Operation-specific encoding in single-digit arithmetic

Solving simple arithmetic problems involves three stages: encoding the problem, retrieving or calculating the answer, and reporting the answer. This study compared the event-related potentials elicited by single-digit addition and multiplication problems to examine the relationship between encoding and retrieval/calculation stages. Results showed that the operation effect appeared as early as the encoding of the first operand and continued to the retrieval/calculation stage: compared to addition, multiplication elicited larger negative potentials in the left anterior electrodes and larger positive potentials in the right posterior electrodes. The consistency of this operation effect across the first two stages of arithmetic processing suggests that encoding of arithmetic problems can be modulated by the nature of representation of the to-be-retrieved arithmetic facts, and thus these two stages are additive rather than interactive.     

Modality switching costs emerge in concept creation as well as retrieval

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation.     

Children's Representation and Imitation of Events: How Goal Organization Influences 3‐Year‐Old Children's Memory for Action Sequences

Children's imitation of adults plays a prominent role in human cognitive development. However, few studies have investigated how children represent the complex structure of observed actions which underlies their imitation. We integrate theories of action segmentation, memory, and imitation to investigate whether children's event representation is organized according to veridical serial order or a higher level goal structure. Children were randomly assigned to learn novel event sequences either through interactive hands‐on experience (Study 1) or via storybook (Study 2). Results demonstrate that children's representation of observed actions is organized according to higher level goals, even at the cost of representing the veridical temporal ordering of the sequence. We argue that prioritizing goal structure enhances event memory, and that this mental organization is a key mechanism of social‐cognitive development in real‐world, dynamic environments. It supports cultural learning and imitation in ecologically valid settings when social agents are multitasking and not demonstrating one isolated goal at a time.     

错误记忆的可植入性

错误记忆具有可植入性。植入性错误记忆常常与真实记忆发生混淆, 成为个体经验的一部分, 进而影响人们的思想、态度和行为。植入错误记忆的范式主要有错误反馈技术、想象膨胀、照片修改范式以及盛情-欺骗范式。研究表明, 植入性错误记忆发生在饮食、消费以及攻击行为等活动中。植入性错误记忆与真实记忆的辨别主要包括结果、情绪、持续性以及生理机制四个方面。植入性错误记忆的解释主要有联结观和多阶段模型。目前研究存在许多问题, 包括要求特征、认知反应、范式选取以及实验伦理等。未来研究需要对植入错误记忆方法的有效性、个体特征与错误记忆植入的匹配、植入性错误记忆行为结果的测量以及实际应用等进行探讨。     

Understanding dynamic and static displays: using images to reason dynamically

We examined expert meteorologists as they created a weather forecast while working in a naturalistic environment. We examined the type of external representation they chose to examine (a static image, a sequence of static images, or a dynamic display) and the kind of information they extracted from those representations (static or dynamic). We found that even though weather is an extremely dynamic domain, expert meteorologists examined very few animations, examining primarily static images. However, meteorologists did extract large amounts of dynamic information from these static images, suggesting that they reasoned about the weather by mentally animating the static images rather than letting the software do it for them.     

Using deferred imitation to understand the process of change in infant memory development

In their commentaries, Carver, Richmond and DeBoer pose several challenging and insightful questions in response to our target article. Two key themes emerged from their commentaries, which are important in the field of infant memory research. The first concerns the use of deferred imitation as a paradigm, and its relationship to other methods of assessing infant cognition. The second concerns understanding the process of change observed in infant memory. How do maturation and experience interact to produce developmental change, and what theories can best account for changes in representational flexibility in early infancy? We will address each area and the implications these questions have for the direction of future research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Historical change, cultural learning, and cognitive representation in Zinacantec Maya children

Against the background of an unchanging sequence of representational development, we demonstrate that implicit processes of learning and cognition can change from one historical period to another. One generation of Zinacantec Maya children was studied in 1969 and 1970, the next generation in 1991 and 1993. In the intervening two decades, the community, located in Chiapas, Mexico, was involved in a transition from an economy based primarily on subsistence and agriculture to an economy based primarily on money and commerce. A naturalistic study of weaving apprenticeship and an experimental study of visual representation showed that the ecological transition was linked to greater emphasis on independent cultural learning, abstract representation, and innovation, and, correlatively, a movement away from scaffolded guidance, detail-oriented representation, and imitative representational strategies. These changes constituted automatic adaptations with an implicit nature. In addition, historical variability in implicit modes of cultural apprenticeship predicted shifts in implicit processes of child and adolescent cognition. In sum, socialization and development are not fixed but adapt, in a coordinated way, to changing ecological conditions.