structures was learned. However, both structures were learned when there was an explicit cue to the midstream change or when exposure to the second structure was tripled in duration. These results demonstrate that successful extraction of the structure in an auditory statistical learning task reduces the ability to learn subsequent structures, unless the presence of two structures is marked explicitly or the exposure to the second is quite lengthy. The mechanisms by which learners detect and use changes in distributional information to maintain sensitivity to multiple structures are discussed from both behavioral and computational perspectives.     

Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations

To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for in purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend on optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content.     

Creationism in Twentieth-Century America

Creationism in Twentieth Century America: A Ten-Volume Anthology of Documents, 1903–1961 Gen ed. Ronald L. Numbers     

Does Every Good Behaviorist Deserve Favor? A Reply to Neil Jacobson

This is a response to Dr. NeilJacobson's article, An Outsider's Perspective on Psychotherapy Integration, which appears in this issue. It addresses the issue of the differences between eclecticism and psychotherapy integration as well as the possible advantages integration holds over a one-model therapy system. This article suggests that virtually all psychotherapy systems operate under an integrated three paradigm model, and offers some concrete examples of this explanation. It also suggests that the use of psychotherapy integration may lead to a better paradigm match between client and therapist, and ultimately to better outcome. This article concludes that psychotherapy integration possibly offers the best alternative in terms of reducing the biases of one's underlying treatment oaradiem.     

Challenging the importance of vision for the development of an extrinsic spatial framework: evidence from the blind and sighted

Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its computational credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation-no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the "conventional" account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks are not genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks.     

Adaptation in Modern Times

Since the beginning of Christian mission, adaptation to local cultures (later called acculturation or inculturation) has been the main factor in mission failure or success. Placide Tempels is considered a pioneer of adaptation in modern times. He was a Flemish Franciscan missionary in Congo from 1933 to 1962 (with two breaks) and is well known for his adaptation to the Bantu worldview. Referring to spiritual and intellectual adaptation, the paper will answer the following questions: Was the adaptation of Placide Tempels successful? If it was or was not, why and in what way? The analysis will be linked to William Biernatzki's theory of root paradigms and meanings. To conclude, a connection will be made to the process of adaptation in international mission organizations today.